Ainoa Barreiro, Anadaniela Del Carpio, Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro, Itxaso Barberia
{"title":"Presentation format influences the strength of causal illusions.","authors":"Ainoa Barreiro, Anadaniela Del Carpio, Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro, Itxaso Barberia","doi":"10.3758/s13421-025-01714-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-025-01714-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Causal illusions refer to the erroneous perception of causal connections between noncontingent variables. Previous research has demonstrated that the format in which contingency information is displayed can impact causal judgments. On this basis, we examined the effect of graphical displays on the strength of causal illusions and reasoning strategies across three experiments. Study 1 revealed that frequency trees and contingency tables involving icons lead to weaker causal illusions than trial-by-trial presentations or contingency tables with numbers. An assessment of the participants' open responses in Study 2 indicated that stronger causal illusions were associated with reports of less sophisticated reasoning strategies. In Study 3, we directly compared frequency trees and contingency table visualizations. In addition to corroborating previous observations, we found that advanced strategies were more likely when the information was presented in frequency trees. Overall, our findings suggest that the efficacy of frequency trees in reducing causal illusions may be due to their ability to make sophisticated strategies more accessible.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144002149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Garry Kong, Isabelle Frisken, Gwenisha J Liaw, Robert Keys, David Alais
{"title":"Efficient measurement of dynamic working memory.","authors":"Garry Kong, Isabelle Frisken, Gwenisha J Liaw, Robert Keys, David Alais","doi":"10.3758/s13421-025-01724-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-025-01724-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Working memory is the ability to maintain a limited amount of information after it has been removed from perception. It is a key cognitive ability, thought to play a role in other cognitive functions, including perception, attention and action. Given its importance, its accurate and efficient measurement is a major goal in working memory research. Here we introduce a novel working memory tracking paradigm, inspired by continuous psychophysics and multiple object tracking. Participants viewed a sequence of stimuli moving along variable paths and were asked to reproduce the path by tracing it on a touchscreen. This reproduction was then compared to the original stimulus to determine error and thus memory performance. Across three experiments, we found that this new method is efficient, reliable and powerful, with only ten trials per condition required for stable performance estimates. We have also shown that the method is only minimally affected by perceptual or attentional confounds. Most importantly, since performance was measured across the trial, this method also allows for the investigation of how working memory changes across time. By averaging equivalent time points across trials, we identified influences from both primacy and recency effects, and quantified performance around particularly important points along the motion path. The working memory tracking paradigm is therefore especially useful when experimental time is limited, experimental conditions are extensive or when the time-course is a key interest. The method also opens up the study of working memory with dynamic stimuli.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143991033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conflict detection with invalid inferences: All heuristics, no logic.","authors":"Veronika Kosourikhina, Simon J Handley","doi":"10.3758/s13421-025-01709-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-025-01709-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Under current process models of reasoning, detecting conflict between beliefs and logic is a key step that determines whether people will engage in reflective thinking. Conflict detection has been found across many tasks, but it is less reliably observed with syllogistic reasoning. 'Reverse' detection effects have also been found in some studies, which are not easily explained within the current model of conflict detection and cannot be attributed only to measurement noise. In this study, we test whether 'reverse' detection effects in invalid syllogisms can be attributed to a mismatch between where conflict is thought to occur based on normative expectations and where conflict actually occurs for participants. We present evidence from two experiments (total N = 248) showing that invalid AC and DA syllogisms are intuitively valid to many participants, and that there are generally no differences in reaction time and confidence between valid and invalid items once believability and chosen response are taken into consideration. Further, we show that 'reverse' detection effects on invalid items disappear if we treat them as valid, on the assumption that this reflects where conflict occurs subjectively. These results indicate that conflict in these items likely occurs between two heuristic responses, rather than logic and heuristics; and that subjective, not objective, conflict should be considered when measuring conflict detection.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144022312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic reminder setting for time-based intentions: Influence of metacognition, delay length, and cue visibility.","authors":"Pei-Chun Tsai, Sam J Gilbert","doi":"10.3758/s13421-025-01708-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-025-01708-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Time-based intentions, such as remembering to make a telephone call at a particular time or removing food from the oven after a delay, can be highly cognitively demanding. In everyday life, people often offload these demands to the external environment by setting alerts and reminders; however, this process of time-based intention offloading has rarely been examined experimentally. Here, we investigated this process in a paradigm where participants had to remember to press a key after a 10, 20, or 30 s delay, while simultaneously engaged in an ongoing two-back working memory task. Use of reminders improved accuracy, and participants were more likely to offload intentions at longer delays. This process was driven at least partially by metacognitive beliefs about the need for reminders, rather than the actual need. There was also an influence of time-monitoring demands: offloading was reduced when a clock was always visible, compared with a condition where participants had to press a button to reveal it. These results show that principles of cognitive offloading established in other domains also apply to time-based prospective memory: it improves performance, is influenced by cognitive demand, and guided by metacognitive beliefs.