{"title":"The paradox of macroprudential policy and sovereign risk","authors":"António Afonso, André Teixeira","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101411","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101411","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the impact of macroprudential policy on sovereign risk. As long as macroprudential policy improves financial stability, it lowers sovereign risk and enables governments to increase spending without raising taxes. Consequently, countries with tighter macroprudential policies have lower primary budget balances and accumulate government debt over time. However, this effect diminishes or reverses when there is excessive regulation or high levels of debt. These findings are somewhat paradoxical: macroprudential policy may lower private debt, while increasing public debt.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101411"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143890688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank recovery and resolution planning, liquidity management and fragility","authors":"Luca G. Deidda , Ettore Panetti","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101395","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101395","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how regulation shapes the interaction between financial fragility and bank liquidity management, and propose a rationale for the complementarity between bank recovery and resolution planning. To this end, we analyze an economy in which a resolution authority arranges a bank resolution plan to suspend deposit withdrawals and create a “good bank” at a cost in the event of a depositors’ run. In such a framework, banks find it optimal to establish recovery plans in advance, specifying how to manage liquidity during runs. However, such plans are time inconsistent, and resolution authorities need powers to force their implementation at times of financial fragility.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101395"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143508381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What drives U.S. corporate private equity? An historical perspective","authors":"John V. Duca , Franklin Sanchez-Colburn","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101413","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101413","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study models the closely held (PE) share of U.S. nonfinancial corporate equity over time. Corporate income tax rates, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, default risk, and the real medium-run Treasury yield significantly affect the PE share, consistent with other studies which separately analyze these factors. The PE share is negatively related to business loan delinquencies and real medium-term Treasury rates. High interest rates discourage PE funds from using leverage to finance buyouts of public companies and fund distributions of interim cash distributions that enhance the relative liquidity of the closely held firms in PE fund portfolios. Interim cash distributions by PE funds help to avoid the double-taxation of dividends, thus causing the appeal of PE to rise with corporate income tax rates, which increases the PE share. The PE share rose during the Enron scandal and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which increased the costs of continuing as, or becoming, a publicly traded corporation. The PE share is well explained and tracked by key macroeconomic variables as well as tax and regulatory policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101413"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143868792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Determinants of global loan pricing: Creditor rights or country size?","authors":"Manthos D. Delis , Maria Iosifidi","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101396","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101396","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using global data on syndicated loans, we show that any negative effect of stronger creditor rights on loan spreads, as identified in the prior literature (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009), disappears once we include a single country characteristic: country size. This finding is robust to several identification methods, both global samples and within-country changes in creditor rights, different panel spans, and hundreds of control variables. We identify that key origins of the effect of country size on loan pricing are ethnic fractionalization and within-country heterogeneity in economic preferences, which create country risk.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101396"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143453952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dating housing booms fueled by credit: A Markov switching approach","authors":"Carlos Cañizares Martínez","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101412","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101412","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study aims to empirically identify the state of the US housing market. I do so by estimating a Markov switching model of housing prices, in which mortgage debt affects house prices nonlinearly and drives state transition probabilities. Second, I compute a state-contingent housing risk measure fed with the probability of being in each state. Finally, I show that such risk measure contains early warning information in a forecasting exercise to predict the charge-off rates of real estate residential loans and a financial stress index. The significance of this study is that it informs economic agents and policymakers about the state of the housing market mechanically.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101412"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143898980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CFO social networks and corporation taxation","authors":"Ming Fang , Qiang Wu , Xin (Emma) Xu , Zejiang Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101405","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101405","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite the significance of social networks in influencing firm behavior, research on their impact on corporate tax behavior is limited. In this paper, we construct social networks of CFOs from U.S. companies based on their employment history, education, and non-professional activities. We find that firms with more socially connected CFOs have lower effective tax rates (ETR) compared to firms with less socially connected CFOs. This effect is more pronounced when corporate governance is weaker and managers have higher incentives. Furthermore, a firm's ETR decreases as CFO centrality increases. We do not observe similar results regarding the connectedness of boards of directors. Additionally, firm pairs exhibit similar ETRs when their CFOs are socially connected, suggesting an exchange of tax-related information among CFOs through their social networks. We also find that the past ETRs of firms with central CFOs predict the ETRs of firms with non-central CFOs. This indicates that less socially connected CFOs tend to follow the tax planning strategies