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How to Be a Prudential Expressivist 如何成为一个审慎的表现主义者
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-01-14 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae072
James L D Brown
{"title":"How to Be a Prudential Expressivist","authors":"James L D Brown","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the prospects for an expressivist theory of prudential thought and discussion, or thought and discussion about what is good for us or what makes our lives go well. It is becoming increasingly common to view prudential thought and discussion as a kind of normative thought and discussion. If this is right, then expressivism, like any other meta-normative view, must be able to explain prudential thought and discussion. However, existing expressivist theories offer no such explanation and lack the resources to construct one. I argue that the best strategy for expressivists is to adopt a fitting attitudes account of prudential concepts. More specifically, I propose that expressivists adopt the rational care theory of well-being, according to which claims about what is good for a person are equivalent to claims about what it is rational to want for that person insofar as one cares for them. In doing so, I defend the rational care theory against its most pressing objection and argue that the view provides an independently attractive account of prudential thought and discussion that fits well with the expressivist’s aim to explain normative thought and discussion in terms of its distinctive practical function.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142981939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Essence Facts and the Source of Normativity 本质事实与规范性的源头
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-01-05 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae070
Umut Baysan
{"title":"Essence Facts and the Source of Normativity","authors":"Umut Baysan","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae070","url":null,"abstract":"What is the source of normativity? According to Bengson, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2023), we can answer this question by identifying non-normative grounds of fundamental normative facts. To illustrate how this can be achieved, they argue that facts concerning essences of normative properties are non-normative facts, and such facts can be seen as non-normative grounds of fundamental normative facts. I argue that this strategy is misguided. First, explanations citing essence facts about normative properties are poor answers to the question of the source of normativity. Second, it is not clear if such facts are non-normative in the relevant sense. Along the way, I address questions about what it is to be a normative fact and relate the implications of this discussion to general issues about metaphysical explanation in meta-normativity.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142929179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Universal Money Pump for the Myopic, Naive, and Minimally Sophisticated 为短视、天真和不太成熟的人提供的通用货币泵
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-12-21 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae061
Johan E Gustafsson
{"title":"A Universal Money Pump for the Myopic, Naive, and Minimally Sophisticated","authors":"Johan E Gustafsson","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae061","url":null,"abstract":"The money-pump argument aims to show that cyclic preferences are irrational. The argument can be based on a number of different exploitation schemes that vary in what needs to be assumed about the agent. The Standard Money Pump works for myopic and naive agents, but not for sophisticated agents who use backward induction. The Upfront Money Pump works for sophisticated agents, but not for myopic or naive agents. In this paper, I present a new money pump, the Universal Money Pump, that works for myopic, naive, and sophisticated agents. Moreover, the Universal Money Pump (just like the Upfront Money Pump) also works for minimally sophisticated agents who need not assume that they will choose rationally at nodes that can only be reached by irrational choices. This enables an argument that rational preferences are acyclic, which is based on weaker assumptions about dynamic rationality than existing money-pump arguments.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Benardete Paradoxes, Causal Finitism, and the Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis 贝纳德悖论、因果有限论与不可满足配对诊断
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-11-27 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae057
Joseph C Schmid, Alex Malpass
{"title":"Benardete Paradoxes, Causal Finitism, and the Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis","authors":"Joseph C Schmid, Alex Malpass","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae057","url":null,"abstract":"We examine two competing solutions to Benardete paradoxes: causal finitism, according to which nothing can have infinitely many causes, and the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis (UPD), according to which such paradoxes are logically impossible and no metaphysical thesis need be adopted to avoid them. We argue that the UPD enjoys notable theoretical advantages over causal finitism. Causal finitists, however, have levelled two main objections to the UPD. First, they urge that the UPD requires positing a ‘mysterious force’ that prevents paradoxes from arising. Since such a force is implausible, the UPD is in trouble. Second, they employ recombination or patchwork principles to argue that paradoxical situations would be possible if causal finitism were false. Since such situations are not possible, causal finitism is true, and so a substantive metaphysical thesis is needed to avoid the paradoxes. We argue that the UPD proponent can successfully respond to these objections.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142753634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori 自由、全知全能与先验权变
