{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 4","pages":"995-1015"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148069078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 4","pages":"969-994"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148069076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 4","pages":"969-994"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148069075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 4","pages":"995-1015"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148069077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third-Party Loan Guarantees","authors":"CHENYU SHAN, DRAGON YONGJUN TANG, WENYA WANG","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13219","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide the first theoretical and empirical study on third-party loan guarantees, a prevalent financing channel worldwide for small borrowers. In our model, the project default probability is unobservable but can be probabilistically discovered with a screening cost. Guarantors, who are more cost-effective in screening than banks, investigate borrowers and facilitate the financing of borrowers with insufficient collateral. Our data support this outsourcing theory: guarantor's risk measure predicts firms' default losses. Patterns of guarantee fees and loan rates are consistent with model predictions. Our findings illustrate how guarantors produce information and increase the efficiency of small business lending.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"57 8","pages":"2003-2042"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145792467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory Capital Management to Exceed Thresholds","authors":"LUCIANA OROZCO, SILVINA RUBIO","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13230","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate whether a <i>carrot</i> approach, which provides benefits for regulatory compliance rather than penalties for noncompliance, incentivizes banks to reach capital levels above the minimum requirements. We document a significant discontinuity at the 10% regulatory capital threshold, where banks receive benefits for exceeding it. Banks exceed it to pay lower deposit insurance fees, access brokered deposits, and expanded financial activities. Banks often rely on equity to reach this threshold while using accounting discretion primarily when facing small capital shortfalls. Our findings suggest the <i>carrot</i> approach can effectively increase banks' capital positions. However, we find that using accounting discretion to exceed the threshold hurts bank stability.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"57 6","pages":"1421-1464"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13230","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144998986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Potential Output Pessimism and Austerity in the European Union","authors":"PEI KUANG, KAUSHIK MITRA","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13233","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper develops a business cycle model with policymakers' learning about potential output to analyze the European recession following the Global Financial Crisis. The initial recession led to overpessimism about potential output and cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB), triggering fiscal austerity. The austerity caused further recession, which reinforced potential output and CAB pessimism, requiring continued austerity. The mutual reinforcement between pessimism and austerity contributed to the prolonged recession. The model replicates new findings regarding revisions to potential output estimates and the relationship between fiscal consolidation and policymakers' beliefs. Without policymakers' overpessimism, Eurozone GDP would have been 4.5% higher in 2012.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"57 7","pages":"1871-1905"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jmcb.13233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145341780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stress Tests, Information Disclosure, and Credit Line Runs","authors":"JOSE E. GUTIERREZ, LUIS FERNÁNDEZ LAFUERZA","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13242","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The public disclosure of bank-level stress test results, while informative for market participants, can adversely affect underperforming entities. We uncover a novel cost of disclosing unfavorable stress test results: credit line runs. Using Spanish Credit Register data and the 2011 European Banking Authority stress test, we find that, after results were released, firms drew down about 10 percentage points more available funds from credit lines granted by banks with poor stress test performance. In addition, these banks reduced credit line sizes more before the release and were more likely to cut term lending to firms without credit lines afterward.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"57 7","pages":"1691-1728"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145341444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Regulatory Stress Tests on Banks' Portfolio Similarity and Implications for Systemic Risk","authors":"FALK BRÄUNING, JOSÉ L. FILLAT","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13239","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Portfolio similarity among the largest U.S. banks has increased since stress testing began in 2012. Using aggregate and detailed loan-level data, we find that, as a result of stress testing, banks rebalance their portfolio toward similarly diversified portfolios, leading to higher concentration in the aggregate banking system and raising financial stability concerns as systemic risk contributions increase. The rebalancing is driven by a supply contraction in loans that cause larger losses under stress testing, especially by banks with high capital losses in past stress tests. This rebalancing holds conditional on assets that have identical contributions to regulatory capital requirements.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"57 6","pages":"1387-1419"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144999122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 4","pages":"1131-1166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148079000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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