Journal of Financial Stability最新文献

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Capital controls in China: A necessity for macroeconomic stability 中国的资本管制:宏观经济稳定的必要性
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-09-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101335
{"title":"Capital controls in China: A necessity for macroeconomic stability","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101335","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101335","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the crucial role of capital controls in maintaining macroeconomic stability in China. We develop an open macroeconomic model integrating capital controls within a managed floating exchange rate system. Our model shows that capital controls enhance the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions by restricting capital outflows and providing a broader array of policy options, though they may also create discrepancies between domestic and foreign asset holdings. Simulations using quarterly time-series data reveal that capital controls are essential for the success of both sterilized and non-sterilized interventions. These results indicate that the combined use of capital controls and foreign exchange interventions can reduce macroeconomic volatility in China. Moreover, our analysis of fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes suggests that an inappropriate regime choice can increase volatility in capital flows. Therefore, China should adopt a balanced financial approach within its managed floating system to stabilize the macroeconomy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142357136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Independent directors’ connectedness and bank risk-taking 独立董事的关联性与银行风险承担
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-09-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101324
{"title":"Independent directors’ connectedness and bank risk-taking","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101324","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101324","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the role of independent directors’ network centrality in bank risk-taking. Following the shareholder-incentive hypothesis and social-network theory, we predict and find that independent directors’ connectedness is positively associated with bank risk-taking. The results hold after a battery of robustness checks and endogeneity tests. Furthermore, consistent with the influence channel of networks, we show that connectedness empowers independent directors, whereas influential independent directors facilitate aggressive investment. We also find that the risk-taking effects are more pronounced for complex banks and banks with higher equity capital, higher income diversity, and lower cost-efficiency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001098/pdfft?md5=74e86273ebeb5134515a982658a3114a&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001098-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142272226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bank runs and media freedom: What you don’t know won’t hurt you? 银行挤兑与媒体自由:你不知道的事不会伤害你?
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101323
{"title":"Bank runs and media freedom: What you don’t know won’t hurt you?","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101323","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101323","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the influence of media freedom restrictions on retail depositor behavior during banking crises. Non-professional, retail depositors are particularly affected due to insufficient access to vital information about the banking industry's vulnerability and broad macroeconomic conditions amidst the crisis. Using data from 85 countries from 2004 to 2019, we found that during crises, higher media restrictions lead to an increase in the rate of household deposit withdrawals. If media restrictions hinder depositors from accurately assessing the banking sector’s exposure, there is a higher likelihood of panic-based response in uncertain times brought on by the banking crisis, potentially triggering bank runs. Furthermore, our results reveal that lower banking sector risk can mitigate the negative effect of media restrictions on retail deposit growth during a banking crisis, especially in middle-income OECD and non-OECD countries, countries with stronger institutional environments, and countries with higher financial literacy. As a policy suggestion, promoting financial literacy could help reduce information asymmetry and prevent panic withdrawals, even in environments with significant media restrictions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142122153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The dynamic effects of debtor bankruptcy on unsecured creditors' stock liquidity 债务人破产对无担保债权人股票流动性的动态影响
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101322
{"title":"The dynamic effects of debtor bankruptcy on unsecured creditors' stock liquidity","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101322","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101322","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores the dynamic effects of counterparty risk on stock liquidity using data on unsecured creditors after a debtor has declared bankruptcy. Through matched pair fixed effect panel regressions, we find that liquidity for unsecured creditors reduces after such declarations but only in the short term. This is evidenced by increases in various spread measures and Kyle's (1985) lambda and decreases in the bid depth differentials between the stocks of the unsecured creditors and the matched firms. Additionally, we find the greater the credit exposure, the greater the decline in liquidity. In the long term, debtor bankruptcies appear to have no effect on spread measures. Rather, the market depth for unsecured creditor stocks improves.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001074/pdfft?md5=7b2d7df2bbd0b7207d200f7cb67cc649&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001074-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142088752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of collateral on small business rationing of term loans and lines of credit 抵押品对小企业定期贷款和信贷额度配给的影响
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101320
{"title":"The effect of collateral on small business rationing of term loans and lines of credit","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101320","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101320","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Theories of loan contracting in the presence of asymmetric information highlight the key role of collateral in mitigating against credit rationing. However, theory also allows for the use of collateral by ‘bad’ borrowers in order to receive better loan contract offers. In this study, we explore the extent to which collateral can affect the incidence of absolute loan denial and partial rationing associated with smaller loans than requested being offered. Using data from a large survey of UK small- and-medium enterprises, we find significant evidence on the negative effect of collateral. Our results also reveal important distinction between lines of credit and term loans, where the presence of collateral is associated with 3 % less term loan approved compared to overdraft. We argue that even the request (or offer) of collateral for a term loan indicates that either the bank or the firm believes it is a risky bet.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142076418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Automatic versus manual investing: Role of past performance 自动投资与手动投资:过往业绩的作用
