多维契约拍卖:一个实证分析

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20200864

Yunmi Kong, I. Perrigne, Q. Vuong

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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文对私有信息是多维的情况下具有一般分配规则的契约多属性拍卖进行了结构分析。在建立投标人合同价值模型的基础上，考虑其事后行为，我们从投标人的投标中非参数地识别投标人的私人信息，并估计其联合分布。通过对路易斯安那州石油租赁权的现金权利金拍卖进行分析，我们发现，考虑到逆向选择和道德风险，与固定权利金的现金拍卖相比，政府收入更差，开发速度也并不好。我们的研究结果修订了关于多属性拍卖最优性的传统智慧。(jel d44, d82, d86, h82, q35)

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Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper, we conduct a structural analysis of multi-attribute auctions of contracts with a general allocation rule when private information is multidimensional. Upon modeling bidders’ contract value that accounts for their endogenous ex post actions, we nonparametrically identify bidders’ private information from their bids and estimate their joint distribution. Analyzing cash-royalty auctions of Louisiana oil leases, we find government revenue worse and development rates no better than in a cash auction with a fixed royalty in view of adverse selection and moral hazard. Our findings revise conventional wisdom on the optimality of multi-attribute auctions. (JEL D44, D82, D86, H82, Q35)

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.