Public Choice最新文献_第2页

Fiscal illusion at the individual level 个人层面的财政幻觉

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01187-9

Kaetana Numa

引用次数: 0

Till We Have Red Faces: Drinking to Signal Trustworthiness in Contemporary China 直到我们红了脸当代中国的可信饮料

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01180-2

Wanlin Lin, Siqin Kang, Jiangnan Zhu, Li Ding

引用次数: 0

Mayoral partisanship and municipal fiscal health 市长党派与市政财政健康

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01190-0

Benedict S. Jimenez, Laiyang Ke, Minji Hong

引用次数: 0

Demonstrated risk preferences and COVID-19 regulations in the United States 美国的示范风险偏好和 COVID-19 法规

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01185-x

Peter Anderson

{"title":"Demonstrated risk preferences and COVID-19 regulations in the United States","authors":"Peter Anderson","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01185-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01185-x","url":null,"abstract":"Research has pointed towards U.S. state officials setting COVID regulations based on their constituents’ political affiliation. But a further explanation is needed as prior to 2020, U.S. voters did not choose their political party in accord with how they thought politicians would act in a pandemic. In contrast, other papers have found that people with higher risk preferences took fewer mitigating actions during COVID. Building on these results and the public choice view that political markets lack a dynamic-feedback process, this paper hypothesizes that upcoming elections incentivized state officials to partially set regulations in congruence with their constituents’ demonstrated risk preferences. The hypothesis is tested with a balanced panel of all U.S. states over seven time periods ranging from April until shortly before the 2020 election. A log-linear hybrid model finds a negative relationship between risky actions and the stringency of COVID regulations at the between-state level. The relationship is statistically and regulatorily significant while controlling for relevant time-varying and time-invariant health, political, and economic measures. Multiple robustness tests confirm these results, including instrumenting people’s risky actions. At the within-state level, regulations only varied with changes in revealed risk preferences when governors faced impending feedback from a reelection contest. Republican governors running for reelection decreased regulations when revealed risk taking increased whereas their Democratic counterparts responded by increasing regulations. In states without a gubernatorial election, regulations show little responsiveness to changes in risk taking, corroborating the public choice viewpoint.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141612082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01175-z

Áron Hajnal

{"title":"Popular autocrats: why do voters support Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary? A quantitative analysis","authors":"Áron Hajnal","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01175-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01175-z","url":null,"abstract":"Authoritarian populism has become an increasingly prevalent subtype of hybrid regime and is characterized by weakened democratic institutions and a leader who relies on populist appeals. Authoritarian populist regimes limit citizens’ freedom, undermine accountability and the rule of law, and are likely to be more corrupt than democratic regimes. Nevertheless, certain authoritarian populist regimes appear to enjoy broad popular support. Based on the European Social Survey database and my calculations of respondents’ personal income tax rates, I investigate the factors that influenced voters’ support for Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary from 2010 to 2020, which may be considered an exemplary case of an autocratic populist regime. The analysis shows that voters’ support for the government was influenced by their perceptions of the economy and government performance, political beliefs (i.e., policy congruence and ideology), and basic human values (i.e., self-transcendence and conservation). By contrast, changes in voters’ individual economic conditions were not found to be associated with their support for the government. The findings indicate that, in addition to explanations of government support that specifically focus on hybrid regimes, economic voting theory, which originated from and has typically been applied in democratic contexts, also provides viable explanations for understanding support for authoritarian populist regimes. More broadly, the findings also lend support to the altruistic and expressive voter hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141570199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Jurisdiction size and perceived corruption 辖区大小与腐败感知

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01188-8

Abel François, Nicolas Lagios, Pierre-Guillaume Méon

{"title":"Jurisdiction size and perceived corruption","authors":"Abel François, Nicolas Lagios, Pierre-Guillaume Méon","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01188-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01188-8","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the relationship between the size of a jurisdiction and how corrupt its citizens perceive officials to be. The relationship may a priori be driven by four distinct mechanisms: (i) larger communities have more officials, thereby making it more likely at least one official is corrupt; (ii) larger communities have a larger budget, thereby offering more opportunity for corruption; (iii) monitoring officials is costlier in larger communities; and (iv) the public is less likely to have contact with officials in larger communities, which raises citizens’ suspicion. First, using cross-country analysis, we establish that people perceive more corruption in countries with larger populations. We then test this stylized fact using French survey data on the perception of municipal government corruption. We again observe that the perception of corruption increases with population size. This result is robust to a series of checks and many confounding factors. Moreover, our results hold across two distinct periods and for another administrative unit, departments. Finally, we report suggestive evidence that the stylized fact is driven by mechanisms (i) and (ii), but not by (iii) and (iv).","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141570200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Environmental regulation, regulatory spillovers and rent-seeking 环境监管、监管溢出效应和寻租

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01189-7

Juan Pablo González

引用次数: 0

Movement split: how the structure of revolutionary coalitions shapes revolutionary outcomes 运动分裂：革命联盟的结构如何塑造革命成果

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01170-4

Benjamin Abrams

{"title":"Movement split: how the structure of revolutionary coalitions shapes revolutionary outcomes","authors":"Benjamin Abrams","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01170-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01170-4","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the relationship between the coalitional structure of revolutionary movements and revolutionary outcomes. Noting the chimerical nature of revolutionary coalitions, it introduces readers to the concept of ‘movement split’: the moment in a revolutionary process when, once a regime is overthrown, the revolutionary coalition fractures into ‘radicals’, who seek further, social revolution; and ‘conservatives’ who are satisfied with a limited, political revolution. By means of a comparative historical analysis of the 1789 French Revolution and 2011 Egyptian Revolution, it analyses the role of coalition structure in determining revolutionary outcomes after movement split. In both cases, the distribution of mobilizing capacity between radicals and conservatives was the key factor determining whether each revolutionary movement came to pursue a ‘political’ or ‘social’ revolutionary’ program. Where conservatives retained control over mobilization, advancement of the revolutionary process ended once political revolution was achieved, while when radicals retained control, a process of social revolution was undertaken. Thus, when seeking to anticipate the trajectory of change an emergent revolutionary movement is liable to undertake, it is fruitful to examine whether it is radicals or conservatives who control its principal mobilizing structures.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141504910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Revolution and Institutional Change: an introduction to the special issue 革命与体制变革：特刊导言

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01183-z

Mehrdad Vahabi

引用次数: 0

Ruled by robots: preference for algorithmic decision makers and perceptions of their choices 被机器人统治：对算法决策者的偏好以及对其选择的看法

IF 1.6 3区经济学

Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01178-w

Marina Chugunova, Wolfgang J. Luhan

引用次数: 0