{"title":"Does corporate responsibility increase consumers’ product value? Evidence from two experiments","authors":"Julian Conrads , Alexandra Eyberg , Bernd Irlenbusch , Maivand Sarin","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107189","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107189","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do consumers reward companies for engaging in corporate responsibility (CR)? Obtaining clear evidence on this question is challenging in naturally occurring purchasing environments due to numerous confounding factors, including brand reputation, product quality, and product appearance. CR predominantly focuses on two dimensions, i.e., (i) the social dimension, like providing fair working conditions, and (ii) the ecological dimension, like using recycled materials in production. We provide new evidence on this debate through two experiments in backpack sales for young adults. We find that CR information about both dimensions increases consumers’ product value by more than 17 percent. In a separate study, we ask whether this effect is potentially entirely driven by one of the two CR dimensions, specifically social versus ecological. We find no significant difference in the increase in consumers’ value between these two dimensions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107189"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evidence and perceptions of discrimination in restaurants","authors":"Graeme Pearce , Brit Grosskopf","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107164","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107164","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present a natural field experiment designed to examine price discrimination in retail markets. This is done by examining the portion sizes served in British Carvery Restaurants. Carvery restaurants serve traditional, fixed-price roast dinners, and are characterised by the manner in which customers are served: a single chef serves every customer individually and, under observation, cuts them a portion of meat from a roasted joint. We employed 147 testers to pose as diners. We find systematic variations in served meat quantities that correlate with the testers’ gender, with men receiving significantly more meat than women. The gender disparity in portion sizes is robust to controlling for a range of appearance and physical characteristics, and cannot be fully explained by women taking more vegetables or wasting more food than men in a complementary lab-in-the-field experiment. Responses to an online survey conducted via Prolific using a representative sample from the UK point towards a widely held belief that women eat less meat than men, suggesting that the observed discrepancies could stem from statistical discrimination. Evidence from a complementary framed-field experiment highlights how both women and men are negatively affected by this gender disparity. Furthermore, the Prolific survey reveals that neither gender believes serving less meat to women than men when they pay the same price is socially acceptable.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107164"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dongyang ZHANG , Bo NING , Yiping CHEN , Yizhi WANG
{"title":"Trust over toasts: The role of alcohol culture in firms’ access to trade credit","authors":"Dongyang ZHANG , Bo NING , Yiping CHEN , Yizhi WANG","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107200","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107200","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In markets where the formal institutions remain underdeveloped, informal mechanisms, particularly cultural norms, often play a critical role in facilitating economic transactions. This paper examines the impact of Chinese alcohol culture on firms’ access to trade credit. Using the city-level distribution of Moutai specialty stores as a proxy for the intensity of local alcohol culture, we find that a stronger alcohol culture significantly improves firms’ access to trade credit. The effect appears to operate through enhanced inter-firm relationships and reduced information asymmetry. Accordingly, the positive impact is more pronounced among firms that rely heavily on <em>guanxi</em> networks and operate with lower disclosure quality. Our main results are robust to a range of identification strategies, including the instrumental variables approach, the Eight Provisions shock, and cultural confounder controls. The positive effect is stronger for firms with female or locally oriented managers and for those facing higher credit or litigation risk. It is also more evident among firms in industries with higher demand for trade credit and in regions with underdeveloped formal credit systems. This paper highlights the enduring relevance of cultural practices in shaping economic behavior and offers new insights into how informal institutions can complement or substitute for formal financial systems in emerging markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107200"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144860541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sumit Joshi , Ahmed Saber Mahmud , Hector Tzavellas
{"title":"Endogenous multiplex networks","authors":"Sumit Joshi , Ahmed Saber Mahmud , Hector Tzavellas","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107192","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107192","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Agents are typically connected in a multiplex of interrelated networks (layers). Given an initial asymmetric “seed” layer endowed with a nested split graph topology, we characterize the architecture of connections that bind agents in each layer of a multiplex. We propose a sequential multiplex formation game in which agents are free to choose layers and partners. Adding/deleting links on any layer generates intra-layer externalities within that layer and inter-layer externalities across other layers. The inter-layer externality transmitted from one layer to another is positive (negative) if actions on the two layers are strategic complements (substitutes). The flow of intra-layer and inter-layer externalities produce a limit multiplex in which non-seed layers that are complements (substitutes) of the seed inherit nested split graph topologies that are parallel (flip) of the seed in the sense that high-centrality agents in the seed layer occupy high (low) centrality positions in the non-seed layer. This result is shown to hold across duplexes, triplexes, and a sub-class of higher dimensional multiplexes. A number of applications are also discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107192"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144860543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Antonio Cabrales , Francesco Feri , Piero Gottardi , Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
