择校问题中的有效匹配

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20210240

P. Reny

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引用次数: 8

摘要

学校选择中的稳定匹配不一定是帕累托有效的，可能会让成千上万的学生陷入不必要的困境。如果没有匹配可以使任何优先级被μ违反的学生的优先级更好，而不会违反某些优先级更差的学生的优先级，则调用匹配μ优先级中立。如果匹配的优先级中立且帕累托有效，则称其为优先级高效。我们证明了存在唯一的优先级高效匹配，并且它支配着所有优先级中立匹配和所有稳定匹配。此外，在选择优先级有效匹配的机制中，讲真话是每个学生的最大最优策略。(jel c78, i21, i28)

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Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem

Stable matchings in school choice needn’t be Pareto efficient and can leave thousands of students worse off than necessary. Call a matching μ priority-neutral if no matching can make any student whose priority is violated by μ better off without violating the priority of some student who is made worse off. Call a matching priority-efficient if it is priority-neutral and Pareto efficient. We show that there is a unique priority-efficient matching and that it dominates every priority-neutral matching and every stable matching. Moreover, truth-telling is a maxmin optimal strategy for every student in the mechanism that selects the priority-efficient matching. (JEL C78, I21, I28)

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.