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101319
{"title":"Automatic versus manual investing: Role of past performance","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101319","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101319","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using unique data from a leading peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform, we investigate the link between past investment performance and choice of auto-investing tool. Our results suggest that investors who experience fewer defaults in the manual mode are more inclined to switch to automatic investment. Several factors account for this relationship, including investor inattention, decision speed, investment delegation, and experience. Regarding the latter, our results suggest that experienced investors are more likely to continue self-directed bidding, even if they have faced defaults in manual investments in the past. These investors may attribute their previous mistakes to their own actions rather than the limitations of the self-directed bids. Our results are robust to alternative specifications.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001049/pdfft?md5=b135d0c0683919e6d30e6e05bcf53c77&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001049-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142021416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Employee lawsuits and business downsizing: Evidence from labor unions 员工诉讼与企业裁员:来自工会的证据
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101318
{"title":"Employee lawsuits and business downsizing: Evidence from labor unions","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101318","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101318","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we examine how employee lawsuits are related to firms’ business decisions. By using union-filed lawsuit data, we document that litigation increases the likelihood of firms downsizing their businesses. Furthermore, cases filed by unions lead to an increase in both the number of store closures and the number of employees affected by these closures. We demonstrate that violations related to labor have a significant negative impact on operating performance. Our findings reveal the fact that the cost of labor, damage to reputation, legal liabilities, and diverted resources resulting from litigation damages firms’ new business opportunities. Overall, our results highlight the importance of employee treatment at the workplace, which affects corporate decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142088753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does being a responsible bank pay off? Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic 做一家负责任的银行有回报吗?来自 COVID-19 大流行病的证据
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101317
{"title":"Does being a responsible bank pay off? Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101317","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate whether banks’ initial responses during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in supporting their customers, communities, and governments were perceived as value-enhancing by investors. Using a unique responsible banking measure for a sample of the largest US and European commercial banks, we find a negative relationship between responsible bank behavior and stock market performance, particularly in the first wave of the pandemic. We also find that riskier banks were affected more negatively if they behaved responsibly. Overall, our findings show that banks’ responsible behavior during a crisis reduces, or at best is not relevant to, shareholder value.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308924001025/pdfft?md5=782481203558f54ef1a192096b4fafe2&pid=1-s2.0-S1572308924001025-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142076417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Policy rules and forward guidance following the Covid-19 recession 科维德-19 经济衰退后的政策规则和前瞻性指导
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101321
{"title":"Policy rules and forward guidance following the Covid-19 recession","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101321","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101321","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In August 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee adopted a far-reaching Revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. The framework contains two major changes from the original 2012 statement. First, policy decisions will attempt to mitigate <em>shortfalls</em>, rather than <em>deviations</em>, of employment from its maximum level. Second, the FOMC will implement Flexible Average Inflation Targeting. We show how to modify the rules in the Fed’s Monetary Policy Report to be consistent with the revised statement, how the pattern of falling behind the curve, pivot, and getting back on track in Fed policy during 2021 and 2022 could have been avoided by following inertial rules consistent with either the original or the revised statements, and how current and projected Fed policy for 2023 – 2026 is in accord with the prescriptions from inertial rules.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142195780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks 游说和流动性要求:大型银行与小型银行
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101316
{"title":"Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101316","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101316","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We design a model with banks of unequal size operating subject to liquidity requirements in an imperfectly-competitive deposit market. We show that large banks have stronger incentives than small ones to lobby in order to relax the liquidity requirements unless they bear significantly higher lobbying costs. Therefore, lobbying magnifies asymmetries between banks. Furthermore, we establish that the organization of influence activities matters. An industry-wide bank association for lobbying to relax the liquidity requirements suffers from an internal conflict of interest and cannot simultaneously benefit both large and small banks if these have identical lobbying cost functions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141978213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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