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144054640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Logical intuitions or matching heuristics? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments.","authors":"Omid Ghasemi, Simon J Handley, Rachel G Stephens","doi":"10.3758/s13421-025-01710-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-025-01710-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>When individuals are asked to evaluate the believability of the conclusions to valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid conclusions at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments-the \"logic-belief effect\" -is considered evidence of intuitive logic. However, recent studies challenged this interpretation by demonstrating that \"pseudo-logical\" arguments interfere with belief judgments in the same way as valid logical structures do. This finding suggests that a simple heuristic that relies on the matching of constituent propositions, rather than sensitivity to logical validity per se, may lead to the logic-belief effect. To further test this matching heuristic account, across two experiments, we instructed participants to evaluate the conclusions of a series of logical and pseudo-logical arguments based on logic or belief, before and after a logic training block. The results showed that whilst both judgment types were impacted by both logical and pseudo-logical structures before training, after training the effect of the latter was indeed minimized in logic judgments but not belief judgments. The results largely support the matching heuristic account, which have important implications for contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144035152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hilary Barth, Bethany Rutkowski, Leah Vaidya, Erin Kim, Cameron Bourassa, Annie Fabian, Sierra Eisen, Alexandra Zax, Katherine Williams, Andrea L Patalano
{"title":"Left digit bias in children's and adults' paper-and-pencil number line estimation.","authors":"Hilary Barth, Bethany Rutkowski, Leah Vaidya, Erin Kim, Cameron Bourassa, Annie Fabian, Sierra Eisen, Alexandra Zax, Katherine Williams, Andrea L Patalano","doi":"10.3758/s13421-025-01707-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-025-01707-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Number line estimation tasks are frequently used to learn about numerical thinking, learning, and development. These tasks are often interpreted as though estimates are determined by overall magnitudes of target numerals, rather than specific instantiating digits. Yet estimates are strongly biased by leftmost digits. For example, numbers like \"698\" are placed too far to the left of numbers like \"701\" on a 0-1,000 line. This \"left digit effect\" or \"left digit bias\" has been investigated little in children, and only on electronic tasks. Here, we ask whether left digit bias appears in paper-and-pencil estimates, and whether it differs for paper-based versus computer-based tasks. In Study 1, 5- to 8-year-old children completed a 0-100 number line task on paper. In Study 2, 7- to 11-year-olds completed a 0-1,000 paper task. In Study 3, adults completed tasks on paper in both ranges. Large left digit effects were observed for children aged 8 years or older and adults, but we did not find evidence for left digit bias in younger children. Study 4 compared paper and computer tasks for adults and children aged 9-12 years. Strong left digit bias was observed in all conditions, with a larger effect for the paper-based task in children. Large left digit effects in number line estimation emerge regardless of task format, with a developmental trajectory broadly consistent with other studies. For children in the age range that reliably exhibits left digit bias (but not adults), paper-and-pencil number line estimation tasks elicit even greater bias than computer-based tasks.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144035150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rebecca Lurie, Sophia P Fabrizio, Deanne L Westerman
{"title":"The cost of saving: How photos and screenshots impair memory.","authors":"Rebecca Lurie, Sophia P Fabrizio, Deanne L Westerman","doi":"10.3758/s13421-025-01711-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-025-01711-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The photo impairment effect refers to worse memory for experiences that are photographed compared with those that are not. One proposed explanation for this effect is that photo-taking divides attention between the event and the actions required for photography. However, the results of the present study challenge this account. Specifically, we found that the magnitude of the photo impairment effect did not increase with task complexity, undermining the idea that divided attention is the primary cause. Across three experiments, participants viewed art presented on a computer or their own smartphones and either photographed or took screenshots of the images. Memory was consistently worse for images saved by any of these methods. Notably, screenshotting had particularly detrimental effects on memory, despite being the least complex saving method. Furthermore, the impairment did not vary based on whether participants used a familiar device (their own smartphone) or an unfamiliar, experimenter-provided camera. These findings suggest that divided attention alone cannot account for the photo impairment effect.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143804547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Memory & CognitionPub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2024-07-25DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01608-6
Ewa Butowska-Buczyńska, Maciej Hanczakowski, Katarzyna Zawadzka
