Public Choice最新文献

{"title":"Demonstrated risk preferences and COVID-19 regulations in the United States","authors":"Peter Anderson","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01185-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01185-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research has pointed towards U.S. state officials setting COVID regulations based on their constituents’ political affiliation. But a further explanation is needed as prior to 2020, U.S. voters did not choose their political party in accord with how they thought politicians would act in a pandemic. In contrast, other papers have found that people with higher risk preferences took fewer mitigating actions during COVID. Building on these results and the public choice view that political markets lack a dynamic-feedback process, this paper hypothesizes that upcoming elections incentivized state officials to partially set regulations in congruence with their constituents’ demonstrated risk preferences. The hypothesis is tested with a balanced panel of all U.S. states over seven time periods ranging from April until shortly before the 2020 election. A log-linear hybrid model finds a negative relationship between risky actions and the stringency of COVID regulations at the between-state level. The relationship is statistically and regulatorily significant while controlling for relevant time-varying and time-invariant health, political, and economic measures. Multiple robustness tests confirm these results, including instrumenting people’s risky actions. At the within-state level, regulations only varied with changes in revealed risk preferences when governors faced impending feedback from a reelection contest. Republican governors running for reelection decreased regulations when revealed risk taking increased whereas their Democratic counterparts responded by increasing regulations. In states without a gubernatorial election, regulations show little responsiveness to changes in risk taking, corroborating the public choice viewpoint.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141612082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Popular autocrats: why do voters support Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary? A quantitative analysis","authors":"Áron Hajnal","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01175-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01175-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Authoritarian populism has become an increasingly prevalent subtype of hybrid regime and is characterized by weakened democratic institutions and a leader who relies on populist appeals. Authoritarian populist regimes limit citizens’ freedom, undermine accountability and the rule of law, and are likely to be more corrupt than democratic regimes. Nevertheless, certain authoritarian populist regimes appear to enjoy broad popular support. Based on the European Social Survey database and my calculations of respondents’ personal income tax rates, I investigate the factors that influenced voters’ support for Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary from 2010 to 2020, which may be considered an exemplary case of an autocratic populist regime. The analysis shows that voters’ support for the government was influenced by their perceptions of the economy and government performance, political beliefs (i.e., policy congruence and ideology), and basic human values (i.e., self-transcendence and conservation). By contrast, changes in voters’ individual economic conditions were not found to be associated with their support for the government. The findings indicate that, in addition to explanations of government support that specifically focus on hybrid regimes, economic voting theory, which originated from and has typically been applied in democratic contexts, also provides viable explanations for understanding support for authoritarian populist regimes. More broadly, the findings also lend support to the altruistic and expressive voter hypotheses.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141570199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Jurisdiction size and perceived corruption","authors":"Abel François, Nicolas Lagios, Pierre-Guillaume Méon","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01188-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01188-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the relationship between the size of a jurisdiction and how corrupt its citizens perceive officials to be. The relationship may a priori be driven by four distinct mechanisms: (i) larger communities have more officials, thereby making it more likely at least one official is corrupt; (ii) larger communities have a larger budget, thereby offering more opportunity for corruption; (iii) monitoring officials is costlier in larger communities; and (iv) the public is less likely to have contact with officials in larger communities, which raises citizens’ suspicion. First, using cross-country analysis, we establish that people perceive more corruption in countries with larger populations. We then test this stylized fact using French survey data on the perception of municipal government corruption. We again observe that the perception of corruption increases with population size. This result is robust to a series of checks and many confounding factors. Moreover, our results hold across two distinct periods and for another administrative unit, departments. Finally, we report suggestive evidence that the stylized fact is driven by mechanisms (i) and (ii), but not by (iii) and (iv).</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141570200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Environmental regulation, regulatory spillovers and rent-seeking","authors":"Juan Pablo González","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01189-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01189-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do special interests react to an increase in their regulatory burden? In this paper, I use a shock to the regulatory environment by analyzing state-level enforcement of the Clean Air Act during the fracking boom. First, I show that fracking is associated with an increase in state regulatory activities for non-energy-related industries, generating regulatory spillovers to firms unrelated to fracking. Using the fact that fracking had regulatory spillovers to other industries, I use the presence of fracking as an instrument for environmental regulation for non-energy-related firms. I find that increased environmental enforcement is associated with an increase in state campaign contributions going to Republicans, and particularly to legislative races in competitive districts. These results provide some of the first evidence that changes in the regulatory environment can spur private sector mobilization with the potential to affect broader areas of policy through its electoral consequences.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141570201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internet Addiction and Psychological Health in Adolescent Indian Medical Students: A Cross-sectional Study.","authors":"Megha Agrawal, Sowmya Rajaram, Girija Kumar","doi":"10.32598/bcn.2021.3295.2","DOIUrl":"10.32598/bcn.2021.3295.2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Introduction: </strong>With the presence of the internet in daily life, it has become crucial to explore its purposes, implications, and effects on the mental health of users. As adolescents are a vulnerable age group, this study was conducted on Indian medical students in late adolescence to learn how the internet impacts their lives. We aim to explore the severity of problematic internet use (PIU) in Indian medical students. We intend to assess its effects on psychological health and loneliness and correlate PIU with the purpose of using the internet.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>A total of 185 first-year MBBS students of Bangalore Medical College and Research Institute (mean age: 18.07 years) were recruited and administered four questionnaires: Young's internet addiction test (YIAT20), UCLA loneliness questionnaire (version 3), general health questionnaire (GHQ12), and a self-administered questionnaire (to assess the purpose of internet usage).