{"title":"Economic risk perceptions and willingness to learn about globalization: A field experiment with migrants and other underprivileged groups in Vietnam","authors":"Niccolò W. Bonifai, Edmund J. Malesky, Nita Rudra","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12925","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Existing research maintains that socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals are reluctant to seek information that might help mitigate risk. We challenge this convention by proposing that perceptions of risks associated with global economic shocks can incentivize some disadvantaged individuals to acquire knowledge about their distributional effects. Internal migrants, in particular, have strong incentives to respond to such risks by seeking information. We test our hypotheses using a randomized experiment in Vietnam exposing half of the participants to risks associated with a new trade agreement with the European Union. We track willingness to learn by observing whether respondents accessed an online video describing the economic impacts of the agreement. We find that treated migrants were 187% more likely to seek knowledge than the control group, but find null effects for residents from sending and receiving locations. Our findings help uncover the key role migrants can play in supporting globalization and shared prosperity.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1435-1453"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zoltan L. Hajnal, Vladimir Kogan, G. Agustin Markarian
{"title":"Who wins when? Election timing and descriptive representation","authors":"Zoltan L. Hajnal, Vladimir Kogan, G. Agustin Markarian","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12930","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine how the timing of local elections affects the success of minority candidates, who remain woefully underrepresented in public office. We build on research showing that concurrent elections narrow racial gaps in voter turnout and leverage changes in the timing of local elections in California. Our analysis shows that filling local offices in November of even years increases minority officeholding, at least for some groups. The results demonstrate how, when, and for whom election timing matters. Latinos gain most, potentially at the expense of White and, to a lesser degree, Black representation. An investigation of potential mechanisms suggests that these effects depend on group population size and the magnitude of the turnout changes. An increase in the number of co-ethnic candidates running also appears to contribute to the representational benefits of on-cycle elections. Finally, the effects are most pronounced during presidential elections, when turnout improvements are largest.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1454-1468"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12930","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Biased bureaucrats and the policies of international organizations","authors":"Valentin Lang, Lukas Wellner, Alexandros Kentikelenis","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12921","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article advances a novel argument about the policy output of international organizations (IOs) by highlighting the role of individual staffers. We approach them as purposive actors carrying heterogeneous ideological biases that materially shape their policy choices on the job. Pursuing this argument with an empirical focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we collected individual-level information on the careers of 835 IMF “mission chiefs”—staffers with primary responsibility for a particular member state—and matched them to newly coded data on more than 15,000 IMF-mandated policy conditions over the 1980–2016 period. Leveraging the appointment of the same mission chief to different countries throughout their career, we find that individual staffers influence the number, scope, and content of IMF conditions according to their personal ideological biases. These results contribute to our understanding of the microfoundations behind IO output and have implications for the accountability and legitimacy of IOs.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1486-1504"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12921","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Border fortification and legibility: Evidence from Afghanistan","authors":"Christopher W. Blair","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12923","url":null,"abstract":"<p>States often fortify their borders against militant threats. How do these efforts shape civilian welfare and perceptions in borderland communities? I conceptualize border fortification as a legibility-building endeavor. By bolstering state reach in areas of weak historical penetration, fortification enhances the government's capacity for monitoring, administration, and control. Yet, expanding state authority also disrupts traditional cross-border markets. A trade-off between security and corruption emerges in consequence. I provide evidence for this theory in a difference-in-differences framework, combining administrative records on violence and representative data from a NATO-commissioned survey fielded across Afghanistan. Fortification facilitates government information-collection, improving security provision and fostering civilian reliance on state forces. Enhanced state capacity is countervailed by negative economic impacts. By disturbing the informal borderland economy, fortification fuels criminalization and local opposition. Civilians rely on illicit economic entrepreneurs to sustain traditional market access. Higher smuggling rents fuel official corruption and bribe-taking. The findings point to a key dilemma inherent in border fortification strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1559-1580"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12923","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The politics of teachers' union endorsements","authors":"Michael T. Hartney, Vladimir Kogan","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12922","url":null,"abstract":"<p>School board candidates supported by local teachers' unions overwhelmingly win, and we examine the causes and consequences of the “teachers' union premium” in these elections. First, we show that union endorsement information increases voter support. Although the magnitude of this effect varies across ideological and partisan subgroups, an endorsement rarely hurts a candidate's prospects with the electorate. Second, we benchmark the size of the endorsement premium to other well-known determinants of vote choice in local elections. Perhaps surprisingly, we show the effect can be as large as the impact of shared partisanship, and substantially larger than the boost from endorsements provided by other stakeholders. Finally, examining real-world endorsement decisions, we find that union support for incumbents hinges on self-interested pecuniary considerations and is unaffected by performance in improving student academic outcomes. The divergence between what endorsements mean and how voters interpret them has troubling normative democratic implications.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 3","pages":"1163-1179"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12922","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144712117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Morse, Michael C. Herron, Marc Meredith, Daniel A. Smith, Michael D. Martinez
