Journal of Business Finance & Accounting最新文献

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The beguiling behaviour of narcissistic CEOs: Evidence from repurchase announcements 自恋型首席执行官的诱人行为:来自回购公告的证据
IF 2.9 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12796
Evans O. Boamah, Shantanu Banerjee
{"title":"The beguiling behaviour of narcissistic CEOs: Evidence from repurchase announcements","authors":"Evans O. Boamah,&nbsp;Shantanu Banerjee","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12796","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) narcissism affects a firm's share repurchase announcements and their implementations. Using signature characteristics as a measure of narcissism, we find that US firms with narcissist CEOs are more likely to make repurchase announcements and announce higher repurchase dollar amounts. However, these firms are less likely to follow through. Actual repurchases by these firms are less frequent, and they use a smaller amount of cash for share buyback because they have a higher cashflow sensitivity of cash. Narcissist CEOs’ repurchase announcements are less driven by market timing and have a lower announcement effect compared to those by other CEOs. The higher rate and amount of repurchase announcements are more pronounced in poorly governed firms with narcissistic CEOs. These results are robust to various specifications including a difference-in-difference set-up using CEOs’ exogenous turnover, controlling for other CEO traits and using an alternative measure of narcissism based on pronoun usage in CEO communications. Collectively, the results presented in this study demonstrate that narcissist CEOs play a critical role in the intensity of share repurchase announcements and their executions, particularly for firms with weaker governance structures.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 3-4","pages":"717-755"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12796","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140348854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Audit partner style and financial statement comparability: New evidence from the US market 审计合伙人风格与财务报表可比性:来自美国市场的新证据
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12798
Tracie Frost, Zhijian Chris He, Xin Luo, Derrald Stice
{"title":"Audit partner style and financial statement comparability: New evidence from the US market","authors":"Tracie Frost,&nbsp;Zhijian Chris He,&nbsp;Xin Luo,&nbsp;Derrald Stice","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12798","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12798","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore the influence of individual audit partner style on financial statement comparability in a US setting using newly available data. We find evidence of an audit partner style effect on comparability incremental to audit firm and audit office effects. Our results are consistent across several comparability measures and are economically significant. For example, the audit partner effect is associated with a 12.59% decrease in the mean difference in abnormal accruals compared with a 4.4% decrease for firm pairs audited by the same Big 4 audit office. We also find that audit partner expertise and experience have a greater influence on comparability than audit office expertise and experience. Our results are consistent in endogeneity and robustness tests including (1) auditor switching tests, (2) entropy balancing, (3) placebo tests and (4) controlling for clients’ economic similarity. Our results suggest that the association between audit partner style and financial statement comparability persists in highly regulatory environments and corroborate the PCAOB's intuition that the role of the engagement partner “is of singular importance” to the outcome of the audit (PCAOB 2011).</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2763-2790"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12798","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140199446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax enforcement and corporate cash holdings 税收执法与公司现金持有
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12795
Jiaren Pang, Kun Wang, Le Zhao
{"title":"Tax enforcement and corporate cash holdings","authors":"Jiaren Pang,&nbsp;Kun Wang,&nbsp;Le Zhao","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12795","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12795","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Strengthened tax enforcement increases firms’ expected tax liabilities and uncertainty; thus, firms have incentives to hold more cash. Considering the staggered implementation of a new tax system that increases tax enforcement across provinces in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we employ the difference-in-differences method to test the above prediction. The results indicate that stricter tax enforcement is associated with greater corporate cash holdings. This effect is stronger for financially constrained firms and those located in areas with high tax noncompliance penalties. Additionally, tax enforcement increases firms’ propensity to accumulate cash from cash flows and decreases capital expenditures and dividend payouts. The main findings are robust to the stacked difference-in-differences method, alternative cash holding measures and different sample selections.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2737-2762"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140260805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The unintended cost of data breach notification laws: Evidence from managerial bad news hoarding 数据泄露通知法的意外成本:管理者囤积坏消息的证据
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12794
Ivan Obaydin, Limin Xu, Ralf Zurbruegg
{"title":"The unintended cost of data breach notification laws: Evidence from managerial bad news hoarding","authors":"Ivan Obaydin,&nbsp;Limin Xu,&nbsp;Ralf Zurbruegg","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12794","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12794","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how nonfinancial disclosure laws exacerbate agency issues in firms. Our analysis focuses on the staggered adoption of state-level notification laws that require firms to disclose data breaches. Our findings reveal that the introduction of these laws increases the risk of stock price crashes. Managers appear motivated to accumulate unfavorable news in an effort to prevent market overreactions associated with the mandatory disclosure of data breaches. Cross-sectional analyses also reveal that the impact is stronger when managers have a greater incentive, or greater ability, to hoard information. Our results highlight that nonfinancial disclosures can have unintended consequences for firm information asymmetries and potentially adverse market impacts in cases where the regulation is unable to consider all stakeholders.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2709-2736"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12794","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140074997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political contributions and the auditor–client relationship 政治献金与审计师-客户关系
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12791
Frank Heflin, Dana Wallace
{"title":"Political contributions and the auditor–client relationship","authors":"Frank Heflin,&nbsp;Dana Wallace","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12791","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12791","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the impact of audit client political contributions on various audit attributes. We find that, despite having poorer accruals quality, clients with higher political contributions have fewer restatements, receive no more going concern qualified opinions and receive fewer reported material weaknesses. Additionally, we find that auditors earn higher fees from and have longer tenure with their politically connected clients. Our evidence is indirect, but the totality of our results is most consistent with an economic bond between auditors and their politically connected clients, whereby clients are allowed more accounting discretion and receive fewer adverse audit outcomes, and the auditor charges a persistent risk premium. We conclude that client political connections likely influence audit outcomes because of either reduced scrutiny from regulators or direct influence on auditors. We extend a growing body of research on the consequences of corporate political connections.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2668-2708"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12791","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140074986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Excess control of family board seats and corporate innovation 家族董事会席位的过度控制与企业创新
