{"title":"Placebo Tests for Causal Inference","authors":"Andrew C. Eggers, Guadalupe Tuñón, Allan Dafoe","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12818","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ajps.12818","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Placebo tests are increasingly common in applied social science research, but the methodological literature has not previously offered a comprehensive account of what we learn from them. We define placebo tests as tools for assessing the plausibility of the assumptions underlying a research design relative to some departure from those assumptions. We offer a typology of tests defined by the aspect of the research design that is altered to produce it (outcome, treatment, or population) and the type of assumption that is tested (bias assumptions or distributional assumptions). Our formal framework clarifies the extra assumptions necessary for informative placebo tests; these assumptions can be strong, and in some cases similar assumptions would justify a different procedure allowing the researcher to relax the research design's assumptions rather than test them. Properly designed and interpreted, placebo tests can be an important device for assessing the credibility of empirical research designs.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"68 3","pages":"1106-1121"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12818","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42417709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making Global Governance Accountable: Civil Society, States, and the Politics of Reform","authors":"R. Lall","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12824","url":null,"abstract":"Recent decades have witnessed the adoption of unprecedentedly broad and inclusive accountability mechanisms by many major international institutions, from grievance redress systems to transparency policies. What explains the establishment of these mechanisms—and why have only some institutions embraced them? I argue that adoption is more likely when member states, in particular the most powerful, face “bottom‐up” pressures for accountability from dense transnational civil society networks—networks with the capacity to build leverage through agenda setting, coalition building, and advocacy strategies—and when institutions perform governance tasks that are costly to monitor. Analysis of a rich new dataset shows that adoption is positively related to the density of international nongovernmental organizations in an institution's issue area—including only those based in powerful member countries—and that this relationship is stronger when governance tasks entail high monitoring costs. Statistical tests are complemented by qualitative evidence from interviews and other primary sources.","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43762391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Injustice and the Electoral Connection","authors":"Justin Pottle","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12806","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues office seekers’ messaging gives rise to a distinct and underappreciated epistemic form of political inequality. Electoral incentives push representatives to orient their rhetoric toward appealing to strategically valuable constituencies, yielding flows of elite cues that disproportionately reflect those groups’ perspectives. When inequalities in strategic value overlap with other inequalities of social power, politicians’ messaging strategies exacerbate the epistemic marginalization of disadvantaged citizens by denying them equal influence on the frames and understandings circulated in mainstream debate. This dynamic is best understood as a democratically perverse form of epistemic injustice distinct from but mutually reinforcing with citizens’ unequal influence on political outcomes. Moreover, I show how such inequalities distort otherwise epistemically salutary mechanisms of electoral accountability and undermine the quality of representative decision‐making. I conclude by suggesting hypotheses for testing electoral reform's potential to mitigate these discursive consequences.","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49317480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Climate Cascades: IOs and the Prioritization of Climate Action","authors":"Richard Clark, Noah Zucker","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12793","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ajps.12793","url":null,"abstract":"<p>International organizations (IOs) are rapidly reorienting around climate change, despite powerful principal states having divergent preferences on the issue. When and why do IOs prioritize climate change? We argue that they do so as a result of an endogenous process of staff learning and rotation. IO staff surveil and implement programs in target states. When working in climate-vulnerable countries, they come to see climate change as an issue warranting aggressive action. As these staff are rotated and promoted, interest in climate diffuses outwards and upwards through the institution. To test this theory, we introduce original data tracking the International Monetary Fund's attention to climate change and the career paths of key staff. We complement this with interviews of International Monetary Fund personnel. We find support for our theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"68 4","pages":"1299-1314"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45967512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bureaucratic Structure and Compliance with International Agreements","authors":"Shannon P. Carcelli","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12811","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ajps.12811","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Why do some states comply with international agreements while others flout them? In this article, I introduce a previously unconsidered explanation: bureaucratic structure. I develop a rational choice model examining the impact of bureaucratic structure on compliance, suggesting that the existence of several distinct bureaucracies can mute compliance with an international agreement by insulating some bureaucrats from pressure to comply. I examine this theory through newly coded data on a 2001 OECD agreement designed to decrease the percentage of aid that is “tied” to donor-state products and services—a practice that is popular among special interests but which decreases foreign aid's effectiveness. I find that non–development-oriented bureaucracies, such as departments of interior, labor, and energy, were significantly less likely to comply with the agreement than traditional development bureaucracies. This aggregates to the state level as well, where states with many aid agencies were less compliant than states with a streamlined bureaucracy.