{"title":"Strategic information transmission and social preferences","authors":"Antonio Cabrales , Francesco Feri , Piero Gottardi , Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107194","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107194","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders engage in deception also when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication we observe is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games, even though, as in previous work, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. A novel feature of our framework is that sometimes senders’ and receivers’ interests are in conflict and some other times they are aligned. We show that our findings can be attributed to distributional preferences of senders, which may be sufficiently high to induce them to lie, even when they face a cost of lying, to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than the sender.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107194"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144841630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does economic liberalization increase government accountability?","authors":"Veeshan Rayamajhee , Raymond J. March","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107143","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107143","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of economic liberalization on government accountability. Using a country-level panel spanning 1900-2020 from the V-DEM dataset, we exploit discrete and sustained jumps in state ownership and control of the economy to identify instances of reforms toward economic liberalization. We use a doubly-robust staggered difference-in-differences approach on stacked data and find a sizable and positive relationship between economic liberalization and government accountability. We further identify three channels through which capitalistic reforms improve government accountability: greater media independence and representation, stronger civil society participation, and broader inclusion of diverse elite groups, all of which impose checks on governmental power. Our results are robust to a host of robustness checks including exclusion of different geo-political regions and historical episodes as well as alternative treatment definitions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107143"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144828919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Skewed aspirations: The impact of economic inequality within the classroom on students’ academic performance","authors":"Xiqian Cai , Zhengquan Cheng , Yang Jiao","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107179","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107179","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the effects of economic inequality on student academic performance in the classroom. Leveraging nationally representative randomized class assignments among middle school students in China, we isolate the effects of classroom economic inequality from external living conditions. The results indicate that students in classrooms with greater economic inequality tend to have lower test scores and cognitive outcomes, with particularly pronounced long-term effects. These negative impacts are especially significant among students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, male students, and those preparing for high-stakes examinations. Further analysis reveals that higher classroom inequality negatively impacts student aspirations, reduces parental involvement, and alters parents’ perceptions of their children’s academic potential, all contributing to diminished study effort. Additionally, students in more unequal classrooms engage in fewer peer interactions. These four mechanisms serve as key channels through which inequality influences academic outcomes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107179"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144826664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Giacomo Ravaioli , Francesco Lamperti , Andrea Roventini , Tiago Domingos
{"title":"Tackling emissions and inequality: policy insights from an agent-based model","authors":"Giacomo Ravaioli , Francesco Lamperti , Andrea Roventini , Tiago Domingos","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107188","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107188","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Climate change and economic inequality are two critical and interlinked global challenges. The feasibility of jointly reducing greenhouse gas emissions and inequality has often been questioned. Here, we aim to test whether a properly designed mix of progressive and environmental fiscal policies can effectively reduce both while improving economic dynamics. We extend the DSK integrated-assessment agent-based model to combine an income class-based analysis of inequality with an improved accounting of emissions. We calibrate the model to the European Union and employ it to explore how fiscal policies can tackle the coevolution of income inequality and carbon emission. The results show that no single policy in our portfolio can simultaneously reduce inequality and emissions. Redistributing income increases aggregate consumption and hence emissions, whereas environmental taxes risk hampering economic growth and stability. In contrast, a combination of progressive fiscal policies, green subsidies to reduce carbon intensity of production and a mild carbon tax achieves both goals, while increasing employment, growth, stability and the consumption of low-income households. A potential trade-off emerges between increasing economic growth and reducing emissions, mediated by the extent to which green innovations lead to higher productivity. In conclusion, our results show that moving towards a sustainable and inclusive economy needs the co-design of distributive, innovation and mitigation policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107188"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144826663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gary Charness , Eugen Dimant , Uri Gneezy , Erin Krupka
{"title":"Experimental methods: Eliciting and measuring social norms","authors":"Gary Charness , Eugen Dimant , Uri Gneezy , Erin Krupka","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107187","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107187","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Eliciting social norms is essential for understanding a range of behaviors in economic contexts. This paper reviews key experimental approaches to social-norm measurement, comparing the methods, practical considerations, and specific conditions under which each is most effective. We discuss various social norm elicitation techniques, including coordination-based, opinion-based, and distributional approaches. Our findings suggest that coordination-game approaches are the most widely adopted and tested; they deliver robust results, particularly in contexts with a single dominant norm. Importantly, while early methods focused on eliciting mean or modal normative beliefs, recent work shifts focus to eliciting beliefs about the distribution of normative beliefs. This allows the researcher to draw inferences on the degree of uncertainty that underlies norm assessments. This paper aims to help experimentalists and practitioners choose suitable norm-elicitation methods that are aligned with research objectives and logistical constraints.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107187"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144809774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedging-based scoring rules for multiple-choice questions","authors":"Jingcheng Fu , Xing Zhang , Songfa Zhong","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107184","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107184","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper proposes two novel scoring rules for multiple-choice questions based on the test-takers’ propensity to hedge across possible answers. To examine these scoring rules, we randomly assign 2,986 participants in an IQ test into three conditions. In the control condition, participants choose one option, and receive one point for a correct response. In the treatment conditions, they can explicitly hedge by choosing k options: if the correct option is among the k chosen options, they receive 1/k point in the outcome-mixing treatment, and one point with probability 1/k in the probability-mixing treatment. We find that participants in both treatments hedge pervasively, score lower compared to those in the control, but do not improve their time allocation. While scores in the three conditions exhibit similar psychometric quality, we observe a significant correlation between academic performance and IQ score measured in the probability-mixing condition. These results highlight the potential of these two hedging-based scoring rules for practical applications in multiple-choice questions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 107184"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144810292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}