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Power, costs, collective action, bargaining, and solidarity 权力、成本、集体行动、谈判和团结
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-02-14 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12953
Arash Abizadeh
{"title":"Power, costs, collective action, bargaining, and solidarity","authors":"Arash Abizadeh","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12953","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some argue that the more costly it would be to exercise one's power over an issue, the less power one inherently has over it. I challenge this thesis with two major objections—one conceptual, the other practical or explanatory—contending that costs influence issue-power not inherently but contingently in specifically strategic contexts. Since agents’ strategic dispositions are partly shaped by their perception of others’ strategic incentives or dispositions, costs may affect—for better or worse!—one's bargaining power (in cases of conflict) or power to act in concert with others (in cases of shared preferences or aims). In many significant political contexts, greater costs increase actors’ social power. Moreover, a group's collective power, and so its members’ power-with, depend not only on the external cost structure, but also on opportunities for forging solidarity. The role of costs and solidarity explains why subjection to others can, paradoxically, sometimes increase one's power.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"441-452"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12953","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A strike for democracy? Migration, the bigot's veto, and the electoral use of force 为民主而罢工？移民，偏执狂的否决，以及选举使用武力
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12949
Shmuel Nili
{"title":"A strike for democracy? Migration, the bigot's veto, and the electoral use of force","authors":"Shmuel Nili","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12949","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Politicians and philosophers alike have warned that the spread of anti-migrant bigotry in the Western world requires a tragic trade-off regarding immigration policy: Although millions of asylum-seekers might be owed admission to Western democracies, there are many cases where they nonetheless ought to be denied entry, because their admission is overly likely to increase the electoral appeal of extreme rightwing figures and parties, thus endangering the host country's liberal democracy. This article scrutinizes this influential view, by juxtaposing electorally driven migration policy with electorally driven military strikes abroad. If turning millions of asylum-seekers away can be tragically appropriate as a means of thwarting the electoral rise of the extreme right, why cannot the same be true for military strikes overseas that might harm a far smaller number of innocent outsiders? I examine what—if anything—explains the difference between these two cases.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"491-502"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12949","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A cause to fight 一个斗争的理由
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12985
Scott F. Abramson, Xiaoyan Qiu
{"title":"A cause to fight","authors":"Scott F. Abramson,&nbsp;Xiaoyan Qiu","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12985","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Why do individuals participate in civil conflict? Materialist explanations have dominated quantitative scholarship on the causes and conduct of civil wars. Yet, a substantial body of qualitative, historical, and ethnographic evidence suggests that nonmaterial, ideological motives contribute to individuals' decision to enter combat and their battlefield performance. We bridge these two perspectives by developing a model of civil war recruitment where potential fighters trade off ideological and material incentives to enlist. More ideologically committed individuals are (i) more willing to sacrifice income to enlist, (ii) more likely to exert greater effort in combat and accordingly are assigned to riskier tasks, and (iii) less responsive to changes in enlistment costs. Using detailed biographical data on members of the British Battalion of the Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, we find support for all three implications. Individuals indeed trade off economic and ideological incentives to participate and perform in conflict.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"522-538"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opposition rule under autocracy: Evidence from Russia 独裁统治下的反对派统治：来自俄罗斯的证据
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12961
David Szakonyi
{"title":"Opposition rule under autocracy: Evidence from Russia","authors":"David Szakonyi","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12961","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does the opposition govern under autocracy? Most authoritarian regimes tolerate some degree of internal opposition, allowing it to contest and even take power. Yet we know little about how such power-sharing dynamics affect governance. In this paper, I exploit a unique instance where an opposition won control of political institutions in a prominent electoral autocracy: the 2017 Moscow municipal elections. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that opposition control of municipal councils reduced the financial returns from office for ruling party deputies. This decrease in earnings comes from opposition-held councils removing rent-seeking opportunities by organizing more competitive procurement, reducing unnecessary budget expenditures, and curbing over-the-top compensation. Using a survey experiment, I then show that voters prefer opposition candidates with municipal governing experience over ruling party ones without it. Even in repressive environments, challenging autocratic rule may be well served by joining rather than boycotting institutions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"587-605"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why masses support democratic backsliding 为什么民众支持民主倒退
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-03-23 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12958
Noam Gidron, Yotam Margalit, Lior Sheffer, Itamar Yakir
{"title":"Why masses support democratic backsliding","authors":"Noam Gidron,&nbsp;Yotam Margalit,&nbsp;Lior Sheffer,&nbsp;Itamar Yakir","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12958","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Concerns over democratic backsliding have proliferated recently, as elected politicians have sought to undermine democratic checks and balances. This study examines the underpinnings of public support for democratic backsliding, delineating five theoretical explanations: personalistic leadership, affective polarization, populism, majoritarianism, and entanglement with the legal system. We test the explanatory power of these accounts within the Israeli context, leveraging panel survey data collected before and after the government announced its plan to curtail the courts. Results indicate that support for the plan is best explained by two forces: prior attachment to the leader heading the backsliding effort and animosity toward partisan opponents. Notably, populist attitudes are not associated with support for the government's plan. The theoretical framework and longitudinal research design help explain who supports democratic backsliding.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"720-737"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Brook no compromise: How to negotiate a united front 不容妥协：如何协商统一战线
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-04-29 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12986
Elaine Yao
