Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献

{"title":"Does certification of corporate governance compliance pay off? Evidence from a unique regulatory setting","authors":"Abdus Sobhan,&nbsp;Sudipta Bose,&nbsp;Muhammad Shahin Miah,&nbsp;Rushdi Md. Rezaur Razzaque","doi":"10.1111/corg.12563","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12563","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Questions/Issues</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using insights from agency and signaling theories, we examine the effect on companies' market-based performance of a unique monitoring mechanism of compliance with a corporate governance (CG) code, that is, independent certification of compliance with a CG code and type of certification provider. Furthermore, we examine the impact of two boundary conditions, family company status and company-level information asymmetry, influencing the effect of independent CG compliance certification and type of certification provider on the market-based performance of companies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on 1110 Bangladeshi company-year observations from 2006 to 2017, we firstly find that independent CG compliance certification is positively associated with companies' market-based performance. Secondly, we show that CG compliance certification by a chartered secretarial firm is related to higher market-based performance. Thirdly, we document that family companies attenuate both these associations. Finally, we find that, while company-level information asymmetry reinforces the association between CG compliance certification and market-based performance, it weakens the relationship between certification by a chartered secretarial firm and companies' market-based performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings are consistent with the agency and signaling theory that independent certification of CG compliance and this certification by a chartered secretarial firm reduce information asymmetry between managers and external investors by signaling enhanced credibility of reported CG compliance information. However, the roles of CG compliance certification and certification by a chartered secretarial firm to reduce agency conflict and provide credible signals are conditional on two boundary conditions: family company status and company-level information asymmetry.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study's findings highlight the economic implications of a unique mechanism for monitoring compliance with an adopted CG code. The findings have significant implications for policy makers and regulators in emerging economies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12563","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collusion or governance? Common ownership and corporate risk-taking","authors":"Shouyu Yao,&nbsp;Xinyu Guo,&nbsp;Ahmet Sensoy,&nbsp;John W. Goodell,&nbsp;Feiyang Cheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12562","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12562","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Disputes over the corporate governance impacts of common ownership continue. Differentiating from existing studies, we focus on the Chinese stock market, exploiting the Top 10 Shareholding File, which includes various investors besides institutional investors, to study the impact of common ownership built through blockholders on corporate risk-taking behavior.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that firms with higher common ownership are less likely to engage in corporate risk-taking, with concomitant decreases in future growth rates. Mechanism analysis shows that blockholders' common ownership exerts its influence through increasing market concentration, with concomitant lessening of market competition. Interestingly, further analyses indicate that, in contrast to blockholders, ownership connectedness built by mutual fund families significantly raises corporate risk-taking along with growth. However, individual investors' common ownership does not show the significant statistical relationship with corporate risk-taking.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We add to the debate on common ownership on corporate governance. Consistent with the anti-competition stream of literature, the risk-taking-reduction role we identify for blockholder common ownership supports the theory of anti-competition. Our results highlight the need to consider the heterogeneity of common ownership.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>While blockholder common ownership is evidenced to have a negative effect on corporate risk-taking, with, by extension, a negative impact on economic development, our results also suggest that efficient monitoring mitigates these effects. We also document an interesting heterogeneity in investor types. Mutual fund common ownership, in contrast to blockholder common ownership, is associated with higher risk-taking and more robust firm growth. This suggests the positive role of institutions in corporate governance and the necessity of considering the heterogeneity of common ownership.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135251465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Interrogating diversity: Feminism and the destructuration of Australian board appointment practices","authors":"Claire Wright,&nbsp;Corinne Cortese,&nbsp;Abdullah Al-Mamun,&nbsp;Searat Ali","doi":"10.1111/corg.12559","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12559","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>How have social movements influenced the diversity of Australian corporate leadership? Although board diversity is crucial for corporate governance, the research in this topic is bifurcated between studies examining interlocking directorates and the presence of boardroom gender diversity.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this study, we use a novel dataset and method to understand board diversity. We integrate the analysis of <i>social diversity</i> (structural connections) and <i>demographic diversity</i> among ASX50 boards in 2019 and 2023. Social network analysis (SNA) reveals a closely connected corporate community, with prosopography data identifying a narrow range of “acceptable” demographic characteristics.