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-03-02 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12793
Suyun Chen, Zongze Li, Lingling Chu, Qingzi Cao
{"title":"Excess control of family board seats and corporate innovation","authors":"Suyun Chen,&nbsp;Zongze Li,&nbsp;Lingling Chu,&nbsp;Qingzi Cao","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12793","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12793","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the impact of board-level control on corporate innovation in family firms. We find that excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) is negatively correlated with innovation investment, innovation output and innovation efficiency. Our findings suggest that ECFBS exacerbates type II agency problems. Mechanistic analyses show that ECFBS reduces firms’ risk-taking level, increases their financing constraints and damages channels for acquiring innovative professional knowledge. We also observe that effect of ECFBS on innovation is associated with family origin, familiarization time and family management characteristics. Our findings should be of interest to family firm manager investors and lenders who are interested in family governance mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2635-2667"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140035330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate disclosure differences around the world: International evidence 全球企业信息披露的差异:国际证据
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12790
Zihua Liu, Ziyao San, Albert Tsang, Li Yu
{"title":"Corporate disclosure differences around the world: International evidence","authors":"Zihua Liu,&nbsp;Ziyao San,&nbsp;Albert Tsang,&nbsp;Li Yu","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12790","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12790","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine whether and how variations in country-level institutional factors explain the intensity, diversity and informativeness of corporate disclosures around the world. Using a comprehensive corporate disclosure dataset containing more than 100 types of disclosures from firms domiciled in 35 countries, we examine the effect of four core country-level institutional factors—legal system, creditor/investor rights, political process and societal characteristics—on corporate disclosures. Our results suggest that the country-level institutional factor, which is likely to capture the legal system of a country, is negatively associated with the intensity, diversity and informativeness of disclosure. Moreover, our results suggest that the level of creditor/investor rights protection, political process and societal characteristics can also consistently affect the production, diversity and informativeness of disclosures. Overall, our evidence broadens our collective understanding of how core institutional factors at the society and country levels systematically explain corporate disclosures and their associated informativeness.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2592-2634"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139758516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Variable rate premiums and defined benefit pension funding 可变利率保费和固定福利养老金筹资
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12777
Abbie Sadler
{"title":"Variable rate premiums and defined benefit pension funding","authors":"Abbie Sadler","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12777","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12777","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the association between variable rate premiums (VRPs) charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and defined benefit pension funding in the United States. The PBGC requires VRPs from firms that fail to adequately fund their pension plans. Because millions rely on pension income, it is important to understand how government incentives impact pension funding decisions. In the aggregate, VRPs are positively associated with increases in pension funding. However, these premiums are not associated with excess pension contributions (EPCs) for financially distressed firms. These results suggest that financially distressed US firms engage in risk shifting. The lack of association persists even for financially distressed firms with tax benefits associated with pension funding. Finally, the association between VRPs and EPCs holds only for firms with combined lower borrowing costs and higher premiums. This finding suggests that higher premiums are not an effective incentive when firms also face higher borrowing costs and that lower premiums are not an effective incentive for EPCs, regardless of a firm's borrowing cost.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2561-2591"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12777","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139758621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The reputational costs of connections to controversial politicians: Evidence from political scandals 与有争议的政治人物建立联系的声誉成本:政治丑闻的证据
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12788
Susanne Preuss, Jacco L. Wielhouwer
{"title":"The reputational costs of connections to controversial politicians: Evidence from political scandals","authors":"Susanne Preuss,&nbsp;Jacco L. Wielhouwer","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12788","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12788","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We use the exogenous nature of political scandals to test whether political connections in the form of campaign contributions expose firms to reputational risk. We hand-collect a sample of 218 scandals of members of the U.S. Congress that occurred between 2000 and 2019 and estimate the abnormal returns around the day a scandal first appeared in the news. We find that connected firms and to a lesser extent other politically active firms experience value losses around corruption scandals involving firms or lobbyists. These losses increase in managers’ propensity to engage in unethical behavior. Moreover, we find that following such corruption scandals, media sources release negative news about connected firms, shareholders of connected firms are more likely to submit proposals on the disclosure of political contributions, and connected firms reduce political spending. Overall, our results suggest that losses around scandals are driven by reputation spillover and investors updating their beliefs about the risks of political contributions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2523-2560"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jbfa.12788","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139758625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Acquisitions and social capital 收购和社会资本
IF 2.2 3区 管理学
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-31 DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12787
Hasibul Chowdhury, Ashrafee Hossain, Anand Jha
{"title":"Acquisitions and social capital","authors":"Hasibul Chowdhury,&nbsp;Ashrafee Hossain,&nbsp;Anand Jha","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12787","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jbfa.12787","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the association between the social capital—social norms that encourage altruism and discourage opportunism—in the state of the firm's headquarters and the acquisitions it makes. We find that the cumulative abnormal return around an acquisition announcement is high when an acquirer is headquartered in a high social capital state in the United States. This effect is robust and incremental to the effect of a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings and economically comparable to the effect of corporate governance. The effect of social capital is stronger for firms that have lower CSR ratings, which indicates social capital may act as a substitute for CSR. An additional analysis shows that social capital's effect is stronger in a subsample of firms with weak corporate governance. Acquirers from states with high social capital also demonstrate less hubris in acquiring targets than those from states with low social capital as the evidence of lower bid premiums indicates. Overall, our results show that the social norms that social capital measures mitigate potential agency problems in acquisitions by inducing managers to honor their obligations to shareholders.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2490-2522"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139909607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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