{"title":"Public Pension Reforms and Retirement Decisions: Narrative Evidence and Aggregate Implications","authors":"Huixin Bi, Sarah Zubairy","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200881","url":null,"abstract":"We construct a database of public pension policy changes with motivation and implementation information for ten OECD countries. Structural pension reforms, motivated by long-run sustainability concerns, often come with prolonged phase-in periods. In response to pension retrenchments implemented immediately, people close to retirement stay in the workforce longer. News about future pension retrenchments with implementation lags, however, is likely to lead this group to exit the labor market. This decline in the labor force participation rate is particularly strong for reforms with long lags, ones that introduce fundamental policy changes, and ones where citizens have lower trust in the government. (JEL E62, H55, J14, J22, J26)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"3 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135161309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Import Competition on Unionization","authors":"John S. Ahlquist, Mitch Downey","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200709","url":null,"abstract":"We study direct and indirect effects of Chinese import competition on union membership in the United States, 1990–2014. Import competition in manufacturing induced a modest decline in unionization within manufacturing industries. The magnitude is small because unionized manufacturers competed in higher-quality product segments. Manufacturers in right-to-work states experienced more direct competition with low-quality Chinese imports. Outside of manufacturing, however, import competition causes an important increase in union membership, as less educated women shift away from retail and toward jobs in health care and education where unions are stronger. We calculate that Chinese imports prevented 26 percent of the union density decline that would have otherwise occurred. (JEL F14, F16, J16, J51, L60, P33)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"275 1-2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135217803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digitization and the Market for Physical Works: Evidence from the Google Books Project","authors":"Abhishek Nagaraj, Imke Reimers","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210702","url":null,"abstract":"The free digital distribution of creative works could cannibalize demand for physical versions, but it could also boost physical sales by enabling consumers to discover the original work. We study the impact of the Google Books digitization project on the market for physical books. We find that digitization significantly boosts the demand for physical versions and provide evidence for the discovery channel. Moreover, digitization allows independent publishers to introduce new editions for existing books, further increasing sales. Our results highlight the potential of free digital distribution to strengthen the demand for and supply of physical products. (JEL D12, L82, L86)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"90 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135166957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation","authors":"Karsten Müller","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200626","url":null,"abstract":"Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically looser before elections, particularly during economic expansions. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain, regulators are closely tied to politicians, and institutions are poor. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to “lean against the wind.” (JEL D72, E32, G01, G21, G28)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"44 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135216640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael D. Frakes, Jonathan Gruber, Timothy Justicz
{"title":"Public and Private Options in Practice: The Military Health System","authors":"Michael D. Frakes, Jonathan Gruber, Timothy Justicz","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210625","url":null,"abstract":"Recent debates over health care reform, including in the context of the Military Health System (MHS) and Veterans Administration, highlight the dispute between public and private provision of health care services. Using novel data on childbirth claims from the MHS and drawing on the combination of plausibly exogenous patient moves and heterogeneity across bases in the availability of base hospitals, we identify the impact of receiving obstetrical care on versus off military bases. We find evidence that off-base care is associated with slightly greater resource intensity, but also notably better outcomes, suggesting marginal efficiency gains from care privatization. (JEL H51, H56, I11, I18, J13, L33)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Credit Supply Shocks Affect Employment in Middle-Income Countries?","authors":"Emilio Gutierrez, David Jaume, MartÃn Tobal","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210354","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of bank credit supply shocks on formal employment in Mexico using a proprietary dataset containing information on all loans extended to firms by commercial banks during 2010–2015. We find large impacts on the formal employment of small and medium firms: a positive credit shock of 1 standard deviation increases yearly employment by 1.4 percentage points. The shares of uncollateralized credit and credit received by family firms, younger firms, and firms with no previous bank relationships also increase, suggesting that credit shocks may play a more prominent role for employment creation in credit-constrained settings. (JEL D22, G21, G32, J23, L25, M51, O16)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"40 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"College Enrollment and Mandatory FAFSA Applications: Evidence from Louisiana","authors":"Christa Deneault","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210360","url":null,"abstract":"I estimate the impact of a Louisiana state policy that mandated Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) applications as a high school graduation requirement. I find significant increases in FAFSA completion rates (19 percentage points), and my estimates imply an increase of 1–2 percentage points in college enrollment. There is suggestive evidence that these effects were more concentrated among lower-income students/schools, and merit-based state financial aid applications also increased. The design of this mandate implies that pushing students into action may be more effective than informational nudges and that localized support systems such as counselors are important for the success of a top-down policy. (JEL D91, H75, I21, I22, I23, I28)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86174540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination","authors":"Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200703","url":null,"abstract":"We explore how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may improve the quality of issued patents on “secondary” drug features by giving examiners more time to review drug patent applications. Our findings suggest that current time allocations are causing examiners to issue low-quality secondary patents on the margin. To assess the merits of expanding ex ante scrutiny of drug patent applications at the agency, we set forth estimates of the various gains and losses associated with giving examiners more time, including reduced downstream litigation costs and added personnel expenses, along with both the static gains and dynamic innovation losses associated with earlier generic entry. (JEL K11, L65, O31, O34, O38)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135931083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem","authors":"Joshua A. Blonz","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210208","url":null,"abstract":"In many settings, misaligned incentives and inadequate monitoring lead employees to take self-interested actions. This paper identifies and quantifies the costs of this principal-agent problem in the context of an energy efficiency appliance replacement program. I show that contractors (agents) hired by the electric utility (the principal) increase their compensation by intentionally misreporting program data to authorize the replacement of nonqualified refrigerators. I estimate that each unqualified replacement reduces program benefits by $106 and saves 30 percent less electricity than replacements that follow program guidelines. The same program without a principal-agent distortion would increase program benefits by $60 per replacement. (JEL D82, L68, L94, L98)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83553924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}