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Changing Our Logic: A Quinean Perspective 改变我们的逻辑:一个奎因的观点
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-26 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad010
Michael Devitt, Jillian Rose Roberts
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引用次数: 2
Deflecting Ockham’s Razor: A Medieval Debate about Ontological Commitment 偏离奥卡姆的剃刀：关于本体论承诺的中世纪争论
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-26 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad007
Susan Brower-Toland
{"title":"Deflecting Ockham’s Razor: A Medieval Debate about Ontological Commitment","authors":"Susan Brower-Toland","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his razor will, Chatton argues, either prove unacceptably dull when it comes to determining ontological commitment or prove unacceptably sharp when it comes to determining commitments entailed by certain theological doctrines. While Chatton’s objection is subtle and interesting in its own right, the broader significance of the debate between these thinkers lies in the light it sheds on medieval approaches to issues surrounding metaphysical methodology.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46525247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemological Cognition in Husserl 胡塞尔的认识论认识
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-25 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad001
T. M. Larsen
{"title":"Epistemological Cognition in Husserl","authors":"T. M. Larsen","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What degree of justification should be required of epistemological cognition, the kind of cognition by which epistemological problems are to be solved? I consider the question by examining Husserl’s view of the matter. Challenging the current consensus, I argue that he is committed to the infallibility of epistemological cognition. I first present what he takes to be the leading problem of epistemology, which he designates as the ‘problem of transcendence’ or the problem of how ‘transcendent cognition’ is possible. I then give an account of what I call his Non-Transcendence Constraint, on which the problem cannot be solved by means of cognitions of the kind whose possibility it concerns, and so cannot be solved by means of transcendent cognition. Pointing out that he provides four specifications of the problem, I go on to argue that on the most fundamental of these it concerns the general possibility of fallible cognition. By the Non-Transcendence Constraint, however, this entails that the problem of transcendence cannot be solved by means of fallible cognition. I conclude that central aspects of Husserl’s metaepistemology commit him to the infallibility of epistemological cognition, at least as far as solving the supposedly leading problem of epistemology is concerned.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48082619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Counterfactual Decision Theory 反事实决策理论
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac060
B. Hedden
{"title":"Counterfactual Decision Theory","authors":"B. Hedden","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac060","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination, an action can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an action can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. And in cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your action, even though your action cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict, and for the right reasons.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46406102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Spying Through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence, by Cécile Fabre 《透过黑暗的玻璃进行间谍活动:间谍与反情报的伦理》，作者:cacciile Fabre
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-18 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad013
J. Parry
{"title":"Spying Through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence, by Cécile Fabre","authors":"J. Parry","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49120714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle, by Myisha Cherry 《愤怒的理由：为什么愤怒对反种族主义斗争至关重要》，Myisha Cherry著
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac029
L. Silva
{"title":"The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle, by Myisha Cherry","authors":"L. Silva","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42470346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains, by Ernest Sosa 《认识论解释:Telic Normativity理论及其解释》，作者:Ernest Sosa
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad012
Errol Lord
{"title":"Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains, by Ernest Sosa","authors":"Errol Lord","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48518401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Touch and Bodily Transparency 触摸和身体透明
1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad005
Vivian Mizrahi
{"title":"Touch and Bodily Transparency","authors":"Vivian Mizrahi","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As most philosophers recognize, the body’s central role in touch differs from the role it plays in the other sense modalities. Any account of touch must then explain the pivotal nature of the body’s involvement in touch. Unlike most accounts of touch, this paper argues that the body’s centrality in touch is not phenomenological or experiential: the body is not felt in any special way in tactile experiences. Building on Aristotle’s account in De Anima, I argue that the body is central in touch because it is the medium of tactile perception. Touch depends on the body as vision and audition depend on air or any medium that can transmit light or sound waves. I show that it is precisely because the body must be transparent in order to transmit tangible properties that it cannot be perceived or experienced in tactile perception. Although this account conflicts with the widespread view that tactile perception is mediated by bodily sensations, I maintain that it explains how the structure and constitution of the human body contribute directly to what we feel in tactile experiences and that it provides a better understanding of the relation between the sense of touch and our bodily feelings.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135647903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, by David Papineau 《感官经验的形而上学》，大卫·帕皮诺著
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-07 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad004
Farid Masrour
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, by David Papineau","authors":"Farid Masrour","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46392985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
KK, Knowledge, Knowability KK，知识，可知性
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-06 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac048
Weng Kin San
{"title":"KK, Knowledge, Knowability","authors":"Weng Kin San","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 kk states that knowing entails knowing that one knows, and K¬K states that not knowing entails knowing that one does not know. In light of the arguments against kk and K¬K, one might consider modally qualified variants of those principles. According to weak kk, knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. And according to weak  K¬K, not knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one does not know. This paper shows that weak kk and weak  K¬K are much stronger than they initially appear. Jointly, they entail kk and K¬K. And they are susceptible to variants of the standard arguments against kk and K¬K. This has interesting implications for the debate on positive introspection and for deeper issues concerning the structure and limits of knowability.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43243913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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