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We extend institutional theory by examining the role of global social movements (GSMs) for the destructuration of board appointment practices and the resulting uneven progress on equality. Activism from the global feminist movement has applied multi-dimensional coercive and normative pressures to develop a “pipeline” and “catalyst” for women's board appointments. Simultaneously, the absence of targeted action on other diversities and the intensification of directors' professional requirements have institutionalized the group's social and demographic profile.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>These findings are relevant to policymakers and corporations, highlighting the role of social movements for disrupting the status quo and the multidimensional institutional pressures needed to destructure entrenched appointment practices.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12559","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does the age of compensation committee members matter for CEO compensation?","authors":"Yiwei Li,&nbsp;Michael Clements,&nbsp;Carol Padgett,&nbsp;Xiu-Ye Zhang","doi":"10.1111/corg.12560","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12560","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the impact of the age of compensation committee (CC) members on CEO compensation. Sociological theory suggests that age is a significant demographic factor influencing behavior. We argue that monitoring intensity increases with age because older directors are more likely to commit to their fiduciary duties.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using FTSE 350 firms for the period 2002 to 2017, we find that CC members' age is negatively associated with the level of CEO pay but positively associated with pay–performance sensitivity after controlling for risk aversion attitude, experience in board monitoring, knowledge of the firm, and other firm and CEO characteristics. The relationships remain robust to alternative measures for age and compensation, using two-stage least squares and high-dimensional fixed effects models. Consistent with the view that older individuals tend to hold higher ethical standards and concomitant closer monitoring, we find that age effects are sensitive to the influence of ethical factors and are strongest for those firms for which intense monitoring is most needed. This suggests that age operates via older directors carrying out their roles more assiduously. We further show that our findings are less likely to be driven by director reputational effects, and the relationship between CC member age and CEO compensation persists even when we control for multiple dimensions of culturally inherited attributes of the CC members.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Despite the large literature on the influence of demographic characteristics on corporate governance, this study is the first on the monitoring effect of CC members' age. It contributes to the literature on the influence of demographic characteristic. It also contributes to the literature on CEO compensation by identifying a demographic factor—age—as a determinant of CEO pay, after controlling for the economic and corporate governance variables of the firm.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study highlights the role of demographic factors in explaining the monitoring of the CEO compensation contracting process and provides timely evidence on the recent regulatory changes.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12560","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135830955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Chief executive officer private firm experience and idiosyncratic risk","authors":"Dev R. Mishra","doi":"10.1111/corg.12556","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12556","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine chief executive officers' (CEOs) lifetime work experience in private firms and its potential influence in shaping managers' style in public firms and their corporate policies and thus the market's perception of a firm's risk.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that the idiosyncratic risk of public firms increases with the extent of CEO work experience in privately owned firms (<i>CEO private experience</i>). While there is no evidence of higher investment risk taking by private CEOs, the proportion of private-firm work experience has a positive association with disclosure deficiency, decrease in manager-owner agency conflicts, and an increase in political risk revelations at earnings conference calls, which, in turn, are associated with the elevation of idiosyncratic risk.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The findings of this study underscore arguments in the upper echelons theory, imprinting theory, and behavioral agency theory. The study also has implications for literature related to corporate disclosure, governance, and political risk.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Idiosyncratic risk is important for firms, as the literature suggests it hurts a firm's ability to finance future capital investments; therefore, it is optimal for corporate boards to have strategies in place to monitor and offer orientation packages targeted at alleviating CEO style heterogeneities presented by their prior work experience in private firms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135739863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders","authors":"William J. Becker,&nbsp;Sattar Mansi,&nbsp;Maryam Nazari,&nbsp;John K. Wald","doi":"10.1111/corg.12557","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12557","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>For firms with institutional dual holders, is proxy voting affected by whether the vote is confidential? Does confidential voting affect firms' cost of debt?</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Consistent with social exchange theory and reciprocity norms, we find that, in the absence of confidential voting, firms with institutional dual holders gain more favorable votes for proposals and, in particular, for management-sponsored compensation proposals. Further, these firms pay a higher cost of borrowing. This reciprocity relation does not exist if the firm has confidential voting in place.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The results are consistent with reciprocity norms creating a psychological obligation to repay valuable favors between firm managers and institutional dual holders when proxy votes are not confidential.