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Reason and Inquiry: The Erotetic Theory, by Philipp Koralus 理性与探索：情欲理论》，作者 Philipp Koralus
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-24 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad062
Daniel Hoek
{"title":"Reason and Inquiry: The Erotetic Theory, by Philipp Koralus","authors":"Daniel Hoek","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad062","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"112 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139242307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fichte’s Moral Philosophy, by Owen Ware 费希特的道德哲学》，欧文-瓦尔著
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-24 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad066
S. Hoeltzel
{"title":"Fichte’s Moral Philosophy, by Owen Ware","authors":"S. Hoeltzel","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139238659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision? 不可测量倾向于不精确吗?
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad041
Cian Dorr
{"title":"Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?","authors":"Cian Dorr","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad041","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent paper, Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek, and John Hawthorne argue for the rational permissibility of ’credal imprecision’ by appealing to certain propositions associated with non-measurable spatial regions: for example, the proposition that the pointer of a spinner will come to rest within a certain non-measurable set of points on its circumference. This paper rebuts their argument by showing that its premises lead to implausible consequences in cases where one is trying to learn, by making multiple observations, whether a certain outcome is associated with a non-measurable region or a measurable one.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"72 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"110423272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Infelicitous Conditionals and KK 错误条件句和KK
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-11 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad046
John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs
{"title":"Infelicitous Conditionals and KK","authors":"John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad046","url":null,"abstract":"Kevin Dorst (2019) uses the ‘manifest unassertability’ of conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know p, then p’ as a new motivation for the KK thesis. In this paper we show that his argumentation is misguided. Plausible heuristics offer a compelling and nuanced explanation of the relevant infelicity data. Meanwhile, Dorst relies on tools that, quite independently of KK, turn out to be rather poor predictors of the infelicity of indicative conditionals.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"14 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"110423312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto 《思想主题:知识、信仰、想象的逻辑》，弗朗西斯科·贝尔托著
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad051
Igor Douven
{"title":"Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto","authors":"Igor Douven","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad051","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto Get access Topics of Thought: The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination, by Francesco Berto. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 229. Igor Douven Igor Douven IHPST / CNRS / Panthéon–Sorbonne University, France igor.douven@univ-paris1.fr Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad051, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad051 Published: 09 November 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" 22","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135291657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Adoption Problem and the Epistemology of Logic 采用问题与逻辑认识论
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad009
Romina Birman
{"title":"The Adoption Problem and the Epistemology of Logic","authors":"Romina Birman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"15 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135430056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic 克里普克，奎因，“采纳问题”与逻辑的经验概念
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad011
Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright
{"title":"Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic","authors":"Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, there has been a significant upsurge of interest in what has come to be known as the 'Adoption Problem', first developed by Saul Kripke in 1974. The problem purports to raise a difficulty for Quine’s anti-exceptionalist conception of logic. In what follows, we first offer a statement of the problem and argue that, so understood, it depends upon natural but resistible assumptions. We then use that discussion as a springboard for developing a different adoption problem, arguing that, for a significant class of basic logical principles, there is indeed a difficulty in seeing how they might be ‘freely adopted,’ thereby vindicating something close to the spirit of Kripke’s original claim. This first part of our argument will enforce a significant qualification of Quine’s claim that basic logical principles can be empirically confirmed. In the concluding sections of the paper, we turn to the question, specifically, of the empirical revisability of logic, arguing that when proper attention is paid to the role of reasoning in theory revision, it does indeed emerge that anti-exceptionalism, in full generality, is untenable.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"15 s2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135430057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Question of Logic 逻辑问题
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad008
Saul A Kripke
{"title":"The Question of Logic","authors":"Saul A Kripke","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Under the influence of Quine’s famous manifesto, many philosophers have thought that logical theories are scientific theories that can be ‘adopted’ and tested as scientific theories. Here we argue that this idea is untenable. We discuss it with special reference to Putnam’s proposal to ‘adopt’ a particular non-classical logic to solve the foundational problems of quantum mechanics in his famous paper ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ (1968), which we argue was not really coherent.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" 24","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135292808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro 《柏拉图的形而上学》中的形式与结构，作者:A. Marmodoro
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad059
Dimitri El Murr
{"title":"Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro","authors":"Dimitri El Murr","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro Get access Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics, by A. Marmodoro. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp vii + 223. Dimitri El Murr Dimitri El Murr Department of Philosophy, École normale supérieure - PSL, France dimitri.el.murr@ens.psl.eu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad059, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad059 Published: 04 November 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"54 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135775851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Hope of Agreement: Against Vibing Accounts of Aesthetic Judgment 一致的希望:反对审美判断的震动叙述
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad055
Nat Hansen, Zed Adams
{"title":"The Hope of Agreement: Against Vibing Accounts of Aesthetic Judgment","authors":"Nat Hansen, Zed Adams","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Stanley Cavell’s account of aesthetic judgment has two components. The first is a feeling: the judge has to see, hear, or ‘dig’ something in the object being judged; there has to be an ‘emotion’ that the judge feels and expresses. The second is the ‘discipline of accounting for [the judgment]’, a readiness to argue for one’s aesthetic judgment in the face of disagreement. The discipline of accounting for one’s aesthetic judgments involves what Nick Riggle has called a norm of convergence: the judge aims to get one’s audience to taste, see, or hear what the judge tastes or sees or hears in the object being judged. Because of the unmistakable difficulty in reaching agreement in aesthetic judgment, Riggle has denied that aesthetic judgment requires a convergence norm and has proposed instead that it requires ‘a kind of harmony of individuality’ (which Riggle calls ‘vibing’). We argue that Cavell offers a version of the convergence norm that is distinct from those that Riggle criticizes, namely Kant’s demand for agreement and Andy Egan’s presupposition of similarity in dispositions in ‘non-defective’ aesthetic conversations. Cavell’s version of the convergence norm is ‘the hope of agreement’. One can hope that one’s audience will agree with one’s aesthetic judgments even when one isn’t in a position to demand agreement or to presuppose similarity in the dispositions that would make agreement more likely. Cavell’s distinct convergence norm avoids Riggle’s criticisms and contributes to a richer account of what’s going on when we disagree about aesthetic matters.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135975679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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