{"title":"Identity, Information and Situations","authors":"Daniele Pennesi","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper introduces a model of individual behavior based on identity, a person’s sense of self. The individual evaluates situations, i.e., sets of available actions given a belief about the actions’ uncertain payoffs. In some situations, a psychological cost arises because the individual’s identity prescribes an action that differs from the one maximizing material benefits. The model shows that a common process of weighing psychological costs and material benefits drives the choice of both information and future opportunities. As a result, information avoidance is akin to preferring fewer opportunities, such as crossing the street to avoid a fundraiser. The model provides a coherent rationalization for diverse behaviors, including willful ignorance, opting out of social dilemmas, and excess entry into competitive environments. The psychological cost varies non-monotonically with the quality of information or with having more opportunities. Non-monotonicity complicates the identification of prescriptions from behavior, a difficulty that is partially resolvable by observing specific choices.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48738164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Georg Duernecker, Berthold Herrendorf, Á. Valentinyi
{"title":"Structural Change within the Services Sector and the Future of Cost Disease","authors":"Georg Duernecker, Berthold Herrendorf, Á. Valentinyi","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Baumol (1967) observed that developed economies suffer from cost disease, i.e., aggregate productivity growth falls because structural change reallocates production to services with low productivity growth. We document that cost disease importantly contributed to the productivity growth slowdown in the postwar U.S. To assess how severe cost disease may become, we build a model of structural change among the goods sector and broad services sectors. Calibrating the model to the postwar U.S. implies that broad categories of services are substitutes and the services with low productivity growth do not take over production. Simulating the calibrated model forward implies that future cost disease will be less severe than past one.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42525441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Limited Nominal Indexation of Optimal Financial Contracts","authors":"Césaire Meh, Vincenzo Quadrini, Yaz Terajima","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When financial contracts are not fully enforceable and firms observe their own nominal sales before the observation of the aggregate nominal price, the optimal financial contract is not fully indexed to inflation. Because of the limited nominal indexation, which is endogenous in the model, unanticipated inflation affects aggregate investment and future economic activity. The macroeconomic volatility induced by price uncertainty, however, is not monotone: it first increases and then decreases with nominal price uncertainty. We also show that the degree of nominal indexation declines with real idiosyncratic volatility and the impact of an inflation shock decreases with nominal indexation. Using firm-level data from Canada, we find that both predictions are supported by the data.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76006958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laura Alfaro, Nicholas Bloom, Paola Conconi, Harald Fadinger, Patrick Legros, Andrew Newman, Raffaella Sadun, John Van Reenen
{"title":"Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation","authors":"Laura Alfaro, Nicholas Bloom, Paola Conconi, Harald Fadinger, Patrick Legros, Andrew Newman, Raffaella Sadun, John Van Reenen","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We jointly study firm boundaries and the allocation of decision rights within them by confronting an incomplete-contracts model with data on vertical integration and delegation for thousands of firms around the world. Integration has an option value: it confers authority to delegate or centralize decision rights, depending on who can best solve problems that arise in the course of an uncertain production process. In line with the model’s predictions, we find that firms are more likely to integrate suppliers that produce more valuable inputs and operate in industries with more dispersed productivity, and that firms delegate more decisions to integrated suppliers that produce more valuable inputs and operate in more productive industries.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135473941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spillovers in Childbearing Decisions and Fertility Transitions: Evidence from China","authors":"Pauline Rossi, Yun Xiao","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article uses China’s family planning policies to quantify and explain spillovers in fertility decisions. We test whether ethnic minorities decreased their fertility in response to the policies, although only the majority ethnic group, the Han Chinese, were subject to birth quotas. We exploit the policy rollout and variation in pre-policy age-specific fertility levels to construct a measure of the negative shock to Han fertility. Combining this measure with variation in the local share of Han, we estimate that a woman gives birth to 0.63 fewer children if the average completed fertility among her peers is exogenously reduced by one child. The fertility response of minorities is driven by cultural proximity with the Han and by higher educational investments, suggesting that spillovers operate through both social and economic channels. These results provide evidence that social multipliers can accelerate fertility transitions.