MINDPub Date : 2023-05-06DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac070
Rea Golan
{"title":"A Unified Interpretation of the Semantics of Relevance Logic","authors":"Rea Golan","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac070","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I introduce a novel and quite intuitive interpretation of the ternary relation that figures in the relational semantics of many relevance logics. Conceptually, my interpretation makes use only of incompatibility and parthood relations, defined over a set of states. In this way, the proposed interpretation—of the ternary relation and the conditional—extends Dunn’s and Restall’s works on negation and the Routley star operator. Therefore, the interpretation is unified, and hence not only intuitive but also parsimonious. Additionally, the interpretation provides us with a cogent argument to the effect that a ternary relation is indispensable, and we cannot merely do with a binary relation.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41925969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-29DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad014
Gil Sagi
{"title":"One True Logic, by Owen Griffiths and A.C. Paseau","authors":"Gil Sagi","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47563884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-29DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad018
Bryan W. Van Norden
{"title":"Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom, by Tao Jiang","authors":"Bryan W. Van Norden","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43822174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-28DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad002
Tobias Malte Müller
{"title":"Taming Pereboom’s Wild Coincidences","authors":"Tobias Malte Müller","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Pereboom’s ‘wild coincidences’ argument against agent-causal libertarianism is based on the claim that in a world governed by statistical laws, the dovetailing of indeterministic physical happenings with the free actions of agent causes would be a coincidence too wild to be credible. In this paper it is shown that the conclusion is valid for deterministic laws, but that it fails for statistical laws. Therefore, the ‘wild coincidences’ argument does not provide the promised empirical refutation of agent-causal libertarianism.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46765549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-26DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad007
Susan Brower-Toland
{"title":"Deflecting Ockham’s Razor: A Medieval Debate about Ontological Commitment","authors":"Susan Brower-Toland","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his razor will, Chatton argues, either prove unacceptably dull when it comes to determining ontological commitment or prove unacceptably sharp when it comes to determining commitments entailed by certain theological doctrines. While Chatton’s objection is subtle and interesting in its own right, the broader significance of the debate between these thinkers lies in the light it sheds on medieval approaches to issues surrounding metaphysical methodology.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46525247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad001
T. M. Larsen
{"title":"Epistemological Cognition in Husserl","authors":"T. M. Larsen","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What degree of justification should be required of epistemological cognition, the kind of cognition by which epistemological problems are to be solved? I consider the question by examining Husserl’s view of the matter. Challenging the current consensus, I argue that he is committed to the infallibility of epistemological cognition. I first present what he takes to be the leading problem of epistemology, which he designates as the ‘problem of transcendence’ or the problem of how ‘transcendent cognition’ is possible. I then give an account of what I call his Non-Transcendence Constraint, on which the problem cannot be solved by means of cognitions of the kind whose possibility it concerns, and so cannot be solved by means of transcendent cognition. Pointing out that he provides four specifications of the problem, I go on to argue that on the most fundamental of these it concerns the general possibility of fallible cognition. By the Non-Transcendence Constraint, however, this entails that the problem of transcendence cannot be solved by means of fallible cognition. I conclude that central aspects of Husserl’s metaepistemology commit him to the infallibility of epistemological cognition, at least as far as solving the supposedly leading problem of epistemology is concerned.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48082619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-19DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac060
B. Hedden
{"title":"Counterfactual Decision Theory","authors":"B. Hedden","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac060","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination, an action can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an action can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. And in cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your action, even though your action cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict, and for the right reasons.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46406102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-18DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad013
J. Parry
{"title":"Spying Through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence, by Cécile Fabre","authors":"J. Parry","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49120714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MINDPub Date : 2023-04-14DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzac029
L. Silva
{"title":"The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle, by Myisha Cherry","authors":"L. Silva","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42470346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}