制度性干扰和非法商业行为：职业关注和财富激励的作用

IF 4.2 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-08-16 DOI:10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101450

Daniel Neukirchen , Gerrit Köchling , Peter N. Posch

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用机构投资者投资组合的外生冲击来表明，当机构投资者分心时，管理者会明显更多地参与与利益相关者相关的不当行为。另外的横断面测试显示，管理职业生涯的考虑和冒险股权激励强烈地调节了这种关系，表明管理人员在这些时期从事不当行为之前权衡了潜在的利益和风险。最后，我们提供的证据表明，当那些可能是经理人的激励监督者的机构投资者变得心烦意乱时，结果更加明显。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Institutional distraction and illegal business practices: The role of career concerns and wealth incentives

We exploit exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolios to show that managers engage in significantly more stakeholder-related misconduct when institutional investors are distracted. Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that managerial career concerns and risk-taking equity incentives strongly moderate this relationship, suggesting that managers weigh the potential benefits and risks before engaging in misconduct during these periods. Finally, we provide evidence that the results are more pronounced when especially those institutional investors who are likely to be motivated monitors of the managers become distracted.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Stability Multiple-

CiteScore

7.70

自引率

9.30%

发文量

审稿时长

34 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Stability provides an international forum for rigorous theoretical and empirical macro and micro economic and financial analysis of the causes, management, resolution and preventions of financial crises, including banking, securities market, payments and currency crises. The primary focus is on applied research that would be useful in affecting public policy with respect to financial stability. Thus, the Journal seeks to promote interaction among researchers, policy-makers and practitioners to identify potential risks to financial stability and develop means for preventing, mitigating or managing these risks both within and across countries.