European Economic Review最新文献_第5页

Appetite for Ignorance: Does eating meat cause information avoidance about its harms? 无知的欲望：吃肉会导致对其危害的信息回避吗？

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105013

Bénédicte Droz , Berno Buechel , Mónica Capra , Xi Chen , Anis Nassar , Seong Gyu Park , Jin Xu , Shanshan Zhang , Joshua Tasoff

{"title":"Appetite for Ignorance: Does eating meat cause information avoidance about its harms?","authors":"Bénédicte Droz , Berno Buechel , Mónica Capra , Xi Chen , Anis Nassar , Seong Gyu Park , Jin Xu , Shanshan Zhang , Joshua Tasoff","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Meat consumption is associated with environmental and animal-welfare harms, and many people consume more than is healthy. Past research has shown that conflicted consumers manage their beliefs in a variety of domains. Based on two independent studies, we test whether eating meat affects people’s preferences for information about the environmental, animal-welfare, and health harms of meat, as well as the alleged environmental benefits of animal agriculture. Our findings are mixed. Eating beef causes information avoidance about the environmental effects of cattle, and eating pork causes people to avoid information about the health effects of pork. Other results were not significant. We interpret these mixed results as suggesting that eating meat causes information avoidance, but the effects are nuanced as they are meat-specific and topic-specific. This project combines the independent explorations of two teams regarding the same research question. The joint conclusion reached differs from the initial independent conclusions. Consequently, this paper also serves as a case study about the sensitivity of scientific interpretation to experimental design.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 105013"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143696640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Income uncertainty, precautionary wealth, and social insurance 收入不确定性、预防性财富和社会保险

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105003

Matthew Joyce, Aarti Singh

引用次数: 0

A quantitative model of trust as a predictor of social group sizes and its implications for technology 信任作为社会群体规模预测因子的定量模型及其对技术的影响

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105012

M. Burgess , R.I.M. Dunbar

{"title":"A quantitative model of trust as a predictor of social group sizes and its implications for technology","authors":"M. Burgess , R.I.M. Dunbar","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The human capacity for working together and with tools builds on cognitive abilities that, while not unique to humans, are most developed in humans both in scale and plasticity. Our capacity to engage with collaborators and with technology requires a continuous expenditure of attentive work that we show may be understood in terms of what is heuristically argued as ‘trust’ in socio-economic fields. By adopting a ‘social physics’ of information approach, we are able to bring dimensional analysis to bear on an anthropological-economic issue. The cognitive-economic trade-off between group size and rate of attention to detail is the connection between these. This allows humans to scale cooperative effort across groups, from teams to communities, with a trade-off between group size and attention. We show here that an accurate concept of trust follows a bipartite ‘economy of work’ model, and that this leads to correct predictions about the statistical distribution of group sizes in society. Trust is essentially a cognitive-economic issue that depends on the memory cost of past behaviour and on the frequency of attentive policing of intent. All this leads to the characteristic ‘fractal’ structure for human communities. The balance between attraction to some alpha attractor and dispersion due to conflict fully explains data from all relevant sources. The implications of our method suggest a broad applicability beyond purely social groupings to general resource constrained interactions, e.g. in work, technology, cybernetics, and generalized socio-economic systems of all kinds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 105012"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143643922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reaching for gold! The impact of a positive reputation shock on career choice 夺金！正面声誉冲击对职业选择的影响

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105017

Daniel Goller , Stefan C. Wolter

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Job separation shocks, costly vacancy creation and job rationing 工作分离冲击，昂贵的职位空缺和工作配给

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105004

Jhih-Chian Wu

{"title":"Job separation shocks, costly vacancy creation and job rationing","authors":"Jhih-Chian Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper demonstrates that accurately assessing the roles of matching frictions and job rationing in U.S. unemployment requires a model that captures the observed decrease in labor market tightness following a job separation shock. The free entry version of the job rationing model underestimates the impact of matching frictions, instead emphasizing job rationing as the primary driver of U.S. unemployment, because it produces a counterfactual increase in tightness, which raises the job-finding rate and reduces unemployment attributed to matching frictions. Conversely, the costly entry version, which incorporates vacancy creation costs, accurately reproduces the observed decline in tightness, indicating that U.S. unemployment is primarily driven by matching frictions. The response of labor market tightness to a job separation shock is shaped by two opposing effects: the marginal product effect, which increases tightness, and the capitalization effect, which decreases tightness. Including vacancy creation costs strengthens the capitalization effect, outweighing the marginal product effect, and results in the observed decline in tightness. These findings underscore the importance of incorporating vacancy creation costs to accurately measure the impact of matching frictions on unemployment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"177 ","pages":"Article 105004"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144170496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Public pensions reforms: Financial and political sustainability 公共养老金改革：财政和政治上的可持续性