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135802662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bubbles and Stagnation","authors":"Inês Xavier","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies the consequences of asset bubbles for economies that are vulnerable to persistent stagnation. Stagnation is the result of a shortage of assets that creates an oversupply of savings and puts downward pressure on the level of interest rates. Once the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds, the real rate cannot adjust further downward, forcing output to fall instead. In such context, bubbles are useful as they expand the supply of assets, absorb excess savings, and raise the natural interest rate—the real rate that is compatible with full employment—crowding in consumption and raising welfare. However, a risky bubble that can collapse with positive probability is smaller and less effective in doing so than a safe bubble. In this case, fiscal policy in the form of promised bailout transfers in case of a bubble collapse, can support an existing bubble and improve its size.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135932609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Julián Díaz-Saavedra, R. Marimon, João Brogueira de Sousa
{"title":"A Worker’s Backpack as an Alternative to Payg Pension Systems","authors":"Julián Díaz-Saavedra, R. Marimon, João Brogueira de Sousa","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Facing an ageing population and historical trends of low employment rates, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, currently in place in several European countries, imply very large economic and welfare costs in the coming decades. In an overlapping generations economy with incomplete insurance markets and frictional labour markets, an employment fund, which can be used while unemployed or retired, can enhance production efficiency and social welfare. With an appropriate design, the sustainable Backpack employment fund (BP) can greatly outperform (measured by average social welfare in the economy) existing pay-as-you go systems and also Pareto dominate a full privatization of the pension system, as well as a standard fully funded defined contribution pension system. We show this in a calibrated model of the Spanish economy, by comparing the effect of its ageing transition under these different pension systems and by showing how a front-loaded transition, from the PAYG to the BP system can be Pareto improving, while minimizing the cost of the reform.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41360545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inspiring Regime Change","authors":"Stephen Morris, Mehdi Shadmehr","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider the problem of a leader who can assign rewards for citizens for different anti-regime actions. Citizens face a coordination problem in which each citizen has a private, endogenous degree of optimism about the likelihood of regime change. Because more optimistic citizens are easier to motivate, the choice of optimal rewards entails optimal screening. This leads to a distribution of anti-regime actions. A key result is the emergence of a vanguard, consisting of citizens who engage in the endogenous, maximum level of action. Other citizens participate at varying degrees, with less optimistic citizens contributing less. We explore how the regime’s strength or the maximum reward available to the leader influences the distribution of actions. Moreover, we show that more heterogeneity (e.g., higher inequality) among potential revolutionaries reduces the likelihood of regime change. Our methodological contribution is that we deliver a sharp and novel marriage of screening and global games.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tracking Inattention","authors":"Nathan Goldstein","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study proposes a real-time estimate of inattention, based on micro-level data. I show that a simple specification that estimates the persistence of a forecaster's deviation from the mean provides a direct estimate of parameters of information frictions according to prominent models of expectations. The new estimate can also be interpreted as a hybrid measure of both information frictions and behavioral frictions. Using the new specification, I revise several key findings documented in the previous literature. I find higher levels of inattention and document new forms of variations over time and across variables, horizons, individuals, and types of agents. I also report new results from long-run forecasts and document an unprecedented response to COVID-19.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136166875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
James Cloyne, Clodomiro Ferreira, Maren Froemel, Paolo Surico
{"title":"Monetary Policy, Corporate Finance, and Investment","authors":"James Cloyne, Clodomiro Ferreira, Maren Froemel, Paolo Surico","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In response to a change in interest rates, younger firms not paying dividends adjust both their capital expenditure and borrowing significantly more than older firms paying dividends. The reason is that the debt of younger non-dividend payers is far more sensitive to fluctuations in collateral values, which are significantly affected by monetary policy. The results are robust to a wide range of possible confounding factors. Other channels, including movements in interest payments, product demand, profitability, and mark-ups, are also significant but seem unlikely to explain the heterogeneity in the response of capital expenditure. Our findings suggest that these types of financial frictions play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135295060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}