Accounting Organizations and Society最新文献_第10页

Accounting and the territorialization of markets: A field study of the Colorado cannabis market 会计和市场的属地化:科罗拉多州大麻市场的实地研究

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101351

Daniel E. Martinez , Dane Pflueger , Tommaso Palermo

引用次数: 3

Death is a law: Death of former colleagues and management forecasts 死亡是一条规律:前同事的死亡和管理层的预测

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101350

Yu Flora Kuang , Leye Li , Louise Yi Lu , Bo Qin

引用次数: 1

The effects of audit committee ties and industry expertise on investor judgments—Extending Source Credibility Theory 审计委员会关系和行业专业知识对投资者判断的影响——延伸来源可信度理论

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101352

Jeffrey R. Cohen , Lisa Milici Gaynor , Ganesh Krishnamoorthy , Arnold M. Wright

{"title":"The effects of audit committee ties and industry expertise on investor judgments—Extending Source Credibility Theory","authors":"Jeffrey R. Cohen , Lisa Milici Gaynor , Ganesh Krishnamoorthy , Arnold M. Wright","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101352","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101352","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Personal ties (e.g., belonging to the same country club) and/or professional ties (e.g., serving on boards together) between the CEO and audit committee members can potentially impair members' objectivity. Additionally, prior research indicates that audit committee member industry<span> expertise enhances financial reporting quality. In an experiment with 342 reasonably informed investors, we find, as hypothesized by Source Credibility Theory (SCT), personal ties negatively impact investors’ assessments of audit committee independence more than professional ties, and industry expertise enhances assessments of competence. We also find investors assess audit committees with no ties and industry expertise (personal ties and no industry expertise) as the most (least) effective and indicate the highest (lowest) likelihood of investing. Further, extending SCT we find the incremental positive effect of industry expertise is greater when there are personal ties than when there are no ties. In a path model, competence and independence assessments directly affect each other, and in turn affect assessments of audit committee effectiveness and investment decisions. Finally, in a second experiment we find reasonably informed investors recognize variations in the nature of personal ties and that industry expertise attenuates the effect of advisory ties but not close friendship ties.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 101352"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44765549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Financial priming, psychological distance, and recognizing financial misreporting as an ethical issue: The role of financial reporting responsibility 财务启动、心理距离和承认财务误报是一个道德问题:财务报告责任的作用

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101349

Nicholas C. Hunt , Mary B. Curtis , Jessica M. Rixom

{"title":"Financial priming, psychological distance, and recognizing financial misreporting as an ethical issue: The role of financial reporting responsibility","authors":"Nicholas C. Hunt , Mary B. Curtis , Jessica M. Rixom","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101349","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Prior research finds that financial priming (thinking about money) results in leniency toward unethical activities. This research suggests that accountants, because of frequent financial priming, may be prone to overlooking unethical acts. Construal level theory research further suggests that psychologically distant events (also common in accounting) may exacerbate financial priming's effects. Across three experiments, we explore the interactive effect of financial priming, psychological distance, and financial reporting responsibility on recognition of financial misreporting as an ethical issue. Consistent with past research, we find that financially (versus neutrally) primed businesspeople without prior financial reporting responsibility are less likely to recognize psychologically distant financial misreporting as an ethical issue. Importantly, however, we find that financially (versus neutrally) primed accountants and other business professionals with financial reporting responsibility consider psychologically distant financial misreporting to be more unethical. Preliminary process evidence suggests that, when exposed to psychologically distant financial misreporting, financially (versus neutrally) primed businesspeople with financial reporting responsibility focus more on protecting those who rely on accurate financial reports than on protecting the company committing the financial misreporting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 101349"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43980185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Do auditors’ incentives affect materiality assessments of prior-period misstatements? 审计师的激励会影响前期错报的重要性评估吗?

