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How to Do Without Encroachment 如何做到不受侵占
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae029
Sarah Moss
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引用次数: 0
Abilities and the Epistemology of Ordinary Modality 能力与普通模式认识论
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae037
Barbara Vetter
{"title":"Abilities and the Epistemology of Ordinary Modality","authors":"Barbara Vetter","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae037","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past two decades, modal epistemology has turned its attention to ordinary modal knowledge. This paper brings to the fore a neglected but central form of ordinary modal knowledge: knowledge of agentive modality, and in particular of our own abilities, which I call ‘ability knowledge’. I argue that modal epistemology as it is does not account for ability knowledge, by looking at the most promising candidate theories: perception-based, counterfactual-based, and similarity-based modal epistemologies. I then outline a more promising epistemology for our ability knowledge, which relies on the experience of our own agency, and draw out some lessons for modal epistemology in general.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141877348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ancient Women Philosophers: Recovered Ideas and New Perspectives, edited by Katharine R. O’Reilly and Caterina Pellò 古代女哲学家：凯瑟琳-R.-奥赖利和卡特琳娜-佩洛编辑的《恢复的思想和新视角
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae034
M. Deslauriers
{"title":"Ancient Women Philosophers: Recovered Ideas and New Perspectives, edited by Katharine R. O’Reilly and Caterina Pellò","authors":"M. Deslauriers","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141651135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The State, by Philip Pettit 国家》，菲利普-佩蒂特著
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae038
Rebecca Buxton
{"title":"The State, by Philip Pettit","authors":"Rebecca Buxton","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141651634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Living Toward Virtue: Practical Ethics in the Spirit of Socrates 活出美德苏格拉底精神中的实用伦理学
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae031
Naomi Reshotko
{"title":"Living Toward Virtue: Practical Ethics in the Spirit of Socrates","authors":"Naomi Reshotko","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141349959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Who Needs a Proof of the Principle of Non-Contradiction? 谁需要不矛盾原理的证明？
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae030
Timothy Clarke
{"title":"Who Needs a Proof of the Principle of Non-Contradiction?","authors":"Timothy Clarke","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae030","url":null,"abstract":"The topic of this paper is Aristotle’s ‘proof by refutation’ of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (Metaphysics Γ 4, 1006a11–1007a20). I consider a worry which has often been raised in connection with this proof. The worry is that, faced with an opponent who is prepared to tolerate contradictions, the argument is dialectically powerless: it is incapable of getting them to abandon their position. In reply, I argue that the proof needs to be seen in its proper context, that is, as part of Aristotle’s response to an opponent who demands a demonstration of the principle. This allows us to clarify the purpose of the argument and answer the worry about its effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141315673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Relationist Theory of Intentional Identity 意向性身份的关系理论
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae021
Dilip Ninan
{"title":"A Relationist Theory of Intentional Identity","authors":"Dilip Ninan","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae021","url":null,"abstract":"This essay argues for a relationist treatment of intentional identity sentences like (1): (1) Hob believes that a witch blighted Bob’s mare and Nob believes that she killed Cob’s sow. According to relationism, facts of the form a believes that ϕ and b believes that ψ are not in general reducible to facts of the form c believes that χ. I first argue that extant, non-relationist treatments of intentional identity are unsatisfactory, and then go on to motivate and explore a relationist alternative in some detail. I show that the general thesis of relationism can be directly motivated via cases already discussed in the literature, and then develop a particular version of relationism couched in the possible worlds framework. The resulting theory avoids the problems facing its non-relationist rivals, and yields a natural account of the truth conditions of (1), truth conditions which can be generated in a compositional manner by a version of dynamic semantics. The theory also helps us to cleanly separate semantic questions about intentional identity from metasemantic ones.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141185137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consequences of Assigning Non-Measurable Sets Imprecise Probabilities 赋予不可测量集合不精确概率的后果
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-05-21 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae023
Joshua Thong
{"title":"Consequences of Assigning Non-Measurable Sets Imprecise Probabilities","authors":"Joshua Thong","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae023","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a discussion note on Isaacs, Hájek and Hawthorne (2022), which claims to offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities, based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurability. In this note, I clarify some consequences of that proposal. In particular, I show that if the proposal is applied to a bounded 3-dimensional space, then one has to reject at least one of the following: If A is at most as probable as B and B is at most as probable as C, then A is at most as probable as C. • Let A∩C=B∩C=∅. A is at most as probable as B if and only if (A∪C) is at most as probable as (B∪C). But rejecting either statement seems unattractive.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141079357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Margaret Macdonald, Philosopher of Language 玛格丽特-麦克唐纳，语言哲学家
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae025
O. Spinney
{"title":"Margaret Macdonald, Philosopher of Language","authors":"O. Spinney","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I chart the philosophical development of neglected figure Margaret Macdonald and situate that development in the context of mid-century analytic philosophy more broadly. I examine Macdonald’s changing attitude towards verificationism, and show that these changing views led her, in 1950 and beyond, to a very thorough appreciation of language use as capable of being employed in the execution of distinctive kinds of performative act. I compare Macdonald’s views with the far better known work of J. L. Austin, and I emphasise the extent to which she has, despite her insightful contributions, been omitted from the history of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140968898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shepherd’s Accounts of Space and Time 牧羊人的时空叙述
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
MIND Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae024
David Landy
{"title":"Shepherd’s Accounts of Space and Time","authors":"David Landy","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzae024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is an apparent tension in Shepherd’s accounts of space and time. Firstly, Shepherd explicitly claims that we know that the space and time of the unperceived world exist because they cause our phenomenal experience of them. Secondly, Shepherd emphasizes that empty space and time do not have the power to effect any change in the world. My proposal is that for Shepherd time has exactly one causal power: to provide for the continued existence of self-same or changing objects. Because Shepherd takes causation to be a relation whereby two objects combine to form a third, their effect, whenever we perceive a continually existing object, since time is a proper part of such objects, our perception of time is caused by time itself. Likewise, space’s causal power is to provide for the possibility of the motion or rest of objects, and so when we perceive objects with space as a proper part, we come into causal contact with space.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140971331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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