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Intergovernmental alignment and the electoral value of mayors: reverse coattails in an unexpected technocracy 政府间协调与市长的选举价值：意想不到的技术官僚体制中的反向 "裙带关系
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01128-y
Alexandru Savu
{"title":"Intergovernmental alignment and the electoral value of mayors: reverse coattails in an unexpected technocracy","authors":"Alexandru Savu","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01128-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01128-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Although parties are documented to invest significant amounts of resources towards strengthening their hold on local governments, whether mayors benefit their parties in national elections remains an open question. More specifically, it is unclear if mayors are electorally valuable in periods when party-affiliated central governments do not support them via politically discriminatory policies. We address this gap by studying “reverse coattails” in a unique setting: under a technocratic central government instituted following an unexpected, exogenous tragic event that forced the previous government’s resignation. Investigating close mayoral races in Romania in a regression discontinuity analysis, we find that local incumbency generated meaningful vote share premiums in the 2016 parliamentary elections. Exploring the underlying mechanism, we retrieve evidence for prospective voting, suggesting that the reverse coattails we document are partially driven by voters’ expectations of future preferential resource allocations by the central government. We show that preferential central policies were implemented <i>after, but not before</i> the national elections, and find that reverse coattails were stronger in constituencies where funds received from the center are an important component of local revenues.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140627195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A unified approach to measuring unequal representation 衡量不平等代表权的统一方法
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01159-z
Junichiro Wada, Yuta Kamahara
{"title":"A unified approach to measuring unequal representation","authors":"Junichiro Wada, Yuta Kamahara","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01159-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01159-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The concept of unequal representation is commonly understood through the lenses of <i>disproportionality</i> and <i>malapportionment</i>, pertaining to <i>inter-party</i> and <i>inter-district</i> aspects, respectively. Popular indices used to measure such features are analyzed separately despite being mathematically identical. District-level <i>wasted votes</i> are not measured in terms of unequal representation, even though they can be conceptualized as <i>intra-district unequal representation</i>. A new component, <i>intra-party unequal representation</i>, which measures unequal representation across districts for voters who support each party, has not been considered to contribute to unequal representation. We propose a unified approach for measuring these components—disproportionality, malapportionment, wasted votes, and intra-party unequal representation—by using <span>({alpha })</span>-divergence. We show mathematically that the total of disproportionality and intra-party unequal representation equals that of malapportionment and wasted votes. We apply this approach to the Japanese political system and demonstrate the role of intra-party unequal representation in sustaining disproportionality in favor of the Liberal Democratic Party.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140630739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revolutions and rational choice: A critical discussion 革命与理性选择：批判性讨论
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01153-5
Pierre Courtois, Rabia Nessah, Tarik Tazdaït
{"title":"Revolutions and rational choice: A critical discussion","authors":"Pierre Courtois, Rabia Nessah, Tarik Tazdaït","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01153-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01153-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since the early studies of Olson (The logic of collective action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971/1965) and Tullock (Public Choice 11:89–99, 1971), who first defined the paradox of revolution, there has been a great deal of relevant work based on rational choice theory. While the main point of this research is to investigate solutions to this apparent paradox, its overall contribution is the provision of a rich analysis of revolutions in the light of rational choice. This article provides an overview of the literature over the last fifty years, highlighting the richness and complexity of the issues underlying the paradox and, more generally, collective action. The emphasis is placed on the salient points of what this literature and its evolution teach us about revolutionary commitment.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140627464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The political economy of climate action in Indian Country 印第安地区气候行动的政治经济学
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01157-1
Tessa Provins
{"title":"The political economy of climate action in Indian Country","authors":"Tessa Provins","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01157-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01157-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The public choice literature has long considered the political economy of environmental regulation and has examined a variety of national and subnational governments’ environmental policies aimed at adaption to climate change. However, there has been little attention paid to the determinants of environmental adaptive actions taken by indigenous governments. Given many indigenous peoples’ heightened vulnerability to issues caused by climate change, it is important to understand when and why they take action to adapt to climate change and what obstacles may stand in the way. I argue that natural resource abundance, informational resource access, population vulnerability, and reliance on natural resources will impact whether indigenous governments enact policies to respond to climate change. Using an original dataset of tribal actions addressing climate change for 574 federally recognized tribal governments, I find that the amount of land, educational attainment, broadband access, and proportion of tribal members working in the natural resource industries are positively associated with the tribal government’s responses to climate change.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140627312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to choose a compatible committee? 如何选择一个合适的委员会？
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01163-3
Ritu Dutta, Rajnish Kumar, Surajit Borkotokey