{"title":"Errorful learning of trivia questions and answers: The role of study time.","authors":"Ewa Butowska-Buczyńska, Maciej Hanczakowski, Katarzyna Zawadzka","doi":"10.3758/s13421-024-01608-6","DOIUrl":"10.3758/s13421-024-01608-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Errorful learning-asking questions and forcing responding even before the correct answers are presented for study-has recently been proposed as a way of maximizing the effectiveness of study. However, much support for the superiority of errorful learning over standard learning via reading comes from studies employing pairs of words as study materials, which remain of little educational relevance. Studies using materials affording richer semantic processing, such as trivia questions and their answers, have shown benefits of errorful learning only when the errorful learning condition is granted additional time for formulating guesses. In the present study, we systematically examined the role of timing when comparing errorful learning and reading strategies applied to study of trivia questions and their answers. In Experiments 1 and 2, we obtained evidence for the superiority of errorful learning over reading when additional time was given to formulate guesses, but this superiority was abolished when the overall time to study was equated between the two learning strategies. We further examined the role of answer familiarity in Experiment 3, showing that incorrect guessing produced no benefit for learning regardless of whether the to-be-learned concepts were familiar or not. In Experiments 4 and 5, no benefits of errorful learning emerged when participants were required to guess responses to two different questions that shared a common set of possible answers. We conclude that the benefits of errorful learning for trivia questions emerge only when guessing gives more time to process target questions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":"804-819"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12053351/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141767643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Memory & CognitionPub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2024-07-24DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01604-w
Thalia H Vrantsidis, Tania Lombrozo
{"title":"Inside Ockham's razor: A mechanism driving preferences for simpler explanations.","authors":"Thalia H Vrantsidis, Tania Lombrozo","doi":"10.3758/s13421-024-01604-w","DOIUrl":"10.3758/s13421-024-01604-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People often prefer simpler explanations, defined as those that posit the presence of fewer causes (e.g., positing the presence of a single cause, Cause A, rather than two causes, Causes B and C, to explain observed effects). Here, we test one hypothesis about the mechanisms underlying this preference: that people tend to reason as if they are using \"agnostic\" explanations, which remain neutral about the presence/absence of additional causes (e.g., comparing \"A\" vs. \"B and C,\" while remaining neutral about the status of B and C when considering \"A,\" or of A when considering \"B and C\"), even in cases where \"atheist\" explanations, which specify the absence of additional causes (e.g., \"A and not B or C\" vs. \"B and C and not A\"), are more appropriate. Three studies with US-based samples (total N = 982) tested this idea by using scenarios for which agnostic and atheist strategies produce diverging simplicity/complexity preferences, and asking participants to compare explanations provided in atheist form. Results suggest that people tend to ignore absent causes, thus overgeneralizing agnostic strategies, which can produce preferences for simpler explanations even when the complex explanation is objectively more probable. However, these unwarranted preferences were reduced by manipulations that encouraged participants to consider absent causes: making absences necessary to produce the effects (Study 2), or describing absences as causes that produce alternative effects (Study 3). These results shed light on the mechanisms driving preferences for simpler explanations, and on when these mechanisms are likely to lead people astray.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":"746-774"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141761785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Memory & CognitionPub Date : 2025-04-01Epub Date: 2024-09-03DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01622-8
Iris Lowenscuss-Erlich, Avi Karni, Carmit Gal, Eli Vakil
{"title":"Different delayed consequences of attaining a plateau phase in practicing a simple (finger-tapping sequence learning) and a complex (Tower of Hanoi puzzle) task.","authors":"Iris Lowenscuss-Erlich, Avi Karni, Carmit Gal, Eli Vakil","doi":"10.3758/s13421-024-01622-8","DOIUrl":"10.3758/s13421-024-01622-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In practicing a new task, the initial performance gains, across consecutive trials, decrease; in the following phase, performance tends to plateau. However, after a long delay additional performance improvements may emerge (delayed/ \"offline\" gains). It has been suggested that the attainment of the plateau phase is a necessary condition for the triggering of skill consolidation processes that lead to the expression of delayed gains. Here we compared the effect of a long-delay (24-48 h) interval following each of the two within-session phases, on performance in a simple motor task, the finger-tapping sequence learning (FTSL), and in a conceptually complex task, the Tower of Hanoi puzzle (TOHP). In Experiment 1 we determined the amount of practice leading to the plateau phase within a single practice session (long practice), in each task. Experiment 2 consisted of three consecutive sessions with long-delay intervals in between; in the first session, participants underwent a short practice without attaining the plateau phase, but in the next two sessions, participants received long practice, attaining the plateau phase. In the FTSL, short practice resulted in no delayed gains after the long delay, but after 24-48 h following long practice, task performance was further improved. In contrast, no delayed gains evolved in the TOHP during the 24- to 48-h delay following long practice. We propose that the attainment of a plateau phase can indicate either the attainment of a comprehensive task solution routine (achievable for simple tasks) or a preservation of work-in-progress task solution routine (complex tasks); performance after a long post-practice interval can differentiate these two states.</p>","PeriodicalId":48398,"journal":{"name":"Memory & Cognition","volume":" ","pages":"960-973"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12052877/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142127045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}