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2021.101332

Brant Christensen , Roy Schmardebeck , Timothy Seidel

{"title":"Do auditors’ incentives affect materiality assessments of prior-period misstatements?","authors":"Brant Christensen , Roy Schmardebeck , Timothy Seidel","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2021.101332","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2021.101332","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether auditors' incentives affect materiality assessments of prior-period misstatements. Interviews with global network firm partners reveal consistency across firms in the process used to assess prior-period misstatements and highlight points in the process where judgments are most susceptible to auditors’ conscious or subconscious biases. In related empirical tests, we find that auditors assess misstatements as less material (i.e., misstatements are disclosed less prominently) when auditors face greater engagement risk (comprised of the risk of litigation and reputation loss) or have greater incentives to please important clients. These effects only occur when auditor incentives to avoid further litigation or client losses within an audit office are most salient and when the quantitative magnitude of the misstatement is in a range subject to greater professional judgment. Thus, we identify boundary conditions on the extent to which auditor incentives affect materiality judgments. Finally, additional tests suggest that neither local engagement partners nor professional practice partners are immune from these incentives. Our study should be informative to audit firms when designing and updating quality control structures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 101332"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46827333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Managing the trade-off between autonomy and task interdependence in creative teams: The role of organizational-level cultural control 管理创造性团队中自主性和任务相互依赖之间的权衡:组织层面文化控制的作用

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101347

Isabella Grabner , Aleksandra Klein , Gerhard Speckbacher

{"title":"Managing the trade-off between autonomy and task interdependence in creative teams: The role of organizational-level cultural control","authors":"Isabella Grabner , Aleksandra Klein , Gerhard Speckbacher","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101347","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101347","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the creative industries, creative output is often produced in temporary project teams, staffed with employees from within the organization. In this study we make two main contributions regarding the management of creative performance in such teams. First, we provide evidence for a fundamental trade-off inherent in creative teamwork. Team creativity benefits both from high team member autonomy and high task interdependence, but when team leaders give higher autonomy to team members then this undermines the positive effect of a more interdependent design of teamwork on team creativity, and vice versa. Second, we argue that cultural control at the organizational level is an effective means to resolve this team-level trade-off and to enable teams to leverage both high autonomy and high task interdependence for higher team creativity. We test our hypotheses using survey data collected at three different organizational levels (team members, team leaders, and agency heads) from 372 individuals of 101 temporary project teams within 53 advertising agencies, and find evidence consistent with our predictions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 101347"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368222000149/pdfft?md5=2a10df4fe1aa60483872cdd8ad0cf51c&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368222000149-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41784585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Budgeting and employee stress in times of crisis: Evidence from the Covid-19 pandemic 危机时期的预算和员工压力:来自Covid-19大流行的证据

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101346

David S. Bedford , Roland F. Speklé , Sally K. Widener

{"title":"Budgeting and employee stress in times of crisis: Evidence from the Covid-19 pandemic","authors":"David S. Bedford , Roland F. Speklé , Sally K. Widener","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101346","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101346","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Prior research has shown that that management control practices change in response to global crises, yet we have little understanding of the behavioral consequences of these changes. The purpose of this study is to explore the behavioral effects that stem from crisis-induced changes to management control practices and the factors that intensify or diminish these effects. Using survey data from business unit managers in the Netherlands, our results show that firms tighten their budget controls in response to a negative impact of Covid-19. In turn, the tightening of budget controls is positively associated with employees' emotional exhaustion because of increased perceptions of role ambiguity and role conflict. We furthermore find that the effect of tighter budget controls on role ambiguity is mitigated when managers perceive that the budget controls are used in an enabling way prior to the crisis but heightened with increased trust in senior management. These results suggest that if firms use their budgets to help managers acquire a deeper understanding of their tasks and responsibilities, they are better able to respond to a negative shock and the accompanying tightening of budget controls, which helps mitigate the undesired behavioral response of increased role ambiguity and emotional exhaustion. Our findings also suggest that trust, which usually is beneficial to organizations, has a ‘dark’ side in that managers will push themselves harder to reciprocate the trust they have in their senior managers, which exacerbates the effect of tighter budget controls on role ambiguity and, in turn, emotional exhaustion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 101346"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368222000137/pdfft?md5=e0f804e523a58a9b841896709ca5a6ff&pid=1-s2.0-S0361368222000137-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48069315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 19

Auditors' response to management confidence and misstatement risk 审计师对管理层信心和错报风险的回应