{"title":"Election administration harms and ballot design: A study of Florida's 2018 United States Senate race","authors":"Michael Morse, Michael C. Herron, Marc Meredith, Daniel A. Smith, Michael D. Martinez","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12919","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce a typology of election administration harms and apply it to empirically study the consequences of ballot design. Our typology distinguishes between individual, electoral, and systemic harms. Together, it clarifies why ballot design can be a particular vulnerability in election administration. Using both ballot-level and precinct-level data, we revisit Florida's 2018 United States Senate race, in which Broward County's ballot design flouted federal guidelines and, according to critics, was pivotal to the outcome. We estimate that Broward's ballot design induced roughly 25,000 voters to undervote in a race determined by about 10,000 votes and that these excess undervotes were concentrated among low-information voters. Broward's ballot did not, however, affect the outcome of the election. Nonetheless, flawed ballot designs are still concerning in an age of voter distrust. Given the risk that flawed ballots can cause systemic harm, we offer a roadmap for procedural reforms to improve ballot design.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1335-1353"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12919","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When you come at the king: Opposition coalitions and nearly stunning elections","authors":"Oren Samet","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12920","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Opposition coalitions under electoral authoritarianism have been associated with greater likelihood of opposition victory and democratization. I argue, however, that coalitions also entail significant downside risks with implications for longer term prospects for democracy. Where coalitions produce strong electoral outcomes but fail to force turnovers, regimes are left with both the incentive and capacity to repress and reconsolidate power. I show cross-nationally that opposition coalitions are associated with stronger opposition performance overall, but that when oppositions fail to take power, exceptionally strong performance is associated with greater autocratization in the subsequent years, including increased repression and poorer electoral quality in future contests. Probing the case of Cambodia, I demonstrate how the very features that make opposition coalitions a useful tool in strengthening performance also invite new threats from regimes. I argue that this makes coalition formation a particularly risky proposition.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1469-1485"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12920","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic state violence and migration in conflict","authors":"Jessica S. Sun","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12918","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Governments routinely wage civil conflicts in ways that disrupt civilians' lives and livelihoods, creating harmful externalities like internal displacement. Both fighting and displacement hinder economic activity, jeopardizing popular support for governments and reducing the future gains of governance. How do states fight when using force induces migration and thus risks popular discontent? I model a conflict where government efforts to control territory spur displacement, creating economic disruption that can spark tension between displaced civilians and government supporters. The risk of losing popular support leads the government to modify its tactics. While the government could mitigate the disruptive consequences of displacement by fighting less, I find another, more troubling, strategy. Governments may engage in preemptive violence to prevent migration. Moreover, economic downturns exacerbate migration incentives and, I find, can also increase violence against civilians. Governments anticipating displacement fight more intense conflicts today to see relatively less migration in the future.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1317-1334"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abolishing structural domination: US Reconstruction and the double bind of emancipation","authors":"Michael Gorup","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12917","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What does it take to abolish structural domination? If domination is structural, then it can only be eliminated by the transformation or abolition of structures. For this to happen, agents advantaged by existing structures will often have to be brought under a form of power that lays beyond their control. Defeating domination therefore seems to require the embrace of dominating power. I call this dilemma the <i>double bind of emancipation</i>. To illustrate, I turn to debates regarding land confiscation during the Reconstruction era in the United States (1865–1877). Confiscation was intended to destroy the material bases of planter power and guarantee formerly enslaved people economic independence. But it would also entail subjecting planters to uncontrolled power. To address the double bind, I argue emancipation must be guided by a social theory of domination. Emancipation from structural domination requires identifying and eliminating the conditions that reproduce domination over time.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"69 4","pages":"1374-1387"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145335671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Georgina Evans, Gary King, Adam D. Smith, Abhradeep Thakurta
{"title":"Differentially private survey research","authors":"Georgina Evans, Gary King, Adam D. Smith, Abhradeep Thakurta","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12890","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Survey researchers have long protected respondent privacy via de-identification (removing names and other directly identifying information) before sharing data. Unfortunately, recent research demonstrates that these procedures fail to protect respondents from intentional re-identification attacks, a problem that threatens to undermine vast survey enterprises in academia, government, and industry. This is especially a problem in political science because political beliefs are not merely the subject of our scholarship; they represent some of the most important information respondents want to keep private. We confirm the problem in practice by re-identifying individuals from a survey about a controversial referendum declaring life beginning at conception. We build on the concept of “differential privacy” to offer new data-sharing procedures with mathematical guarantees for protecting respondent privacy and statistical validity guarantees for social scientists analyzing differentially private data. The cost of these procedures is larger standard errors, which can be overcome with larger sample sizes.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"70 1","pages":"90-103"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146140157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}