{"title":"Brook no compromise: How to negotiate a united front","authors":"Elaine Yao","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12986","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Negotiating factional conflict is crucial to successful coordination: Political parties, rebel alliances, and authoritarian elites must all overcome internal disagreements to survive and achieve collective aims. Actors in these situations sometimes employ hardball tactics to block outcomes they dislike, but at the risk of causing coordination failure. Using a dynamic bargaining model, I explore how the threat and usage of these tactics impact coordination. In the model, two players who prefer different reforms must jointly agree on one to overturn a mutually unfavorable status quo. Neither knows the other's willingness to compromise—whether they prefer the status quo over their less-preferred outcome. Players who are willing to compromise delay hardball, balancing incentives to preempt the opponent against the benefit of waiting to gather more information. Finally, I identify factors that incentivize players to exercise caution, thereby reducing the incidence of avoidable miscoordination, which results when players preemptively rule out possible compromises.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"643-657"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12986","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections 有说服力的游说和关系的价值
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12965
Emiel Awad, Clement Minaudier
{"title":"Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections","authors":"Emiel Awad,&nbsp;Clement Minaudier","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12965","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The inflow of money into politics and the influence of interest groups on policies are well-documented, but the monetary value of accessing policymakers is less well-understood. As a result, it is unclear what inferences researchers can draw from lobbying expenditures about interest groups' strategies and their ideological alignment with policymakers. We study a model of informational lobbying with a collective decision-making body and endogenous reforms to investigate the determinants of the value of access. We show that the funds flowing to a given policymaker depend not only on this policymaker's ideology and procedural power but also on the overall distribution of preferences and power among other policymakers. Two policymakers with the same ideology and procedural power might therefore attract different amounts of contributions, depending on the preferences of fellow policymakers. Our results help clarify empirical research linking lobbying expenditures by interest groups to politicians' ideologies and power.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"539-554"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12965","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring electoral democracy with observables 用观察结果衡量选举民主
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-04-23 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12968
Daniel Weitzel, John Gerring, Daniel Pemstein, Svend-Erik Skaaning
{"title":"Measuring electoral democracy with observables","authors":"Daniel Weitzel,&nbsp;John Gerring,&nbsp;Daniel Pemstein,&nbsp;Svend-Erik Skaaning","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12968","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Most cross-national indices of democracy rely centrally on coder judgments, which are susceptible to bias and error, and require expensive and time-consuming coding by experts. We present an approach to measurement based on observables that aim to preserve the nuanced quality of subjectively coded democracy indices. Our observable-to-subjective score mapping is free of idiosyncratic coder errors arising from misinformation, slack, or biases. It is less susceptible to systematic bias that may arise from coders’ inferences about a country's regime, for example, from the ideology of the ruler. The data collection procedure and mode of analysis are fully transparent and replicable, and the procedure is based on random forests and is cheap to produce, easy to update, and offers coverage for all polities with sovereign or semisovereign status, surpassing the sample of any existing index. We show that this expansive coverage makes a big difference to our understanding of some causal questions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"606-622"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can norm-based information campaigns reduce corruption? 基于规范的信息运动能减少腐败吗？
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-01-05 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12940
Aaron Erlich, Jordan Gans-Morse
{"title":"Can norm-based information campaigns reduce corruption?","authors":"Aaron Erlich,&nbsp;Jordan Gans-Morse","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12940","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Can norm-based information campaigns reduce corruption? Such campaigns use messaging about how people typically behave (descriptive norms) or ought to behave (injunctive norms). Drawing on survey and lab experiments in Ukraine, we unpack and evaluate the distinct effects of these two types of social norms. Four findings emerge: First, injunctive-norm messaging produces consistent but relatively small and temporary effects. These may serve as moderately effective, low-cost anti-corruption tools but are unlikely to inspire large-scale norm transformations. Second, contrary to recent studies, we find no evidence that either type of norm-based messaging “backfires” by inadvertently encouraging corruption. Third, descriptive-norm messages emphasizing corruption's decline produce relatively large and long-lasting effects—but only among subjects who find messages credible. Fourth, both types of norm-based messaging have a substantially larger effect on younger citizens. These findings have broader implications for messaging campaigns, especially those targeting social problems that, like corruption, require mitigation of collective action dilemmas.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"471-490"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12940","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics 权力转移、国家间战争和国内政治
IF 5.6 1区 社会学
American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2026-04-17 Epub Date: 2025-04-23 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12984
Scott Wolford, Yuji Masumura
{"title":"Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics","authors":"Scott Wolford,&nbsp;Yuji Masumura","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12984","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze a model in which shifting power undermines foreign states’ commitments to the status quo, yet domestic leaders cannot credibly communicate the true scale of averted power shifts after preventive war. Publics prefer war only for large prospective power shifts, but preventive war renders the true size of averted shifts unobservable, incentivizing leaders to lie ex post to avoid political punishment. When publics are ex ante skeptical over shift size and war outcomes are middling, the probabilities of war and political punishment, as well as public skepticism over averted shifts and the chances of erroneous punishment, all increase in war outcomes. Public strategies of punishing military failures are particularly unsuccessful at discouraging undesirable preventive wars, yet the same conditions that encourage preventive war undermine its political benefits. We use our model to explain why Japan's leaders failed to convince the public of preventive success against Russia in 1905.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 2","pages":"691-704"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148012160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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