Pejman Abedifar , Morteza Abdollahzadeh , Amine Tarazi , Lawrence J. White
{"title":"The sale of failed banks: The importance of their branch networks and of the acquirers’ financial strength","authors":"Pejman Abedifar , Morteza Abdollahzadeh , Amine Tarazi , Lawrence J. White","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101338","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101338","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the pricing of insolvent banks in the U.S. that are sold under the <em>purchase and assumption</em> resolution method of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We consider quarterly data for 444 acquisitions of insolvent U.S. banks between 2009 and 2016. We find that acquirers not only pay higher prices for insolvent banks with larger core deposits, as has been highlighted by the literature (and is consistent with the FDIC’s beliefs), but also for those banks with larger branch networks that are less dispersed geographically. When the acquirers bid (separately) for the assets of the insolvent banks, they place a positive value on the number of branches of the insolvent bank, but appear to be insensitive to geographic dispersion. Acquirers also pay more for banks with a national charter. The results additionally show that failed banks are most likely to be acquired by relatively large and highly capitalized banks whose organic growth is not affected in the years following the acquisition. Overall, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the implications of the <em>purchase and assumption</em> resolution method for the FDIC and for the banking industry.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101338"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142531948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do repeated government infusions help financial stability? Evidence from an emerging market","authors":"Madhu Kalimipalli , Olaleye Morohunfolu , Shankar Ramachandran","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101334","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101334","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While government led bank capital infusions in US and other developed markets have been usually contingent an external shock or crisis episode, India presents a unique setting where significant capital infusions happen annually to stabilize the weak balance sheets of undercapitalized government owned public sector banks. Such <em>“repeated”</em> capital infusions can either better engender financial stability, given the timely government interventions; or create instability arising from possible moral hazard concerns. \"<em>Do such repeated government capital infusions lower banks’ financial risks and improve financial stability?</em>” We shed light on the question through the lens of capital infusions in the Indian market. Based on the exhaustive sample of government capital infusions into public sector banks for the period 2008–18, we find robust evidence that capital infusions are associated with economically significant higher default, capital shortfall and network risks post-infusion, signaling a moral hazard problem, where treated banks may assume more risky investments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101334"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142531947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capital controls in China: A necessity for macroeconomic stability","authors":"Cheng Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101335","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101335","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the crucial role of capital controls in maintaining macroeconomic stability in China. We develop an open macroeconomic model integrating capital controls within a managed floating exchange rate system. Our model shows that capital controls enhance the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions by restricting capital outflows and providing a broader array of policy options, though they may also create discrepancies between domestic and foreign asset holdings. Simulations using quarterly time-series data reveal that capital controls are essential for the success of both sterilized and non-sterilized interventions. These results indicate that the combined use of capital controls and foreign exchange interventions can reduce macroeconomic volatility in China. Moreover, our analysis of fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes suggests that an inappropriate regime choice can increase volatility in capital flows. Therefore, China should adopt a balanced financial approach within its managed floating system to stabilize the macroeconomy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101335"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142357136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abu Amin , Sabur Mollah , Syed Kamal , Yang Zhao , Rasim Simsek
{"title":"Independent directors’ connectedness and bank risk-taking","authors":"Abu Amin , Sabur Mollah , Syed Kamal , Yang Zhao , Rasim Simsek","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101324","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101324","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the role of independent directors’ network centrality in bank risk-taking. Following the shareholder-incentive hypothesis and social-network theory, we predict and find that independent directors’ connectedness is positively associated with bank risk-taking. The results hold after a battery of robustness checks and endogeneity tests. Furthermore, consistent with the influence channel of networks, we show that connectedness empowers independent directors, whereas influential independent directors facilitate aggressive investment. We also find that the risk-taking effects are more pronounced for complex banks and banks with higher equity capital, higher income diversity, and lower cost-efficiency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101324"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001098/pdfft?md5=74e86273ebeb5134515a982658a3114a&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001098-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142272226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maria Semenova , Vladimir Sokolov , Alexander Benov
{"title":"Bank runs and media freedom: What you don’t know won’t hurt you?","authors":"Maria Semenova , Vladimir Sokolov , Alexander Benov","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101323","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101323","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the influence of media freedom restrictions on retail depositor behavior during banking crises. Non-professional, retail depositors are particularly affected due to insufficient access to vital information about the banking industry's vulnerability and broad macroeconomic conditions amidst the crisis. Using data from 85 countries from 2004 to 2019, we found that during crises, higher media restrictions lead to an increase in the rate of household deposit withdrawals. If media restrictions hinder depositors from accurately assessing the banking sector’s exposure, there is a higher likelihood of panic-based response in uncertain times brought on by the banking crisis, potentially triggering bank runs. Furthermore, our results reveal that lower banking sector risk can mitigate the negative effect of media restrictions on retail deposit growth during a banking crisis, especially in middle-income OECD and non-OECD countries, countries with stronger institutional environments, and countries with higher financial literacy. As a policy suggestion, promoting financial literacy could help reduce information asymmetry and prevent panic withdrawals, even in environments with significant media restrictions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 101323"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142122153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dinh Trung Nguyen , Thu Phuong Pham , Ngoc Anh Tran , Ralf Zurbruegg
