{"title":"Bank Culture and Bank Liquidity Creation","authors":"Loan Quynh Thi Nguyen, Luu Duc Toan Huynh","doi":"10.1111/corg.12580","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12580","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study aimed to understand the impact of bank culture on liquidity creation by applying textual analysis to data from US bank holding companies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The results indicated a substantial connection between bank culture and liquidity creation. Control and collaborative cultures negatively impacted liquidity creation, whereas a competing culture had a positive effect. The negative impacts were stronger in more diversified, experienced, and profitable banks and weaker in larger banks. In complete culture banks, liquidity creation decreased with increased experience and profitability but increased with size. The influence of culture on the different aspects of liquidity creation was similar across the board for overall liquidity generation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>By introducing a new bank culture index, this study offers a unique contribution to the academic understanding of the interplay between organizational culture and financial performance, particularly liquidity creation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The insights from this study are valuable for bank managers and regulators as they highlight the aspects of bank culture that can be leveraged or adjusted to optimize liquidity creation, thereby informing strategies and policy decisions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 6","pages":"1087-1109"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12580","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141194737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Asif Saeed, Aitzaz Ahsan Alias Sarang, Asad Ali Rind
{"title":"Co-opted Independent Directors and Firms' Environmental Performance","authors":"Asif Saeed, Aitzaz Ahsan Alias Sarang, Asad Ali Rind","doi":"10.1111/corg.12588","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12588","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Considering escalating environmental concerns and the important role of board members in shaping strategic corporate decisions, we investigate the relationship between co-opted independent directors and firms' environmental performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Examining US firms from 2002 to 2018, we document a significant negative relationship between co-opted independent directors and firm environmental performance. Our findings show that while institutional ownership and CEO power exacerbate the negative association, strong corporate governance mitigates this negative impact of co-opted independent directors on environmental performance. The cross-sectional results show that the relationship is pronounced in firms with young CEOs, male CEOs, and low CEO compensation. Further, the relationship is also prevalent in boards with fewer meetings, high multiple directors, and higher compensation, indicating a monitoring compromise by independent co-opted directors.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Reasonable theoretical arguments are drawn from agency theory and the theory of friendly boards, and our statistical analysis supports the academic position of the theory of friendly boards. The negative effect of independent co-opted directors on firm environmental performance challenges the role of independent directors in addressing agency issues in environmental efforts, hinting at a departure from conventional agency theory expectations.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>To improve environmental performance, firms should reconsider their board structures, acknowledging the potential drawbacks of co-opted independent directors. Our findings challenge the Sarbanes–Oxley Act's (SOX) emphasis on increasing the number of outside directors, which assumes independent board members will rigorously oversee executives. Such legislation is greatly based on the premise that independent board members strictly monitor executives. However, our findings indicate that not all independent directors are strict monitors, as demonstrated by lower environmental performance when there are more co-opted independent directors.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 1","pages":"73-102"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141194730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: CEO Turnover: Cross-Country Effects\u0000 Burns, N., K. Minnick, and L. Starks. 2023. CEO Turnover: Cross-Country Effects. Corporate Governance: An International Review 31, no. 6: 820–844. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12506","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12586","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12586","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the biography, the author's information has been corrected below.</p><p><b>Natasha Burns</b> is a professor of finance at The University of Texas at San Antonio. She was awarded her PhD in finance from The Ohio State University. Her research interests include the effect of incentives, law, and culture in corporate finance. Her research appears in the <i>Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance</i>, <i>Journal of Financial Economics</i>, <i>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis</i>, <i>The Financial Review</i>, and the <i>Quarterly Journal of Finance</i>. She is an associate editor of <i>The Financial Review</i>, is on the Editorial Board of <i>Corporate Governance: An International Review</i>, and was a visiting economist at the Securities and Exchange Commission.</p><p>The authors apologize for the error.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"756"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12586","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141194725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}