Chief executive officer private firm experience and idiosyncratic risk

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Dev R. Mishra
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Question/Issue

We examine chief executive officers' (CEOs) lifetime work experience in private firms and its potential influence in shaping managers' style in public firms and their corporate policies and thus the market's perception of a firm's risk.

Research Findings/Insights

We find that the idiosyncratic risk of public firms increases with the extent of CEO work experience in privately owned firms (CEO private experience). While there is no evidence of higher investment risk taking by private CEOs, the proportion of private-firm work experience has a positive association with disclosure deficiency, decrease in manager-owner agency conflicts, and an increase in political risk revelations at earnings conference calls, which, in turn, are associated with the elevation of idiosyncratic risk.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

The findings of this study underscore arguments in the upper echelons theory, imprinting theory, and behavioral agency theory. The study also has implications for literature related to corporate disclosure, governance, and political risk.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Idiosyncratic risk is important for firms, as the literature suggests it hurts a firm's ability to finance future capital investments; therefore, it is optimal for corporate boards to have strategies in place to monitor and offer orientation packages targeted at alleviating CEO style heterogeneities presented by their prior work experience in private firms.

私营公司首席执行官的经验和特殊风险
研究问题/议题 我们研究首席执行官(CEO)在私营企业的终生工作经历及其对塑造上市公司管理者风格和公司政策的潜在影响,从而研究市场对公司风险的看法。 研究结果/见解 我们发现,上市公司的特异性风险会随着首席执行官在私营企业的工作经验(首席执行官的私人经验)的增加而增加。虽然没有证据表明私营企业首席执行官会承担更高的投资风险,但私营企业工作经验的比例与信息披露不足、管理者与所有者之间的代理冲突减少以及财报电话会议上政治风险揭示的增加呈正相关,而这反过来又与特异性风险的上升有关。 理论/学术启示 本研究的结论强调了上层理论、印记理论和行为代理理论的论点。本研究还对与公司信息披露、治理和政治风险相关的文献产生了影响。 对实践者/政策的启示 闲散风险对公司非常重要,因为有文献表明,它会损害公司为未来资本投资融资的能力;因此,公司董事会最好制定战略,对CEO进行监督,并提供有针对性的指导方案,以缓解CEO因之前在私营企业的工作经历而产生的风格异质性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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