MINDPub Date : 2025-09-23DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf048
David Kinney
{"title":"How (Relational) Beliefs Simplify Reasoning","authors":"David Kinney","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf048","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the relationship between graded, probabilistic representations of partial belief (that is, credences) and binary representations of outright belief. It is often argued that outright beliefs simplify our credal reasoning. However, Staffel (2019) complicates this picture by arguing that if outright beliefs help us to update our credences through a process called pseudo-conditionalization, then beliefs do not actually simplify credal reasoning. This is because Staffel’s model of pseudo-conditionalization is just as computationally intractable as the exact Bayesian process of credal updating via conditionalization. I put forward a different model of pseudo-conditionalization that is computationally tractable. My model depends crucially on the existence of outright beliefs whose objects are not individual propositions but are instead probabilistic influence relations between propositions. Thus I provide a new account of the belief–credence relation according to which beliefs simplify our credal reasoning via a process of pseudo-conditionalization.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145127674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-09-23DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf047
Laura Tomlinson Makin
{"title":"Intention and the Meaning of ‘Ought’","authors":"Laura Tomlinson Makin","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf047","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the standard semantics for ‘ought’ is, as it stands, incorrect. I begin by arguing that the standard semantics is morally tendentious, in precisely the way ethicists have suspected it to be: it rules out substantive alternatives to consequentialism. The problem is in the very inclusive inheritance principle that the standard semantics validates. I then review a number of classic paradoxes and puzzles that afflict (a particular part of) that inheritance principle, and introduce one new puzzle of my own. Those arguments give cause to examine the closure rules for ‘intention’; I argue that the restricted contours of an inheritance rule for intention solve a number of the problems that the unrestricted inheritance rule for ‘ought’ faces. Using the similarities between ‘intention’ and ‘ought’, I propose a unified explanation for the inheritance failures of ‘ought’, and offer two conjectures about how an adequate semantic account of ‘ought’ should be developed.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"156 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145127715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-09-08DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf045
Elek Lane
{"title":"Deadnaming, Taboo, and Linguistic Authority","authors":"Elek Lane","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf045","url":null,"abstract":"To deadname is to call a trans person by a name they have rejected due to their gender transition. Deadnaming has a visceral impact, and is presumptively blameworthy. I offer an account of these properties in terms of taboo violations and acts of linguistic authority. Linguistic authority is posited to derive from a fundamental interest in being the author of one’s own social persona(e). I also consider, and reject, a semantic account of the behaviour of deadnames.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145017490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-05-28DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf012
Levin Hornischer, Francesco Berto
{"title":"The Logic of Dynamical Systems Is Relevant","authors":"Levin Hornischer, Francesco Berto","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf012","url":null,"abstract":"Lots of things are usefully modelled in science as dynamical systems: growing populations, flocking birds, engineering apparatus, cognitive agents, distant galaxies, Turing machines, neural networks. We argue that relevant logic is ideal for reasoning about dynamical systems, including interactions with the system through perturbations. Thus dynamical systems provide a new applied interpretation of the abstract Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logic: the worlds in the model are the states of the system, while the (in)famous ternary relation is a combination of perturbation and evolution in the system. Conversely, the logic of the relevant conditional provides sound and complete laws of dynamical systems.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"152 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-05-22DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf011
Colin Chamberlain
{"title":"How To Eat a Peach: Malebranche on the Function of the Passions","authors":"Colin Chamberlain","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf011","url":null,"abstract":"Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) holds that the senses, imagination, and passions serve the body’s needs. In this paper, I explain how the passions keep us alive by situating them in Malebranche’s account of ordinary bodily action. Malebranche holds a consent-based view of action. An agent translates her inclinations or motives into action only when she consents to them. The passions contribute to the preservation of life by helping the agent close the gap between inclination and action. The passions, according to Malebranche, are complex psychophysiological phenomena whose various elements—perceptions, shifts of attention, evaluations, bodily preparation, feelings, and so on—work together to elicit the agent’s consent.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-05-12DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf006
Wade A Tisthammer
