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The Logic of Dynamical Systems Is Relevant 动力系统的逻辑是相关的
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf012
Levin Hornischer, Francesco Berto
{"title":"The Logic of Dynamical Systems Is Relevant","authors":"Levin Hornischer, Francesco Berto","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf012","url":null,"abstract":"Lots of things are usefully modelled in science as dynamical systems: growing populations, flocking birds, engineering apparatus, cognitive agents, distant galaxies, Turing machines, neural networks. We argue that relevant logic is ideal for reasoning about dynamical systems, including interactions with the system through perturbations. Thus dynamical systems provide a new applied interpretation of the abstract Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logic: the worlds in the model are the states of the system, while the (in)famous ternary relation is a combination of perturbation and evolution in the system. Conversely, the logic of the relevant conditional provides sound and complete laws of dynamical systems.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"152 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144153449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How To Eat a Peach: Malebranche on the Function of the Passions 如何吃桃子：论激情的作用
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-05-22 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf011
Colin Chamberlain
{"title":"How To Eat a Peach: Malebranche on the Function of the Passions","authors":"Colin Chamberlain","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf011","url":null,"abstract":"Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) holds that the senses, imagination, and passions serve the body’s needs. In this paper, I explain how the passions keep us alive by situating them in Malebranche’s account of ordinary bodily action. Malebranche holds a consent-based view of action. An agent translates her inclinations or motives into action only when she consents to them. The passions contribute to the preservation of life by helping the agent close the gap between inclination and action. The passions, according to Malebranche, are complex psychophysiological phenomena whose various elements—perceptions, shifts of attention, evaluations, bodily preparation, feelings, and so on—work together to elicit the agent’s consent.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Grim End Is at Hand: Schmid’s Grim Reaper Symmetry Argument, Precognitive Grandfather Paradoxes, and an Intrinsicality Test 严峻的结局就在眼前：施密德的死神对称论证、先见之明的祖父悖论和内在性测试
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-05-12 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf006
Wade A Tisthammer
{"title":"A Grim End Is at Hand: Schmid’s Grim Reaper Symmetry Argument, Precognitive Grandfather Paradoxes, and an Intrinsicality Test","authors":"Wade A Tisthammer","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf006","url":null,"abstract":"Paradoxes inspired by José Benardete have been used in arguments for temporal finitism and causal finitism. Joseph C. Schmid has argued that there is a symmetry between those arguments and a corresponding argument against an endless future with respect to Koons’ patchwork principle using intrinsically identical copies of situations involving God revealing a future. I argue that this symmetry argument has limitations a theist can exploit to avoid the problem. A precognitive grandfather paradox about using simple foreknowledge to reveal the future that is redolent of the grandfather paradox against time travel illustrates why one might prefer a type of subjunctive foreknowledge over simple foreknowledge with respect to revealing the future, and a test for intrinsicality reveals that the future-revealing quality need not be intrinsic to a situation containing a subjunctively foreknowing God revealing the future.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143940120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Complexity–Coherence Trade-Off in Cognition 认知中的复杂性-连贯性权衡
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-04-18 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf015
David Thorstad
{"title":"The Complexity–Coherence Trade-Off in Cognition","authors":"David Thorstad","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf015","url":null,"abstract":"I present evidence for a systematic complexity–coherence trade-off in cognition. I show how feasible strategies for increasing cognitive complexity along three dimensions come at the expense of a heightened vulnerability to incoherence. I discuss two normative implications of the complexity–coherence trade-off: a novel challenge to coherence-based theories of bounded rationality and a new strategy for vindicating the rationality of seemingly irrational cognitions. I also discuss how the complexity–coherence trade-off sharpens recent descriptive challenges to dual process theories of cognition.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143849676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shepherd’s Metaphysics of Emergence 谢泼德的涌现形而上学
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae074
Ariel Melamedoff
{"title":"Shepherd’s Metaphysics of Emergence","authors":"Ariel Melamedoff","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae074","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of causation that Mary Shepherd develops in her 1824 An Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (ERCE) has a number of surprising features that have only recently begun to be studied by scholars. This relation is synchronic, rather than diachronic (ERCE pp. 49–50); it always involves a ‘mixture’ of pre-existing objects (ERCE pp. 46–7); and the effect must be ‘a new nature, capable of exhibiting qualities varying from those of either of the objects unconjoined’ (ERCE p. 63). In this essay, I argue for an emergentist interpretation of Shepherd’s causal theory. On the reading I defend, all effects have qualities that metaphysically emerge from the complex interactions of their constituents. This reading explains the structure of Shepherd’s causal relation and clarifies the central aims of her philosophical project. In response to the problems raised by the science of her time, Shepherd developed a theory of emergence and published it during the period when the concept was first being shaped and adopted by prominent philosophers. Her work thus merits a place in the history of emergentist ideas.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143546413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are we agentially luminous? 我们是天生发光的吗？
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaf005
Juan S Piñeros Glasscock