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The findings support the popular position that confidential voting is in the best interests of shareholders and rigorous external corporate governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41299140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12558","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50127374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"No place like home: Do local CEOs invest in labor more efficiently?","authors":"Yan Tong,&nbsp;Yuan Tian,&nbsp;Zhangfan Cao","doi":"10.1111/corg.12553","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12553","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research question/issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates whether local CEOs make more efficient investment decisions in labor.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research findings/insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that firms hiring local CEOs are associated with lower deviations of labor investment from the level justified by economic fundamentals, that is, higher labor investment efficiency. More importantly, we explore the role of information advantage, corporate governance, and CEO cultural background in shaping the relationship. We find the effect of CEO locality is more pronounced when firms have higher levels of local business integration, poorer corporate governance, and higher agency costs. Moreover, the impact of CEO locality is stronger when CEOs' hometowns have stronger unselfishness culture, patriotism culture, and Confucian culture. Our results are robust to a battery of endogeneity tests and robustness checks.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/academic implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study reveals that CEO locality, as one of the idiosyncratic top executive styles, can hinder managers from myopic behavior by investing more efficiently in labor, as a key factor of production and a major internal stakeholder, for a firm's success.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/policy implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Given human capital is considered the primary source of firms' competitive advantage, our study provides useful insights and managerial implications for firms to consider the impact of the idiosyncratic top executive styles as one of the noncontractual factors on firms' employment decisions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135903974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Governance mechanisms, accounting regulation, and corporate disclosure in the aftermath of Covid-19: Novel research questions and methodological opportunities","authors":"Massimiliano Bonacchi,&nbsp;Christine A. Botosan,&nbsp;Dhananjay Nanda,&nbsp;Amedeo Pugliese","doi":"10.1111/corg.12555","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12555","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this commentary, we sought to highlight research opportunities in terms of how governance mechanisms, accounting regulation, and corporate disclosure were affected by Covid-19 (C19) and shaped the economic landscape in the post-C19 period.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The outbreak of the C19 triggered significant researchers' interests in the fields of business and economics for two main reasons: first, to the economic and social consequences of the crisis, and the impact of various policy interventions enacted by governments and supra-national institutions worldwide and, second, the availability of microdata on the spread of the pandemic and vaccines, complemented economic and financial data to assess the effects of policy interventions in curtailing the crisis.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We envision two potential avenues for further study: first, research on the impact of C19 and policy interventions in areas of interest, and, second, using the C19 disruption as a “laboratory” to unravel research questions on how various characteristics of firms, governments, and regulatory bodies affect the response to systemic crises, assuming that pre-existing characteristics are not related to the crisis event.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Relevant and rigorous research on the effects of C19 and the policy interventions is likely to be informative to governments, financial regulators, and supra-national institutions facing future instances of systemic crisis.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12555","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42122050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Keeping them honest? Broad-based employee ownership and earnings management","authors":"Colin Birkhead","doi":"10.1111/corg.12554","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12554","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Does broad-based employee ownership limit accrual earnings management?</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I run a series of random effect and fixed effect models on a sample of S&amp;P 1500 firms between 2008 and 2019 to show that managers at employee-owned firms manipulate earnings less than managers at nonemployee-owned firms. My findings suggest that employee ownership enhances financial transparency and limits the opportunities for managers to misrepresent firm performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study develops and tests theory on employee ownership as a form of internal corporate governance. Equity incentives for executives are typically thought to reduce agency costs. The findings here suggest awarding equity incentives broadly, in which the majority of employees receive equity stakes, may be a more effective method of reducing agency costs.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Earnings management and intentional financial misreporting are often a result of siloed information within firms. Broad-based employee ownership is generally associated with enhanced information flows through greater mutual monitoring and information sharing. Corporate governors interested in reducing managerial malfeasance may find that widely awarding equity to employees is more effective than financially incentivizing individual managers to act in the firm's interests.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45063380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}