{"title":"A Grim End Is at Hand: Schmid’s Grim Reaper Symmetry Argument, Precognitive Grandfather Paradoxes, and an Intrinsicality Test","authors":"Wade A Tisthammer","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf006","url":null,"abstract":"Paradoxes inspired by José Benardete have been used in arguments for temporal finitism and causal finitism. Joseph C. Schmid has argued that there is a symmetry between those arguments and a corresponding argument against an endless future with respect to Koons’ patchwork principle using intrinsically identical copies of situations involving God revealing a future. I argue that this symmetry argument has limitations a theist can exploit to avoid the problem. A precognitive grandfather paradox about using simple foreknowledge to reveal the future that is redolent of the grandfather paradox against time travel illustrates why one might prefer a type of subjunctive foreknowledge over simple foreknowledge with respect to revealing the future, and a test for intrinsicality reveals that the future-revealing quality need not be intrinsic to a situation containing a subjunctively foreknowing God revealing the future.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143940120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-04-18DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf015
David Thorstad
{"title":"The Complexity–Coherence Trade-Off in Cognition","authors":"David Thorstad","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf015","url":null,"abstract":"I present evidence for a systematic complexity–coherence trade-off in cognition. I show how feasible strategies for increasing cognitive complexity along three dimensions come at the expense of a heightened vulnerability to incoherence. I discuss two normative implications of the complexity–coherence trade-off: a novel challenge to coherence-based theories of bounded rationality and a new strategy for vindicating the rationality of seemingly irrational cognitions. I also discuss how the complexity–coherence trade-off sharpens recent descriptive challenges to dual process theories of cognition.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143849676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-03-05DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae074
Ariel Melamedoff
{"title":"Shepherd’s Metaphysics of Emergence","authors":"Ariel Melamedoff","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae074","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of causation that Mary Shepherd develops in her 1824 An Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (ERCE) has a number of surprising features that have only recently begun to be studied by scholars. This relation is synchronic, rather than diachronic (ERCE pp. 49–50); it always involves a ‘mixture’ of pre-existing objects (ERCE pp. 46–7); and the effect must be ‘a new nature, capable of exhibiting qualities varying from those of either of the objects unconjoined’ (ERCE p. 63). In this essay, I argue for an emergentist interpretation of Shepherd’s causal theory. On the reading I defend, all effects have qualities that metaphysically emerge from the complex interactions of their constituents. This reading explains the structure of Shepherd’s causal relation and clarifies the central aims of her philosophical project. In response to the problems raised by the science of her time, Shepherd developed a theory of emergence and published it during the period when the concept was first being shaped and adopted by prominent philosophers. Her work thus merits a place in the history of emergentist ideas.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143546413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-03-04DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf005
Juan S Piñeros Glasscock
{"title":"Are we agentially luminous?","authors":"Juan S Piñeros Glasscock","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf005","url":null,"abstract":"In Piñeros Glasscock (2020) I presented a version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument against the Anscombean thesis that intentional action entails knowledge. I defend this argument from recent criticisms by Beddor and Pavese (2022) and Valaris (2021). I argue that contrary to what my past self and these critics suggest, the conclusion of this anti-luminosity argument does not rest on the existence of essentially intentional actions. The argument can be recast based on the humbler premise that agential cognition must represent actions as intentional. I show that this claim is well motivated by precisely the considerations of control behind the objections.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143546323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2025-01-14DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae072
James L D Brown
{"title":"How to Be a Prudential Expressivist","authors":"James L D Brown","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the prospects for an expressivist theory of prudential thought and discussion, or thought and discussion about what is good for us or what makes our lives go well. It is becoming increasingly common to view prudential thought and discussion as a kind of normative thought and discussion. If this is right, then expressivism, like any other meta-normative view, must be able to explain prudential thought and discussion. However, existing expressivist theories offer no such explanation and lack the resources to construct one. I argue that the best strategy for expressivists is to adopt a fitting attitudes account of prudential concepts. More specifically, I propose that expressivists adopt the rational care theory of well-being, according to which claims about what is good for a person are equivalent to claims about what it is rational to want for that person insofar as one cares for them. In doing so, I defend the rational care theory against its most pressing objection and argue that the view provides an independently attractive account of prudential thought and discussion that fits well with the expressivist’s aim to explain normative thought and discussion in terms of its distinctive practical function.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142981939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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