{"title":"家族董事会席位的过度控制与企业创新","authors":"Suyun Chen, Zongze Li, Lingling Chu, Qingzi Cao","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12793","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the impact of board-level control on corporate innovation in family firms. We find that excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) is negatively correlated with innovation investment, innovation output and innovation efficiency. Our findings suggest that ECFBS exacerbates type II agency problems. Mechanistic analyses show that ECFBS reduces firms’ risk-taking level, increases their financing constraints and damages channels for acquiring innovative professional knowledge. We also observe that effect of ECFBS on innovation is associated with family origin, familiarization time and family management characteristics. Our findings should be of interest to family firm manager investors and lenders who are interested in family governance mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":48106,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"51 9-10","pages":"2635-2667"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Excess control of family board seats and corporate innovation\",\"authors\":\"Suyun Chen, Zongze Li, Lingling Chu, Qingzi Cao\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jbfa.12793\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We examine the impact of board-level control on corporate innovation in family firms. We find that excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) is negatively correlated with innovation investment, innovation output and innovation efficiency. Our findings suggest that ECFBS exacerbates type II agency problems. Mechanistic analyses show that ECFBS reduces firms’ risk-taking level, increases their financing constraints and damages channels for acquiring innovative professional knowledge. We also observe that effect of ECFBS on innovation is associated with family origin, familiarization time and family management characteristics. Our findings should be of interest to family firm manager investors and lenders who are interested in family governance mechanisms.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48106,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting\",\"volume\":\"51 9-10\",\"pages\":\"2635-2667\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jbfa.12793\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jbfa.12793","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Excess control of family board seats and corporate innovation
We examine the impact of board-level control on corporate innovation in family firms. We find that excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) is negatively correlated with innovation investment, innovation output and innovation efficiency. Our findings suggest that ECFBS exacerbates type II agency problems. Mechanistic analyses show that ECFBS reduces firms’ risk-taking level, increases their financing constraints and damages channels for acquiring innovative professional knowledge. We also observe that effect of ECFBS on innovation is associated with family origin, familiarization time and family management characteristics. Our findings should be of interest to family firm manager investors and lenders who are interested in family governance mechanisms.
期刊介绍：
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting exists to publish high quality research papers in accounting, corporate finance, corporate governance and their interfaces. The interfaces are relevant in many areas such as financial reporting and communication, valuation, financial performance measurement and managerial reward and control structures. A feature of JBFA is that it recognises that informational problems are pervasive in financial markets and business organisations, and that accounting plays an important role in resolving such problems. JBFA welcomes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Nonetheless, theoretical papers should yield novel testable implications, and empirical papers should be theoretically well-motivated. The Editors view accounting and finance as being closely related to economics and, as a consequence, papers submitted will often have theoretical motivations that are grounded in economics. JBFA, however, also seeks papers that complement economics-based theorising with theoretical developments originating in other social science disciplines or traditions. While many papers in JBFA use econometric or related empirical methods, the Editors also welcome contributions that use other empirical research methods. Although the scope of JBFA is broad, it is not a suitable outlet for highly abstract mathematical papers, or empirical papers with inadequate theoretical motivation. Also, papers that study asset pricing, or the operations of financial markets, should have direct implications for one or more of preparers, regulators, users of financial statements, and corporate financial decision makers, or at least should have implications for the development of future research relevant to such users.
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