of their more socially connected counterparts. Overall, our findings indicate that more socially connected CFOs possess more relevant information and resources regarding tax planning, leading to the adoption of more aggressive tax strategies compared to their less socially connected counterparts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101405"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143687574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of country- and firm-level governance on capital allocation efficiency: New evidence from India","authors":"Akash Singh Yadav , Inder Sekhar Yadav","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101407","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101407","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the impact of country-level governance on corporate investment efficiency using data from Indian-listed firms between 2009 and 2022. Additionally, we explore how country-level governance interacts with firm-level corporate governance to influence investment inefficiency. Using World Bank's worldwide governance indicators, our findings from panel econometric models reveal that country-level governance and its subcomponents (political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and voice and accountability) negatively affect investment inefficiency, underinvestment, and overinvestment. This suggests that robust governance at country-level serves as a control mechanism, reducing companies' likelihood of investing above or below optimal levels. Furthermore, we find that the effect of firm-level corporate governance (measured using a newly constructed governance index) on investment inefficiency is more pronounced in weak country-level governance environments, indicating a substitutive relationship. Similar patterns are observed in overinvestment and underinvestment scenarios. This evidence implies that when country-level governance is inadequate in mitigating agency conflicts and information asymmetries, firm-level corporate governance mechanisms become crucial for promoting investment efficiency. The robustness of our results is ensured through various methodological approaches. Sample selection bias is addressed using entropy balancing, while endogeneity concerns are mitigated with a combination of two-stage least squares, firm fixed effects, and a two-step generalized method of moments. Additionally, our findings remain consistent when using different proxies for both dependent and independent variables. Our empirical investigation provides valuable insights for regulators, policymakers, and corporate stakeholders in developing efficient investment policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101407"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143816836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geopolitical risk and corporate maturity mismatch","authors":"Man Wang , Xueting Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101408","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101408","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores how geopolitical risk affects corporate maturity mismatch using a sample of Chinese listed corporations. We find that geopolitical risk significantly exacerbates corporate maturity mismatch. Specifically, GPR increases corporate long-term investment and short-term debt, while decreasing corporate short-term investment and long-term debt. Further, the impact of GPR is amplified by R&D investment, industry competitiveness, and financial constraint, but weakened by corporate credit quality. The results of the mechanism test suggest that geopolitical risk exacerbates corporate maturity mismatch by increasing corporate information asymmetry and default risk. Additionally, we find that the impact of GPR on corporate maturity mismatch exhibits industry heterogeneity, and the positive effect of geopolitical risk on corporate maturity mismatch is more significant for high-growth corporations, non-state-owned corporations, small corporations, multinational corporations, and capital-intensive corporations. Finally, based on the extended Fama-French models, we construct two firm-level GPR indicators and the results indicate that individual GPR exacerbates maturity mismatch. Our paper enriches the research on the factors affecting maturity mismatch and helps corporations better manage operational and uncertainty risks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101408"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143759766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digital currency and banking-sector stability","authors":"William Chen , Gregory Phelan","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101414","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101414","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce digital currency into a macro model with a banking sector in which financial frictions generate endogenous systemic risk and instability. In the model, digital currency is fully integrated into the financial system. Stablecoin issuance significantly increases the probability of a banking-sector crisis because it depresses bank deposit spreads, particularly during crises, which limits banks’ ability to recapitalize following losses. While banking-sector stability suffers, household welfare can still improve significantly. Financial frictions nevertheless limit the potential benefits of digital currencies. The optimal level of digital currency could be below what would be issued in a competitive environment. In contrast to stablecoins, which are backed by debt, tokenized deposits backed by traditional bank assets improve welfare without harming financial stability. The scope for welfare gains from stablecoins or tokenized deposits depends on how households value the liquidity services of digital currency relative to traditional deposits and on the cost of issuing stablecoins.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101414"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143876708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Movable assets as collateral in debt financing and effects on trade credit: Evidence from collateral law reforms","authors":"Xiao Li , Jeffrey Ng , Walid Saffar","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101406","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101406","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using the staggered adoption of collateral law reforms across Europe, we examine their effects on trade credit financing. We find that firms in countries that adopt such reforms receive less trade credit, consistent with suppliers viewing these firms as less creditworthy. Moreover, this decrease in trade credit is more pronounced for firms and industries with more movable assets, for financially constrained firms, and for firms in countries with strong legal enforcement, indicating that collateralization of movable assets drives this relation. Our findings suggest that the use of movable assets as collateral in bank borrowing increases supplier risks and decreases demand for trade credit, thus discouraging its use.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 101406"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143654544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}