Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第7页

Behavioral implementation by individual-based rights structures: A full characterization 基于个人的权利结构的行为实现：一个完整的特征

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107367

Ville Korpela , Michele Lombardi , Julius Zachariassen

引用次数: 0

Nudge Me! A field experiment on reminders for medication adherence 推我!一个关于药物依从性提醒的现场实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107368

Kai Barron , Mette Trier Damgaard , Christina Gravert

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The invisible hand meets the raised fist: Social movements and market legitimacy 看不见的手碰到举起的拳头：社会运动和市场合法性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390

Shishir Shakya , Joshua D. Ammons

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No student left behind? Relative feedback and university completion 没有学生掉队吗？相关反馈和大学完成情况

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107383

Raphael Brade , Oliver Himmler , Robert Jäckle

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Make a difference? – An experiment on the effectiveness of performance rating policies 做出改变？-绩效评级政策有效性的实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394

Christine Harbring, Stella Simons

{"title":"Make a difference? – An experiment on the effectiveness of performance rating policies","authors":"Christine Harbring, Stella Simons","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Performance appraisals by supervisors are often used in organizations as a basis for bonus and promotion decisions. These subjective appraisals are often prone to supervisors’ biases (e.g., centrality and leniency bias) resulting in ratings that seem not sufficiently differentiated. Previous research shows that forcing supervisors to differentiate in subjective performance appraisals by implementing a forced distribution system may increase worker productivity. However, forced distribution systems pose a variety of other problems. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate two alternative rating policies which aim to foster differentiation and thus productivity. Firstly, supervisors are simply advised to differentiate across different appraisal levels. We find that this simple recommendation results in less lenient and less compressed performance ratings and tends to increase workers’ performance. Secondly, we analyze how supervisors evaluate workers’ performance when the rewards, which are tied to ratings, may not exceed a certain budget. We detect that specifying a financial budget mitigates the leniency bias and increases workers’ performance. Under both rating policies, the performance differences wear off over the course of the experiment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107394"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The core and the equal division core in a three-person unstructured bargaining experiment 三人非结构化议价实验中的核心与均分核心

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401

Taro Shinoda , Yukihiko Funaki

{"title":"The core and the equal division core in a three-person unstructured bargaining experiment","authors":"Taro Shinoda , Yukihiko Funaki","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Cooperative game theory addresses two main problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. We hypothesize that the existence and size of the core, a central concept in cooperative game theory, influence the formation of the grand coalition, and we test this in a laboratory experiment. In each group, three subjects simultaneously engage in unstructured bargaining over both coalition formation and payoff distribution, mimicking real-world negotiation. Our results highlight four key findings. First, a nonempty core strongly facilitates the formation of the grand coalition. Second, the availability of a chat window increases the likelihood of forming the grand coalition and reduces inequality in the resulting allocations. Third, resulting allocations are often in the core when it exists, and otherwise fall within the equal division core, an extension of the core. Fourth, the resulting allocations reflect the subjects’ theoretical bargaining power: players with higher bargaining power tend to receive larger shares. Finally, allocations outside the equal division core arise mainly because subjects overlook domination via coalition BC, the two-person coalition with the lowest value.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107401"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Understanding legal origins: On the determinants and impact of legal traditions 理解法律起源：关于法律传统的决定因素和影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107305

Carmine Guerriero

{"title":"Understanding legal origins: On the determinants and impact of legal traditions","authors":"Carmine Guerriero","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107305","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107305","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To shed light on the determinants and impact of legal traditions, I evaluate the idea that the uncertain common law can prevail over the certain civil law only when sufficiently heterogeneous legal preferences and/or sufficiently inefficient political institutions encourage the legislator to bias statutes in order to favor special interests. Operationally, I focus on 51 transplants for which I observe over the 1945–2005 period the evolution of the legal tradition, economic outcomes, control variables and the product of the time-varying population share of the ethnic group that was the largest at independence and either its long-lived norms of self-reliance or its genetic distance to the group that was the largest at independence in the exogenously assigned legal origin. These last two variables constitute time-varying proxies for, respectively, the transplant’s aversion to inefficient political institutions and the differences between the transplant’s legal preferences and those of its origin. Consistent with the testable predictions, reforms towards institutions typical of a pure common law legal tradition are found where genetic distance is the largest and a culture of self-reliance is the weakest. Moreover, not only did these reforms encourage stock market capitalization while curbing the unemployment rate in the developing transplants with the most heterogeneous legal preferences, but they also amplified labor market inefficiencies in developing transplants displaying the strongest norms of self-reliance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107305"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The cognitive benefit of a window view 窗外景色的认知益处

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107358

Xuan Li , Xiang Zhou

引用次数: 0

Emotional shocks and consumer spending 情感冲击和消费支出

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107357

Qingyin Cai , Qingxiao Li

引用次数: 0

To the depths of the sunk cost: Experiments revisiting the elusive effect 沉没成本的深度：重新审视难以捉摸的效应的实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107352

George Beknazar-Yuzbashev , Sota Ichiba , Mateusz Stalinski

{"title":"To the depths of the sunk cost: Experiments revisiting the elusive effect","authors":"George Beknazar-Yuzbashev , Sota Ichiba , Mateusz Stalinski","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107352","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107352","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite being often discussed both in practice and academic circles, the sunk cost effect remains empirically elusive. Our model based on reference point dependence suggests that the traditional way of testing it—by assigning discounts—may not produce the desired effect. Motivated by this, we evaluate it across the gain-loss divide in two pre-registered experiments. In an online study with N = 1,806, we randomize the price (low, medium, or high) of a ticket to enter a real-effort task, and observe its effect on play time. Our intervention, which varies the sunk cost by $2 for a 14-minute task, results in a moderate sunk cost effect (0.12 SD or 1.3 min). We further explore the economic applications of the effect in a field experiment on YouTube with N = 11,328 videos in which we randomize whether the time until a pre-video ad becomes skippable is shortened (0 s), default (5 s), or extended (10 s). The intervention has an overall insignificant effect on video engagement. This is driven by a sizable negative effect on the extensive margin, a channel which is not present in the online study. Specifically, more users leave before the video starts in the extended treatment (5.2 pp or 28 % more relative to the shortened treatment). Taking the results of both studies together, we offer evidence of the sunk cost effect in a controlled environment, but its application in policy settings may prove challenging.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107352"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145685009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0