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-21 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae058
Fabio Lampert
{"title":"Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori","authors":"Fabio Lampert","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae058","url":null,"abstract":"One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142487057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conceptual Decolonization, Conceptual Justice, and Religious Concepts 概念非殖民化、概念正义和宗教概念
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae053
Mikel Burley
{"title":"Conceptual Decolonization, Conceptual Justice, and Religious Concepts","authors":"Mikel Burley","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae053","url":null,"abstract":"Calls for decolonization are on the rise in social and academic life, but ‘decolonization’ can mean various things. This article expounds and critically evaluates the programme of conceptual decolonization, chiefly as promulgated in relation to African philosophy by Kwasi Wiredu. The programme involves both resisting the unreflective acceptance of non-indigenous concepts and constructively utilizing indigenous conceptual resources to address philosophical questions. Examining recent objections from Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò and giving particular attention to Wiredu’s treatment of religious concepts, I concur with Wiredu that conceptual decolonization can encourage conceptual enlargement but argue that care is needed to avoid oversimplifying the non-indigenous concepts that are subjected to scrutiny.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142448157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Symmetry, Invariance, and Imprecise Probability 对称性、不变性和不精确概率
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae048
Zachary Goodsell, Jacob M Nebel
{"title":"Symmetry, Invariance, and Imprecise Probability","authors":"Zachary Goodsell, Jacob M Nebel","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae048","url":null,"abstract":"It is tempting to think that a process of choosing a point at random from the surface of a sphere can be probabilistically symmetric, in the sense that any two regions of the sphere which differ by a rotation are equally likely to include the chosen point. Isaacs, Hájek and Hawthorne (2022) argue from such symmetry principles and the mathematical paradoxes of measure to the existence of imprecise chances and the rationality of imprecise credences. Williamson (2007) has argued from a related symmetry principle to the failure of probabilistic regularity. We contend that these arguments fail, because they rely on auxiliary assumptions about probability which are inconsistent with symmetry to begin with. We argue, moreover, that symmetry should be rejected in light of this inconsistency, and because it has implausible decision-theoretic implications. The weaker principle of probabilistic invariance says that the probabilistic comparison of any two regions is unchanged by rotations of the sphere. This principle supports a more compelling argument for imprecise probability. We show, however, that invariance is incompatible with mundane judgements about what is probable. Ultimately, we find reason to be suspicious of the application of principles like symmetry and invariance to non-measurable regions.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
KK is Wrong Because We Say So KK 错了，因为我们这么说
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae050
Simon Goldstein, John Hawthorne
{"title":"KK is Wrong Because We Say So","authors":"Simon Goldstein, John Hawthorne","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae050","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers a new argument against the KK thesis, which says that if you know p, then you know that you know p. We argue that KK is inconsistent with the fact that anyone denies the KK thesis: imagine that Dudley says he knows p but that he does not have 100 iterations of knowledge about p. If KK were true, Dudley would know that he has 100 iterations of knowledge about p, and so he wouldn’t deny that he did. We consider several epicycles, and also explore whether the argument type also challenges other structural conditions on knowledge, such as closure under deduction.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Not Quite Yet a Hazy Limbo of Mystery: Intuition in Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry 尚不完全是朦胧的迷雾：罗素《几何基础论》中的直觉
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae041
Tyke Nunez
{"title":"Not Quite Yet a Hazy Limbo of Mystery: Intuition in Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry","authors":"Tyke Nunez","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae041","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that in Bertrand Russell’s An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (1897), his forms of externality serve the same fundamental role in grounding the possibility of geometry that Immanuel Kant’s forms of intuition serve in grounding geometry in his critical philosophy. Specifically, both provide knowledge of bare numerical difference, where we have no concept of this difference. Because geometry deals with such conceptually homogeneous magnitudes and their composition on both accounts, forms of intuition or externality (respectively) are at its foundation.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intentions and Inquiry 意图与探索
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae056
Daniel C Friedman
{"title":"Intentions and Inquiry","authors":"Daniel C Friedman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae056","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the Intention Account of Individual Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial norms which mandate a rational inquirer’s ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142384026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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