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"68 1","pages":"177-192"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44532066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Electoral Discrimination, Party Rationale, and the Underrepresentation of Immigrant‐Origin Politicians","authors":"Daniel Auer, Lea Portmann, Thomas Tichelbaecker","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12817","url":null,"abstract":"Immigrants and other minorities are underrepresented in politics in most Western democracies. We argue that strategically acting party gatekeepers who update their nomination strategies based on voter behavior contribute to this representation gap. Drawing on unique panel data from Swiss local elections, we find that candidates with a “foreign‐sounding” name systematically receive not only fewer votes but are also fielded on less promising list positions compared to native candidates. We track candidates across elections and show that this inequality is driven by voter discrimination in previous elections. Our study carries relevance for research on minority candidates by linking different stages in the electoral process and showing how parties indirectly discriminate due to their use of candidate‐performance information. It also bears practical implications, pointing to avenues how parties can break the cycle of discrimination in the electoral process.","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43811998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Democracy Reduce Ethnic Inequality?","authors":"Lasse Egendal Leipziger","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12812","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ajps.12812","url":null,"abstract":"<p>To what extent and under what conditions do democratic institutions reduce socioeconomic ethnic inequality? I argue that democratization reduces ethnic inequality by introducing electoral accountability, which facilitates a series of egalitarian policies. However, the effect of democratization is conditional on the distribution of resources under the previous, nondemocratic regime. Countries that were more ethnically unequal prior to democratization experience greater egalitarian effects following democratization. To examine the argument, I leverage multiple country- and group-level measures of ethnic inequality. Using fixed effects regressions, instrumental variable analyses, and event studies, I demonstrate that democratization substantively reduces ethnic inequality, but mainly for countries with high predemocratic levels of inequality.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"68 4","pages":"1335-1352"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12812","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43307067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Junctures: Independence Movements and Democracy in Africa","authors":"Omar García-Ponce, Leonard Wantchekon","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12798","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ajps.12798","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that current levels of democracy in Africa are linked to the nature of its independence movements. Using different measures of political regimes and historical data on anticolonial movements, we find that countries that experienced <i>rural insurgencies</i> tend to have autocratic regimes, while those that faced <i>urban protests</i> tend to have more democratic institutions. The association between the type of independence movement and democracy is statistically significant for the post-Cold War period and robust to a number of potential confounding factors and sensitivity checks. We provide evidence for causality in this relationship by using an instrumental variables approach and a difference-in-differences design with fixed effects. Furthermore, we adjudicate between two potential mechanisms and find support for a <i>behavioral path dependence</i> hypothesis. Urban protests enabled participants to develop norms of peaceful political behavior, which provided cultural bases for liberal democracy. In contrast, armed rebellions generated behavioral patterns that perpetuated political exclusion and the use of violence as a form of political dissent.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"68 4","pages":"1266-1285"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"62862531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Fortification Dilemma: Border Control and Rebel Violence","authors":"Christopher W. Blair","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12794","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ajps.12794","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Where cross-border sanctuaries enable rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border fortification. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational militants’ resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. Extending resource-centric theories of conflict, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in this strategy. Externally supplied rebels can afford conventional attacks and civilian victimization. When border fortifications interdict their foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and cooperative relations with civilians. Hence, counterinsurgent border fortification trades off reduced rebel capabilities for greater competition over local hearts and minds. I test this theory using declassified microdata on border fortification and violence in Iraq. Results highlight the central link between border control and cross-border militancy, and show how governments can contest the transnational dimensions of civil wars, such as external rebel sponsorship.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"68 4","pages":"1366-1385"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12794","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44266286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Citizens with Felony Convictions in the Jury Box: A Peer-Judgment Argument","authors":"Andrei Poama, Briana McGinnis","doi":"10.1111/ajps.12816","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ajps.12816","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Currently, almost all polities that allow for jury trials deprive people with felony convictions of their right to serve as jurors on criminal trials. Against these exclusionary practices, we contend that there are epistemic and political reasons to enable (and not merely allow) convicted felony defendants to serve as jurors. These reasons are derived from the ideal of peer judgment, which we take to be deeply ingrained in and relevant for ensuring fair jury-judgment practices. In this article, we construct an account of peer judgment understood as equal subjection to coercive law, spell out the epistemic dimension of this account, and use it to argue that there are stronger reasons for having people with felony convictions serve as jurors, as compared to average, noncriminalized citizens. Our peer-judgment argument is meant to both weaken and outweigh current justifications for excluding people with felony convictions from jury service.</p>","PeriodicalId":48447,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Political Science","volume":"68 4","pages":"1403-1415"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12816","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43624453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}