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101348

Sanaz Aghazadeh , Jennifer R. Joe

{"title":"Auditors' response to management confidence and misstatement risk","authors":"Sanaz Aghazadeh , Jennifer R. Joe","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101348","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101348","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Corporate managers display varying degrees of confidence, but investors appear to have difficulty distinguishing when management's high confidence is warranted (i.e., when it signals accuracy and/or future positive outcomes). Archival research finds that the managers associated with proxies for high confidence are actually “overconfident” because their choices ultimately resulted in personal and shareholder losses, on average. Auditors are experienced in evaluating management and are trained to be professionally skeptical, and users rely on them to reduce the information risk around noisy signals in financial reporting. Therefore, we investigate whether and how management confidence impacts auditors' response to the risk of material misstatement (RMM). Audit standards are explicit that auditors should increase testing and acquire more reliable evidence as RMM increases. Accordingly, we conduct an experiment, varying management confidence in their explanations about an accounting estimate and RMM at the client. We find, consistent with the thought-suppression literature, that although auditors universally believe relying on management's explanations without corroboration is inappropriate and that high confidence signals management's desire to induce auditor reliance, they do not distinguish their response to RMM when management confidence is high. When management confidence is low, auditors appropriately perform more testing for clients where RMM is higher than lower. Auditors' testing judgements moderate their likelihood of pursuing inquiry evidence for higher than lower risk clients when management confidence is high versus when it was low. Our finding is troublesome because deceitful managers can readily manipulate confidence and influence the explanations and inquiry evidence presented to auditors. Thus, our research offers evidence that auditors' tendency to be influenced by high management confidence can play a contributing role in the observed association between high management confidence and biased financial reporting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"101 ","pages":"Article 101348"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45795587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Competing for narrative authority in capital markets: Activist short sellers vs. financial analysts 资本市场话语权之争:激进卖空者与金融分析师

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101334

Hervé Stolowy , Luc Paugam , Yves Gendron

{"title":"Competing for narrative authority in capital markets: Activist short sellers vs. financial analysts","authors":"Hervé Stolowy , Luc Paugam , Yves Gendron","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101334","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.aos.2022.101334","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Activist short sellers (AShSs) and financial analysts are information intermediaries who analyze firm disclosures as well as produce and disseminate influential investment </span>narratives. This study aims to better understand narrative challenges surrounding the legitimate expertise of financial analysts. Specifically, we examine how AShSs challenge sell-side financial analysts' narrative authority (i.e., the perception that they produce expert knowledge) in interpreting firms' performance and future prospects. We investigate how analysts respond (or do not respond) to this challenge. We use 442 AShS reports, 12 interviews with AShSs and analysts, and analysts' stock recommendations and target prices. In their criticisms of analysts (found in one-third of reports), AShSs frequently frame analysts as lacking market expertise and critical thinking – two core dimensions of analysts' narrative authority. Sixty-six percent of analysts, although explicitly criticized in AShS reports, do not engage in written responses in their equity research reports because they reportedly either adopt a renunciation attitude to the challenge or they engage in off-the-record discussions with certain market participants. However, 34% of analysts respond overtly by counter-framing AShSs as lacking market expertise and objectivity. After the dissemination of AShS reports, analysts, on average, do not revise their highly visible stock recommendations but they revise target prices downward. Theoretically, this study extends our understanding of the construction of narrative authority in capital markets as we examine a challenge to the expertise of influential information intermediaries.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 101334"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41471207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

You can't get there from here: The influence of an audit partner's prior non-public accounting experience on audit outcomes 你不能从这里到达那里:审计合伙人以前的非公开会计经验对审计结果的影响

IF 4.7 2区管理学

Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2021.101331

Ling Lei Lisic , Jeffrey Pittman , Timothy A. Seidel , Aleksandra “Ally” B. Zimmerman

{"title":"You can't get there from here: The influence of an audit partner's prior non-public accounting experience on audit outcomes","authors":"Ling Lei Lisic , Jeffrey Pittman , Timothy A. Seidel , Aleksandra “Ally” B. Zimmerman","doi":"10.1016/j.aos.2021.101331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2021.101331","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the importance of audit partners' prior non-public accounting experience (hereafter, “industry experience”) to audit outcomes. We conducted 20 (nine) semi-structured interviews of audit partners with (without) industry experience. These interviews shed light on industry-experienced partners’ career path choices, perceptions of the challenges and benefits stemming from industry experience, and perceptions of how this experience influences their current audit work. Grounded in theory and the results of these interviews, we empirically examine using a unique hand-collected dataset whether audit partners with industry experience conduct higher quality and more efficient audits. Our evidence implies that industry experience is associated with both higher audit quality and greater efficiency. In additional analyses, we examine the influence of potential mechanisms for these observed associations and find some evidence that the nature and timing of this experience matters. Specifically, actual first-hand experience in major oversight positions among boomerang auditors plays an integral role in the quality of the audits that these partners deliver, while experience in a major oversight position or specialized industry in which the partner audits translates into greater efficiencies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48379,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Organizations and Society","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 101331"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136838827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0