{"title":"The dynamic effects of debtor bankruptcy on unsecured creditors' stock liquidity","authors":"Dinh Trung Nguyen , Thu Phuong Pham , Ngoc Anh Tran , Ralf Zurbruegg","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101322","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101322","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores the dynamic effects of counterparty risk on stock liquidity using data on unsecured creditors after a debtor has declared bankruptcy. Through matched pair fixed effect panel regressions, we find that liquidity for unsecured creditors reduces after such declarations but only in the short term. This is evidenced by increases in various spread measures and Kyle's (1985) lambda and decreases in the bid depth differentials between the stocks of the unsecured creditors and the matched firms. Additionally, we find the greater the credit exposure, the greater the decline in liquidity. In the long term, debtor bankruptcies appear to have no effect on spread measures. Rather, the market depth for unsecured creditor stocks improves.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 101322"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001074/pdfft?md5=7b2d7df2bbd0b7207d200f7cb67cc649&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001074-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142088752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effect of collateral on small business rationing of term loans and lines of credit","authors":"Rebel A. Cole , Marc Cowling , Weixi Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101320","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101320","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Theories of loan contracting in the presence of asymmetric information highlight the key role of collateral in mitigating against credit rationing. However, theory also allows for the use of collateral by ‘bad’ borrowers in order to receive better loan contract offers. In this study, we explore the extent to which collateral can affect the incidence of absolute loan denial and partial rationing associated with smaller loans than requested being offered. Using data from a large survey of UK small- and-medium enterprises, we find significant evidence on the negative effect of collateral. Our results also reveal important distinction between lines of credit and term loans, where the presence of collateral is associated with 3 % less term loan approved compared to overdraft. We argue that even the request (or offer) of collateral for a term loan indicates that either the bank or the firm believes it is a risky bet.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 101320"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142076418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Said Kaawach , Oskar Kowalewski , Oleksandr Talavera
{"title":"Automatic versus manual investing: Role of past performance","authors":"Said Kaawach , Oskar Kowalewski , Oleksandr Talavera","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101319","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101319","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using unique data from a leading peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform, we investigate the link between past investment performance and choice of auto-investing tool. Our results suggest that investors who experience fewer defaults in the manual mode are more inclined to switch to automatic investment. Several factors account for this relationship, including investor inattention, decision speed, investment delegation, and experience. Regarding the latter, our results suggest that experienced investors are more likely to continue self-directed bidding, even if they have faced defaults in manual investments in the past. These investors may attribute their previous mistakes to their own actions rather than the limitations of the self-directed bids. Our results are robust to alternative specifications.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 101319"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001049/pdfft?md5=b135d0c0683919e6d30e6e05bcf53c77&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001049-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142021416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Employee lawsuits and business downsizing: Evidence from labor unions","authors":"Omer Unsal","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101318","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101318","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we examine how employee lawsuits are related to firms’ business decisions. By using union-filed lawsuit data, we document that litigation increases the likelihood of firms downsizing their businesses. Furthermore, cases filed by unions lead to an increase in both the number of store closures and the number of employees affected by these closures. We demonstrate that violations related to labor have a significant negative impact on operating performance. Our findings reveal the fact that the cost of labor, damage to reputation, legal liabilities, and diverted resources resulting from litigation damages firms’ new business opportunities. Overall, our results highlight the importance of employee treatment at the workplace, which affects corporate decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 101318"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142088753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does being a responsible bank pay off? Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"Alper Kara , Steven Ongena , Yilmaz Yildiz","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101317","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate whether banks’ initial responses during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in supporting their customers, communities, and governments were perceived as value-enhancing by investors. Using a unique responsible banking measure for a sample of the largest US and European commercial banks, we find a negative relationship between responsible bank behavior and stock market performance, particularly in the first wave of the pandemic. We also find that riskier banks were affected more negatively if they behaved responsibly. Overall, our findings show that banks’ responsible behavior during a crisis reduces, or at best is not relevant to, shareholder value.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"74 ","pages":"Article 101317"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001025/pdfft?md5=782481203558f54ef1a192096b4fafe2&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001025-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142076417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}