{"title":"How to choose a compatible committee?","authors":"Ritu Dutta, Rajnish Kumar, Surajit Borkotokey","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01163-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01163-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Electing a committee of size <i>k</i> from <i>m</i> candidates (<span>(k &lt; m)</span>) is an interesting problem under multi-winner voting situations. In this paper, we propose a new committee selection rule based on cooperative game theoretic tools, where voters can approve both individuals and groups of candidates simultaneously. This flexibility of approving groups of candidates allows the voters to assess the candidates’ compatibility to work in a group. In many situations, the <i>k</i>-elected candidates have no particular status as a group and voters in such multi-winner elections are presumably concerned about the personal qualities of the candidates. However, many committees function in unison and therefore, their productivity also depends on the compatibility of the members to accomplish a task together. We assume that the voters have prior beliefs about this compatibility. The profile of summed approval votes constitutes the characteristic function of a cooperative game. The Shapley value of this game is calculated to measure the candidates’ expected marginal contributions in accomplishing the group task as perceived by the voters. The top <i>k</i>-ranked candidates prescribed by the Shapley value are selected to form the desired committee. The Shapley value as a committee selection rule is characterized by a set of intuitive axioms. We explore several properties of the committee selection rule.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140627305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Enhancing voluntary contributions in a public goods economy via a minimum individual contribution level 通过最低个人缴费水平加强公益经济中的自愿捐款
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01165-1
Michela Chessa, Patrick Loiseau
{"title":"Enhancing voluntary contributions in a public goods economy via a minimum individual contribution level","authors":"Michela Chessa, Patrick Loiseau","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01165-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01165-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose and theoretically analyze a measure to encourage greater voluntary contributions to public goods. Our measure is a simple intervention that restricts individuals’ strategy sets by imposing a minimum individual contribution level while still allowing for full free riding for those who do not want to contribute. We show that for a well-chosen value of the minimum individual contribution level, this measure does not incentivize any additional free riding while strictly increasing the total contributions relative to the situation without the minimum contribution level. Our measure is appealing because it is nonintrusive and in line with the principle of “freedom of choice.” It is easily implementable for many different public goods settings where more intrusive measures are less accepted. This approach has been implemented in practice in some applications, such as charities.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140596719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Behavioral responses of mandatory masking within social interactions 社会交往中强制性掩蔽的行为反应
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01166-0
Eric Cardella, Briggs Depew, Ryan B. Williams
{"title":"Behavioral responses of mandatory masking within social interactions","authors":"Eric Cardella, Briggs Depew, Ryan B. Williams","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01166-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01166-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Social distance is known to impact interpersonal behaviors. We examine the potential consequences of mandated masking, which increases social distance, on social behavior. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted to systematically impose a mask mandate in the treatment group, and to measure how this mandate affected other-regarding behavior within various social interactions. We find that behavior in the mandatory masking condition is less other-regarding compared to the control group with zero mask wearing. Particularly, we document less altruism, more sabotaging, and less cooperation. Our result suggests that mandatory masking has the potential to have broad behavioral consequences in the form of people generally becoming more selfish. Our results are found to be more pronounced among females than males.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140596959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Attentiveness in elections with impressionable voters 易受影响的选民在选举中的注意力
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01161-5
Costel Andonie, Daniel Diermeier
{"title":"Attentiveness in elections with impressionable voters","authors":"Costel Andonie, Daniel Diermeier","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01161-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01161-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a model of attentiveness in elections with impressionable voters under three electoral rules: plurality, approval voting, and negative plurality. Voters’ conduct is determined by their attentiveness and impressions of candidates. We show that attentiveness is as important as voters’ preferences for the outcome of the election. Specifically, we show that candidates benefit from increased voter attention under all rules other than negative plurality. We then consider exogenous and endogenous attentiveness and show how our model can account for momentum effects in primaries, where candidates rise quickly and then fade away. Finally we consider the case of news coverage tone and show that under plurality rule e.g., primary elections, candidates may benefit from frequent news coverage even if the news is negative.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140596721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Balancing democracy: majoritarianism versus expression of preference intensity 平衡民主：多数主义与表达偏好的强度
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01146-4
Asaf D. M. Nitzan, Shmuel I. Nitzan
{"title":"Balancing democracy: majoritarianism versus expression of preference intensity","authors":"Asaf D. M. Nitzan, Shmuel I. Nitzan","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01146-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01146-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper evaluates three prominent voting systems: the Majority Rule (MR), Borda Rule (BR), and Plurality Rule (PR). Our analysis centers on the susceptibilities of each system to potential transgressions of two foundational principles: the respect for majority preference (majoritarianism) and the acknowledgment of the intensity of individual preferences. We operationalize the concept of 'cost' as the expected deviation from the aforementioned principles. A comparative assessment of MR, BR, and PR is undertaken in terms of their costs. Our findings underscore the superiority of PR over MR, whilst also highlighting the comparative advantage of MR against BR.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140152427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conflict under the shadow of elections 选举阴影下的冲突
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01148-2
Antonis Adam, Maxime Menuet, Petros G. Sekeris
{"title":"Conflict under the shadow of elections","authors":"Antonis Adam, Maxime Menuet, Petros G. Sekeris","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01148-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01148-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article we study whether an elected leader has incentives to withdraw from an ongoing military conflict before elections take place. Remaining active in the conflict increases the chances of a victory, which would boost the political incumbent’s reelection probability. On the other hand, if the rival does not surrender, then the incumbent politician’s reelection probability decreases because of the costly conflict citizens have to endure. We show that when the crisis is costly to voters, the more distant the elections are, the more likely the ruling government withdraws from an ongoing war early. For low-cost conflicts, politicians never give up the fighting. We also show that confrontations in the shadow of elections are socially inefficient (too long or too short) because of the inherent misalignment of preferences between citizens and politicians.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140055163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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