Taming Pereboom’s Wild Coincidences

IF 1.8 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-28 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzad002

Tobias Malte Müller

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Pereboom’s ‘wild coincidences’ argument against agent-causal libertarianism is based on the claim that in a world governed by statistical laws, the dovetailing of indeterministic physical happenings with the free actions of agent causes would be a coincidence too wild to be credible. In this paper it is shown that the conclusion is valid for deterministic laws, but that it fails for statistical laws. Therefore, the ‘wild coincidences’ argument does not provide the promised empirical refutation of agent-causal libertarianism.

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驯服Pereboom的狂野巧合

Pereboom反对主体因果自由意志主义的“疯狂巧合”论点是基于这样一种主张:在一个由统计规律支配的世界里，不确定的物理事件与主体原因的自由行为的吻合将是一种太疯狂而不可信的巧合。本文证明了该结论对确定性定律是有效的，但对统计定律是无效的。因此，“狂野巧合”的论点并没有提供对代理人-因果自由意志主义所承诺的经验反驳。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

MIND PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

3.10

自引率

5.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.