{"title":"Monopsony in the US Labor Market","authors":"Chen Yeh, Claudia Macaluso, Brad J. Hershbein","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200025","url":null,"abstract":"This paper quantifies employer market power in US manufacturing and how it has changed over time. Using administrative data, we estimate plant-level markdowns—the ratio between a plant’s marginal revenue product of labor and its wage. We find most manufacturing plants operate in a monopsonistic environment, with an average markdown of 1.53, implying a worker earning only 65 cents on the marginal dollar generated. To investigate long-term trends for the entire sector, we propose a novel, theoretically grounded measure for the aggregate markdown. We find that it decreased between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, but has been sharply increasing since. (JEL J24, J31, J38, J42, L13, L60)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85588207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
American Economic ReviewPub Date : 2022-07-01Epub Date: 2022-06-13DOI: 10.1007/s00359-022-01555-0
Hermann Wagner, Ina Pappe, Sandra Brill, Hans-Ortwin Nalbach
{"title":"Development of the horizontal optocollic reflex in juvenile barn owls (Tyto furcata pratincola).","authors":"Hermann Wagner, Ina Pappe, Sandra Brill, Hans-Ortwin Nalbach","doi":"10.1007/s00359-022-01555-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s00359-022-01555-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Adult barn owls and primates possess an almost symmetric monocular rotational horizontal optocollic reflex. In primates, the reflex is initially asymmetric and becomes symmetric with time after birth. The condition in barn owls has not been studied so far. Here, we present data on the development of this reflex in this bird. We tested juvenile barn owls from the time before they open their eyes after hatching to the time they reach adult feather length. Wide-field visual patterns served as stimuli. They were presented at different rotational speeds in binocular and monocular settings. The binocular horizontal optocollic responses of juvenile barn owls were symmetric and adult-like on the first day that the birds responded to the stimulus. The monocular responses showed different rates of development in respect to stimulus velocity and stimulus direction. For velocities up to 20 deg/s, the monocular reflex was also adult-like on the first day that the birds responded to the stimulus. An initially higher asymmetry for 30 deg/s compared to adults disappeared within about two weeks. The development at even higher velocities remained unclear.</p>","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"103 1","pages":"479-492"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9250920/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88252239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spreading Gangs: Exporting US Criminal Capital to El Salvador","authors":"María Micaela Sviatschi","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201540","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows how deportation policies can backfire by disseminating not only ideas between countries but also criminal networks, spreading gangs, in this case, across El Salvador, and spurring migration back to the United States. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs developed in Los Angeles were sent back to El Salvador. Using variation in criminal deportations over time and across cohorts, combined with geographical variation in US gangs’ location, I find that these deportations led to an increase in homicide rates and gang activity, as well as an increase in gang recruitment and migration of children. (JEL J15, J18, K37, K42, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74727971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Design-Based Research in Empirical Microeconomics","authors":"David Card","doi":"10.1257/aer.112.6.1773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.112.6.1773","url":null,"abstract":"I briefly review the emergence of “ design-based” research methods in labor economics in the 1980s and early 1990s. These methods were seen as a partial solution to the problems of credible inference identified by Ashenfelter (1974), Leamer (1978), Hendry (1980), and others. Designed-based studies typically use a simplified one-equation model of the outcome of interest—in contrast to model-based studies that specify a data generating process for all factors determining the outcome. I discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the design-based approach and the value of such research in the field. (JEL C20, J01, J24, J31, J38, J51, J53)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73066056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bargaining with Mechanisms","authors":"Marcin Peski","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210626","url":null,"abstract":"Two players bargain over a single indivisible good and a transfer, with one-sided incomplete information about preferences. Both players can offer arbitrary mechanisms to determine the allocation. We show that there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. In the equilibrium, one of the players proposes a menu that is optimal for the uninformed player among all menus, such that each type of the informed player receives at least her payoff under complete information. The optimal menu can be implemented with at most three allocations. Under a natural assumption on the uninformed player’s beliefs, the optimal menu coincides with the Myerson’s neutral solution to the bargaining problem in this environment. (JEL C78, D82, D83)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"107 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89972085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Concentration Thresholds for Horizontal Mergers","authors":"Volker Nocke, M. Whinston","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201038","url":null,"abstract":"Concentration-based thresholds for horizontal mergers, such as those in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, play a central role in merger analysis but their basis remains unclear. We show that there is both a theoretical and an empirical basis for focusing solely on the change in concentration, and ignoring its level, in screening mergers for whether their unilateral price effects will harm consumers. We also argue that current threshold levels likely are too lax, unless one expects efficiency gains of 5 percent or greater, or other factors such as entry and product repositioning to significantly constrain the exercise of market power postmerger. (JEL D43, G34, G38, K21, L13, L41)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72806692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem","authors":"P. Reny","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210240","url":null,"abstract":"Stable matchings in school choice needn’t be Pareto efficient and can leave thousands of students worse off than necessary. Call a matching μ priority-neutral if no matching can make any student whose priority is violated by μ better off without violating the priority of some student who is made worse off. Call a matching priority-efficient if it is priority-neutral and Pareto efficient. We show that there is a unique priority-efficient matching and that it dominates every priority-neutral matching and every stable matching. Moreover, truth-telling is a maxmin optimal strategy for every student in the mechanism that selects the priority-efficient matching. (JEL C78, I21, I28)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88825865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fatih Guvenen, R. Mataloni, Dylan G. Rassier, Kim J. Ruhl
{"title":"Offshore Profit Shifting and Aggregate Measurement: Balance of Payments, Foreign Investment, Productivity, and the Labor Share","authors":"Fatih Guvenen, R. Mataloni, Dylan G. Rassier, Kim J. Ruhl","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190285","url":null,"abstract":"We show how offshore profit shifting by US multinational enterprises affects several key measures of the US economy. Profits shifted out of the United States grew rapidly from the mid-1990s to 2010 and have since waned. From 1982–2016, on average, 38 percent of income attributed to US direct investment abroad is reattributable to the United States. We find that adjusting for profit shifting shrinks the trade deficit, decreases the return on US foreign direct investment abroad, boosts productivity growth rates in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and lowers labor’s share of income. (JEL E23, E25, F14, F23, H25, H87, L25)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90659603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dividend Taxes and the Allocation of Capital","authors":"Charles Boissel, Adrien Matray","doi":"10.3386/w30099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w30099","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the 2013 threefold increase in the French dividend tax rate. Using administrative data covering the universe of firms from 2008 to 2017 and a quasi-experimental setting, we find that firms swiftly cut dividend payments and used this tax-induced increase in liquidity to invest more. Heterogeneity analyses show that firms with high demand and returns on capital responded most while no group of firms cut their investment. Our results reject models in which higher dividend taxes increase the cost of capital and show that the tax-induced increase in liquidity relaxes credit constraints, which can reduce capital misallocation. (JEL D22, G31, G35, H25, H32)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73271429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis","authors":"Yunmi Kong, I. Perrigne, Q. Vuong","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200864","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we conduct a structural analysis of multi-attribute auctions of contracts with a general allocation rule when private information is multidimensional. Upon modeling bidders’ contract value that accounts for their endogenous ex post actions, we nonparametrically identify bidders’ private information from their bids and estimate their joint distribution. Analyzing cash-royalty auctions of Louisiana oil leases, we find government revenue worse and development rates no better than in a cash auction with a fixed royalty in view of adverse selection and moral hazard. Our findings revise conventional wisdom on the optimality of multi-attribute auctions. (JEL D44, D82, D86, H82, Q35)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84383908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}