{"title":"Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation","authors":"Karsten Müller","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200626","url":null,"abstract":"Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically looser before elections, particularly during economic expansions. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain, regulators are closely tied to politicians, and institutions are poor. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to “lean against the wind.” (JEL D72, E32, G01, G21, G28)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"44 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135216640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael D. Frakes, Jonathan Gruber, Timothy Justicz
{"title":"Public and Private Options in Practice: The Military Health System","authors":"Michael D. Frakes, Jonathan Gruber, Timothy Justicz","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210625","url":null,"abstract":"Recent debates over health care reform, including in the context of the Military Health System (MHS) and Veterans Administration, highlight the dispute between public and private provision of health care services. Using novel data on childbirth claims from the MHS and drawing on the combination of plausibly exogenous patient moves and heterogeneity across bases in the availability of base hospitals, we identify the impact of receiving obstetrical care on versus off military bases. We find evidence that off-base care is associated with slightly greater resource intensity, but also notably better outcomes, suggesting marginal efficiency gains from care privatization. (JEL H51, H56, I11, I18, J13, L33)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Credit Supply Shocks Affect Employment in Middle-Income Countries?","authors":"Emilio Gutierrez, David Jaume, MartÃn Tobal","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210354","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of bank credit supply shocks on formal employment in Mexico using a proprietary dataset containing information on all loans extended to firms by commercial banks during 2010–2015. We find large impacts on the formal employment of small and medium firms: a positive credit shock of 1 standard deviation increases yearly employment by 1.4 percentage points. The shares of uncollateralized credit and credit received by family firms, younger firms, and firms with no previous bank relationships also increase, suggesting that credit shocks may play a more prominent role for employment creation in credit-constrained settings. (JEL D22, G21, G32, J23, L25, M51, O16)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"40 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"College Enrollment and Mandatory FAFSA Applications: Evidence from Louisiana","authors":"Christa Deneault","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210360","url":null,"abstract":"I estimate the impact of a Louisiana state policy that mandated Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) applications as a high school graduation requirement. I find significant increases in FAFSA completion rates (19 percentage points), and my estimates imply an increase of 1–2 percentage points in college enrollment. There is suggestive evidence that these effects were more concentrated among lower-income students/schools, and merit-based state financial aid applications also increased. The design of this mandate implies that pushing students into action may be more effective than informational nudges and that localized support systems such as counselors are important for the success of a top-down policy. (JEL D91, H75, I21, I22, I23, I28)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86174540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination","authors":"Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200703","url":null,"abstract":"We explore how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may improve the quality of issued patents on “secondary” drug features by giving examiners more time to review drug patent applications. Our findings suggest that current time allocations are causing examiners to issue low-quality secondary patents on the margin. To assess the merits of expanding ex ante scrutiny of drug patent applications at the agency, we set forth estimates of the various gains and losses associated with giving examiners more time, including reduced downstream litigation costs and added personnel expenses, along with both the static gains and dynamic innovation losses associated with earlier generic entry. (JEL K11, L65, O31, O34, O38)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135931083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Organizational Boundaries on Healthcare Coordination and Utilization.","authors":"Leila Agha, Keith Marzilli Ericson, Xiaoxi Zhao","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200841","DOIUrl":"10.1257/pol.20200841","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We measure <i>organizational concentration</i>-the distribution of a patient's healthcare across organizations-to examine how firm boundaries affect healthcare efficiency. First, when patients move to regions where outpatient visits are typically concentrated within a small set of firms, their healthcare utilization falls. Second, for patients whose PCPs exit the market, switching to a PCP with 1 standard deviation higher organizational concentration reduces utilization by 21%. This finding is robust to controlling for the spread of healthcare across providers. Increases in organizational concentration predict improvements in diabetes care and are not associated with greater use of emergency department or inpatient care.</p>","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"15 3","pages":"184-214"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10403257/pdf/nihms-1868896.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10013011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem","authors":"Joshua A. Blonz","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210208","url":null,"abstract":"In many settings, misaligned incentives and inadequate monitoring lead employees to take self-interested actions. This paper identifies and quantifies the costs of this principal-agent problem in the context of an energy efficiency appliance replacement program. I show that contractors (agents) hired by the electric utility (the principal) increase their compensation by intentionally misreporting program data to authorize the replacement of nonqualified refrigerators. I estimate that each unqualified replacement reduces program benefits by $106 and saves 30 percent less electricity than replacements that follow program guidelines. The same program without a principal-agent distortion would increase program benefits by $60 per replacement. (JEL D82, L68, L94, L98)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83553924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Social Security Reform Affects Retirement and Pension Claiming","authors":"R. Lalive, Arvind Magesan, S. Staubli","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200686","url":null,"abstract":"A reform increasing the full retirement age (FRA) by one year leads to larger than expected delays in pension claiming and retirement, while making late claiming more lucrative leads to a smaller than expected delay in pension claiming. Survey evidence shows people view the FRA as the “normal” retirement age and prefer to couple pension claiming and retirement decisions together, even though these two decisions are not coupled through social security provisions. Two mechanisms are at work: reference dependence with loss aversion in pension claiming, and spillovers from pension claiming on retirement choices. The FRA increase leads to large government savings. (JEL H55, J26)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"113 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84323285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Lawrence Barnett, Andrew Olenski, Adam Sacarny
{"title":"Common Practice: Spillovers from Medicare on Private Health Care","authors":"Michael Lawrence Barnett, Andrew Olenski, Adam Sacarny","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200553","url":null,"abstract":"Efforts to raise US health-care productivity have proceeded slowly, potentially due to the fragmentation of payment across insurers. Each insurer’s efforts to improve care could influence how doctors practice for other insurers, leading to unvalued externalities. We study a randomized letter intervention by Medicare to curtail overuse of antipsychotics. The letters did not mention private insurance but reduced prescribing to these patients by 12 percent, much like the 17 percent effect in Medicare. We cannot reject onefor-one spillovers, suggesting that physicians use similar medical practice styles across insurers. Our findings establish that insurers can affect health care well outside their direct purview. (JEL D24, G22, I11, I13, I18)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ACE—Analytic Climate Economy","authors":"Christian Traeger","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210297","url":null,"abstract":"I study optimal carbon taxation in an analytic quantitative integrated assessment model (IAM) that links IAM components, parametric assumptions, and calibration approaches directly to their policy impacts. I show how temperature’s tax impact differs from that of previously analytically modeled carbon dynamics. Novel to analytic IAMs are a general economy, energy sectors including capital, varying degrees of substitutability across energy sources, an approximation of capital persistence, objective functions that include CES preferences and population weighting, and an explicit model of the greenhouse effect and ocean-atmosphere temperature dynamics. The paper enables economists to develop better-informed opinions about the social cost of carbon. (JEL H23, H43, Q54, Q58)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}