发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Public Choice最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership 国会委员会领导力的锦标赛理论
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y
Christian Fong, Joshua McCrain
{"title":"A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership","authors":"Christian Fong, Joshua McCrain","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We apply tournament theory to congressional leadership to unify research on campaign finance with theories of endogenous party strength. Parties want to incentivize members to do costly work for the benefit of the party, such as fundraising. Accordingly, they make leadership offices attractive and award these leadership offices on the basis of who does the most work for the party. The more attractive the leadership office becomes, the harder party members work to win. We present a model to formalize this argument, derive its empirical implications, and find support for these implications using data from committee assignments, committee authorizations, and fundraising for leadership political action committees and congressional hill committees.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141529141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The political economy of the original “Thucydides’ Trap”: a conflict economics perspective on the Peloponnesian war 原始 "修昔底德陷阱 "的政治经济学：从冲突经济学角度看伯罗奔尼撒战争
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01179-9
George Tridimas
{"title":"The political economy of the original “Thucydides’ Trap”: a conflict economics perspective on the Peloponnesian war","authors":"George Tridimas","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01179-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01179-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141348183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complex externalities: introduction to the special issue 复杂的外部因素：特刊导言
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01176-y
Pablo Paniagua, Veeshan Rayamajhee, I. Murtazashvili
{"title":"Complex externalities: introduction to the special issue","authors":"Pablo Paniagua, Veeshan Rayamajhee, I. Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01176-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01176-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141345765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Democratization and knowledge in social sciences 民主化与社会科学知识
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01181-1
Amir Tayebi, Sheida Teimouri
{"title":"Democratization and knowledge in social sciences","authors":"Amir Tayebi, Sheida Teimouri","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01181-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01181-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141365153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rosters and connected apportionments 名册和相关摊款
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0
Manshu Khanna, Haydar Evren
{"title":"Rosters and connected apportionments","authors":"Manshu Khanna, Haydar Evren","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Affirmative action in India reserves explicit proportions of seats and jobs in publicly funded institutions for various beneficiary groups. Because seats are indivisible and arise in small numbers over time, implementation of this policy requires that beneficiary groups take turns claiming seats, for which purpose India relies on a device called a roster. We study the problem of constructing a roster, which involves addressing a series of connected apportionment problems. To identify suitable apportionment methods, six essential requirements direct our search to a large class of divisor methods. We show that the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method is the unique divisor method that satisfies several practical properties and fairness criteria. Comparative analysis between an existing Indian roster and the application of the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method highlights that method’s benefits.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can fiscal transparency mitigate political budget cycles? 财政透明度能否缓解政治预算周期？
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01174-0
Hyewon Kang
{"title":"Can fiscal transparency mitigate political budget cycles?","authors":"Hyewon Kang","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01174-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01174-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141267756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Housing values and jurisdictional fragmentation 住房价值和管辖区分散
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01160-6
John William Hatfield, Katrina Kosec, Luke P. Rodgers
{"title":"Housing values and jurisdictional fragmentation","authors":"John William Hatfield, Katrina Kosec, Luke P. Rodgers","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01160-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01160-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the impact of the number of local governments in a metropolitan area on housing values within the United States. We find that metropolitan areas with one standard deviation more counties have housing values that are almost 11% higher. This difference may be driven by the fact that we also find higher wages (accounting for worker characteristics) in areas with more local governments. Moreover, we find that areas with more local governments have more business-friendly policies, such as freer labor markets, but similar levels of taxation and spending. The number of local governments does not seem to significantly impact environmental quality, educational outcomes, or crime.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141166490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The institutional structure of pollution: large-scale externalities and the common law 污染的制度结构：大规模外部效应与普通法
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-05-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01172-2
Larry Eubanks, Glenn L. Furton
{"title":"The institutional structure of pollution: large-scale externalities and the common law","authors":"Larry Eubanks, Glenn L. Furton","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01172-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01172-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper revisits a long-standing discussion surrounding the efficacy of the common law versus government intervention in addressing large-scale environmental externalities. Drawing on a conceptual framework developed by James M. Buchanan, we challenge the prevailing economic orthodoxy which holds that so-called “large-number” externalities inherently necessitate government policy intervention. Instead, we argue that the common law offers a viable means of addressing both small- and large-scale environmental pollution problems. Using riparian and nuisance cases from the nineteenth and early twentieth-century as a case study, we demonstrate how common law has historically managed to resolve water pollution disputes, even in cases involving many parties. The paper expands the discussion on externalities by integrating insights from environmental and institutional economics, highlighting the role played by transaction costs, collective action, and institutional reform in the preservation of environmental resources. Our findings suggest that a more polycentric system of rules, relying more heavily on decentralized legal institutions, could offer more efficient and adaptable solutions to contemporary environmental challenges.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141152738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corruption, bribery, and market reform 腐败、贿赂和市场改革
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-05-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01169-x
H. Beladi, S. Marjit, Vivekananda Mukherjee
{"title":"Corruption, bribery, and market reform","authors":"H. Beladi, S. Marjit, Vivekananda Mukherjee","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01169-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01169-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141100654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Investment incentives attract foreign direct investment: evidence from the great recession 投资激励措施吸引外国直接投资：大衰退的证据
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-05-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01158-0
Aycan Katitas, Sonal Pandya
{"title":"Investment incentives attract foreign direct investment: evidence from the great recession","authors":"Aycan Katitas, Sonal Pandya","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01158-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01158-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141102996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信