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104988

Javier Díaz-Giménez , Julián Díaz-Saavedra

引用次数: 0

An issue dedicated to Konrad Mierendorff: Introduction 一期献给康拉德·米伦多夫：导言

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105001

Martin Cripps, Antonio Guarino, Vasiliki Skreta

引用次数: 0

Herd behavior and the intention to vaccinate against COVID-19 群体行为和接种COVID-19疫苗的意愿

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105016

Gil S. Epstein , Odelia Heizler , Osnat Israeli

引用次数: 0

A crises-bailouts game 危机救助游戏

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104999

Bruno Salcedo , Bruno Sultanum , Ruilin Zhou

{"title":"A crises-bailouts game","authors":"Bruno Salcedo , Bruno Sultanum , Ruilin Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104999","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104999","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the optimal design of a liability-sharing arrangement as an infinitely repeated game. We construct a noncooperative model with an active and a passive agent. The active agent can take a costly and unobservable avoidance action to reduce the incidence of a crisis, but a crisis is costly for both agents. When a crisis occurs, each agent decides how much to contribute to mitigating it. For the one-shot game, when the avoidance cost is not too high relative to the expected loss of crisis for the active agent, a no-bailout policy always achieves the first-best outcome, at which the active agent puts in effort to minimize the crisis incidence. However, the first-best is not achievable when the avoidance cost is sufficiently high. We show that, in the latter case with the same stage game, the first-best cannot be implemented as a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) of the infinitely repeated game either. Instead, at any constrained efficient PPE with avoidance, the active agent “shirks” infinitely often, though crises are always mitigated, and is bailed out infinitely often. The reason is that promises of future shirking and bailout incentivize the active player to take the costly crisis-avoidance action in the present. This result runs contrary to the typical moral hazard view that bailouts reduce incentives for agents to avoid crises. Here bailouts enhance ex-ante mitigation efforts rather than diminish them and are necessary to achieve the second-best. We use finite-state automata to approximate the constrained efficient PPE and explore some comparative statics of the repeated game numerically.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 104999"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143679069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Institutional diversity and innovative recombination 制度多元化和创新重组

IF 2.8 2区经济学

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104998

Nathan P. Goodman , Otto Lehto , Mikayla Novak

{"title":"Institutional diversity and innovative recombination","authors":"Nathan P. Goodman , Otto Lehto , Mikayla Novak","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104998","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104998","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In <em>Explaining Technology</em>, <span><span>Koppl et al. (2023)</span></span> argue that “recombination is the essential driver of technological evolution” (p. 3). Modelling combinatorial innovation as a self-propelling, “autocatalytic” process raises the question of what explanatory role, if any, is left for institutional analysis. Although the authors grant institutions only an auxiliary explanatory role, they hint at the functional importance of market institutions, trade networks, patent law, and entrepreneurship. Our paper argues that institutions matter because they crucially affect aggregate levels and rates of recombination and innovation, as well as shaping patterns of recombination and innovation that occur. This paper builds upon Koppl et al.’s acknowledgement of these institutional effects by integrating combinatorial evolution within recent developments in commons theory and institutional economics. Specifically, we argue the burgeoning literature on Governing Knowledge Commons offers a fruitful framework and body of empirical case studies that illuminates the diverse institutions individuals use to facilitate and steer combinatorial innovation. Whilst healthy institutional diversity may incentivize more recombination than any single monocentric institutional arrangement, the non-teleological aspect of recombination means that innovative processes can exude either productive, unproductive, or destructive effects. The institutional diversity fostered by flourishing knowledge commons may allow people to put combinatorial innovations into more productive uses while internalizing their complex externalities. At the same time, it may generate socio-cultural resistances to some forms of innovation processes. We illustrate our theory using cases related to several applied topics including intellectual property, competition policy, and the development of unmanned aerial vehicles.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"174 ","pages":"Article 104998"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143464235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0