更大、更坏的虫子

IF 1.8 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

MIND Pub Date : 2024-09-02 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzae039

Benjamin A Levinstein, Jack Spencer

引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中，我们提出了 "信任原则"，即严格强于 "新原则 "但又严格弱于 "主原则 "的机会信任原则，并通过证明一些限制性结果，论证了信任原则与休谟超验性的冲突。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Bigger, Badder Bugs

In this paper we motivate the ‘principles of trust’, chance-credence principles that are strictly stronger than the New Principle yet strictly weaker than the Principal Principle, and argue, by proving some limitative results, that the principles of trust conflict with Humean Supervenience.

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来源期刊

MIND PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

3.10

自引率

5.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.