{"title":"Are we agentially luminous?","authors":"Juan S Piñeros Glasscock","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzaf005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf005","url":null,"abstract":"In Piñeros Glasscock (2020) I presented a version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument against the Anscombean thesis that intentional action entails knowledge. I defend this argument from recent criticisms by Beddor and Pavese (2022) and Valaris (2021). I argue that contrary to what my past self and these critics suggest, the conclusion of this anti-luminosity argument does not rest on the existence of essentially intentional actions. The argument can be recast based on the humbler premise that agential cognition must represent actions as intentional. I show that this claim is well motivated by precisely the considerations of control behind the objections.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143546323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Be a Prudential Expressivist 如何成为一个审慎的表现主义者
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-01-14 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae072
James L D Brown
{"title":"How to Be a Prudential Expressivist","authors":"James L D Brown","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the prospects for an expressivist theory of prudential thought and discussion, or thought and discussion about what is good for us or what makes our lives go well. It is becoming increasingly common to view prudential thought and discussion as a kind of normative thought and discussion. If this is right, then expressivism, like any other meta-normative view, must be able to explain prudential thought and discussion. However, existing expressivist theories offer no such explanation and lack the resources to construct one. I argue that the best strategy for expressivists is to adopt a fitting attitudes account of prudential concepts. More specifically, I propose that expressivists adopt the rational care theory of well-being, according to which claims about what is good for a person are equivalent to claims about what it is rational to want for that person insofar as one cares for them. In doing so, I defend the rational care theory against its most pressing objection and argue that the view provides an independently attractive account of prudential thought and discussion that fits well with the expressivist’s aim to explain normative thought and discussion in terms of its distinctive practical function.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142981939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Essence Facts and the Source of Normativity 本质事实与规范性的源头
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2025-01-05 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae070
Umut Baysan
{"title":"Essence Facts and the Source of Normativity","authors":"Umut Baysan","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae070","url":null,"abstract":"What is the source of normativity? According to Bengson, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2023), we can answer this question by identifying non-normative grounds of fundamental normative facts. To illustrate how this can be achieved, they argue that facts concerning essences of normative properties are non-normative facts, and such facts can be seen as non-normative grounds of fundamental normative facts. I argue that this strategy is misguided. First, explanations citing essence facts about normative properties are poor answers to the question of the source of normativity. Second, it is not clear if such facts are non-normative in the relevant sense. Along the way, I address questions about what it is to be a normative fact and relate the implications of this discussion to general issues about metaphysical explanation in meta-normativity.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142929179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Universal Money Pump for the Myopic, Naive, and Minimally Sophisticated 为短视、天真和不太成熟的人提供的通用货币泵
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-12-21 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae061
Johan E Gustafsson
{"title":"A Universal Money Pump for the Myopic, Naive, and Minimally Sophisticated","authors":"Johan E Gustafsson","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae061","url":null,"abstract":"The money-pump argument aims to show that cyclic preferences are irrational. The argument can be based on a number of different exploitation schemes that vary in what needs to be assumed about the agent. The Standard Money Pump works for myopic and naive agents, but not for sophisticated agents who use backward induction. The Upfront Money Pump works for sophisticated agents, but not for myopic or naive agents. In this paper, I present a new money pump, the Universal Money Pump, that works for myopic, naive, and sophisticated agents. Moreover, the Universal Money Pump (just like the Upfront Money Pump) also works for minimally sophisticated agents who need not assume that they will choose rationally at nodes that can only be reached by irrational choices. This enables an argument that rational preferences are acyclic, which is based on weaker assumptions about dynamic rationality than existing money-pump arguments.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Benardete Paradoxes, Causal Finitism, and the Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis 贝纳德悖论、因果有限论与不可满足配对诊断
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-11-27 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae057
Joseph C Schmid, Alex Malpass
{"title":"Benardete Paradoxes, Causal Finitism, and the Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis","authors":"Joseph C Schmid, Alex Malpass","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae057","url":null,"abstract":"We examine two competing solutions to Benardete paradoxes: causal finitism, according to which nothing can have infinitely many causes, and the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis (UPD), according to which such paradoxes are logically impossible and no metaphysical thesis need be adopted to avoid them. We argue that the UPD enjoys notable theoretical advantages over causal finitism. Causal finitists, however, have levelled two main objections to the UPD. First, they urge that the UPD requires positing a ‘mysterious force’ that prevents paradoxes from arising. Since such a force is implausible, the UPD is in trouble. Second, they employ recombination or patchwork principles to argue that paradoxical situations would be possible if causal finitism were false. Since such situations are not possible, causal finitism is true, and so a substantive metaphysical thesis is needed to avoid the paradoxes. We argue that the UPD proponent can successfully respond to these objections.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142753634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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