</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Out of 185 students, 67 were average users with complete control of their internet use, and 118 had PIU (113 with frequent, 5 with significant problems). PIU showed a significant positive correlation with psychological morbidity (r=0.34, P<0.0001) and loneliness (r=0.20, P=0.01). Daily mean use of the internet was mostly for social media (51.2%), followed by academics (20%), others (20%), and gaming (8.2%). PIU was significantly and positively correlated to social media usage (r=0.27, P=0.00) and negatively correlated to academics (r=-0.37, P<0.0001).</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>In our study, PIU was positively correlated to poor psychological health, loneliness, and use of social media. It showed a negative correlation with academics. This situation may suggest that PIU is linked to psychosocial implications. It may be worthwhile to correlate the purpose of use with the severity of PIU. Social media seems important in India as opposed to China, where gaming is the major concern. As some activities could be more addictive than others and result in a dysfunctional lifestyle, internet use must be regulated and used judiciously.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"73 1","pages":"477-488"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11565671/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72742069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Movement split: how the structure of revolutionary coalitions shapes revolutionary outcomes","authors":"Benjamin Abrams","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01170-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01170-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article investigates the relationship between the coalitional structure of revolutionary movements and revolutionary outcomes. Noting the chimerical nature of revolutionary coalitions, it introduces readers to the concept of ‘movement split’: the moment in a revolutionary process when, once a regime is overthrown, the revolutionary coalition fractures into ‘radicals’, who seek further, social revolution; and ‘conservatives’ who are satisfied with a limited, political revolution. By means of a comparative historical analysis of the 1789 French Revolution and 2011 Egyptian Revolution, it analyses the role of coalition structure in determining revolutionary outcomes after movement split. In both cases, the distribution of mobilizing capacity between radicals and conservatives was the key factor determining whether each revolutionary movement came to pursue a ‘political’ or ‘social’ revolutionary’ program. Where conservatives retained control over mobilization, advancement of the revolutionary process ended once political revolution was achieved, while when radicals retained control, a process of social revolution was undertaken. Thus, when seeking to anticipate the trajectory of change an emergent revolutionary movement is liable to undertake, it is fruitful to examine whether it is radicals or conservatives who control its principal mobilizing structures.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141504910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Revolution and Institutional Change: an introduction to the special issue","authors":"Mehrdad Vahabi","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01183-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01183-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This special issue reflects one of the first systematic inquiries into the effects of revolutions on institutional change, a topic previously explored only tangentially across diverse social science domains. It fosters interdisciplinary discourse on revolutionary outcomes among economists, political scientists, sociologists, and economic historians informed by the public choice research program. The issue is divided into two parts, the first of which focuses on regime overthrow and institutional transformation and the second of which focuses on rational-choice theoretic analyses of revolution and its results. By employing analytical narratives and comparative analyses of contemporary and historical revolutions, the issue advances both theoretical and empirical understandings of revolution, revolutionary dynamics, and their implications.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141504911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ruled by robots: preference for algorithmic decision makers and perceptions of their choices","authors":"Marina Chugunova, Wolfgang J. Luhan","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01178-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01178-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>As technology-assisted decision-making is becoming more widespread, it is important to understand how the algorithmic nature of the decision maker affects how decisions are perceived by those affected. We use an online experiment to study the preference for human or algorithmic decision makers in redistributive decisions. In particular, we consider whether an algorithmic decision maker will be preferred because of its impartiality. Contrary to previous findings, the majority of participants (over 60%) prefer the algorithm as a decision maker over a human—but this is not driven by concerns over biased decisions. However, despite this preference, the decisions made by humans are regarded more favorably. Subjective ratings of the decisions are mainly driven by participants’ own material interests and fairness ideals. Participants tolerate any explainable deviation between the actual decision and their ideals but react very strongly and negatively to redistribution decisions that are not consistent with any fairness principles.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141529140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership","authors":"Christian Fong, Joshua McCrain","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We apply tournament theory to congressional leadership to unify research on campaign finance with theories of endogenous party strength. Parties want to incentivize members to do costly work for the benefit of the party, such as fundraising. Accordingly, they make leadership offices attractive and award these leadership offices on the basis of who does the most work for the party. The more attractive the leadership office becomes, the harder party members work to win. We present a model to formalize this argument, derive its empirical implications, and find support for these implications using data from committee assignments, committee authorizations, and fundraising for leadership political action committees and congressional hill committees.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141529141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rosters and connected apportionments","authors":"Manshu Khanna, Haydar Evren","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Affirmative action in India reserves explicit proportions of seats and jobs in publicly funded institutions for various beneficiary groups. Because seats are indivisible and arise in small numbers over time, implementation of this policy requires that beneficiary groups take turns claiming seats, for which purpose India relies on a device called a roster. We study the problem of constructing a roster, which involves addressing a series of connected apportionment problems. To identify suitable apportionment methods, six essential requirements direct our search to a large class of divisor methods. We show that the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method is the unique divisor method that satisfies several practical properties and fairness criteria. Comparative analysis between an existing Indian roster and the application of the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method highlights that method’s benefits.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}