{"title":"A network approach to interbank contagion risk in South Africa","authors":"Pierre Nkou Mananga , Shiqiang Lin , Hairui Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101386","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101386","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the resilience of the South African banking sector by applying a dynamic agent-based model and the DebtRank algorithm. In contrast to previous studies focusing on listed banks, our methodology includes both listed and non-listed institutions that make up the banking industry, thereby capturing the systemic importance and vulnerability of all banks within the interbank market network. Our findings indicate that while larger banks exhibit greater systemic importance, a statistically significant correlation exists between a bank’s interbank-lending-to-equity ratio and vulnerability. Moreover, a bank’s size and specific interbank activities influence its systemic contribution, both in terms of importance and vulnerability. These insights offer policymakers an empirically grounded framework for improving financial stability monitoring and risk mitigation efforts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101386"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143201032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hsuan-Chi Chen , Robin K. Chou , Chih-Yung Lin , Chien-Lin Lu
{"title":"Too big to fail? Asymmetric effects of quantitative easing","authors":"Hsuan-Chi Chen , Robin K. Chou , Chih-Yung Lin , Chien-Lin Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101385","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101385","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this study, we examine the impact of liquidity support from the Federal Reserve on the capital structures of firms of varying sizes. Our findings suggest that large firms tend to increase their debt financing and leverage ratios in response to significant shocks triggered by the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) of the US Federal Reserve. By contrast, small firms with preexisting banking relationships are more likely to receive liquidity support. Notably, small firms associated with smaller banks exhibit increased default risks. Furthermore, large firms exhibited weaker operating performance but received greater managerial compensation following the LSAP. This trend indicates potential inefficiencies in the distribution of funding facilitated by unconventional monetary policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101385"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143349930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hasibul Chowdhury , Trinh Hue Le , Kelvin Jui Keng Tan
{"title":"Organization capital and labor investment efficiency","authors":"Hasibul Chowdhury , Trinh Hue Le , Kelvin Jui Keng Tan","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101384","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101384","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine whether a firm’s organization capital (OC) affects its labor investment efficiency. We find that a higher level of OC is related to lower deviations from the optimal level of labor investment according to economic conditions (higher labor investment efficiency). We find that this result is empirically robust to a stacked difference-in-differences approach using exogenous CEO turnover as a quasi-natural experiment and planned CEO retirements and forced CEO turnovers as placebo tests. We identify that the ability to retain talented employees and reduction of agency costs are the two channels by which OC improves a firm’s labor investment efficiency. Furthermore, we report that the positive effect of OC on labor investment efficiency is more pronounced in firms in highly competitive markets, firms with better access to external financing and firms with highly skilled labor.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101384"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143201029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The ECB’s APP’s impact on non-financial firms’ cost of borrowing and debt choice","authors":"Joana F. Kanda , João M. Pinto , Beatriz P. Silva","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101387","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101387","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the impact of the ECB’s asset purchase programmes on euro area non-financial firms’ cost of borrowing and their choice between corporate bonds and syndicated loans. Our findings indicate that the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) reduced spreads for both eligible and non-eligible corporate bonds, and that ECB purchases of covered bonds positively affected corporate bond spreads. The CSPP also compressed spreads across all syndicated loans, irrespective of eligibility. We find evidence supporting a “cost of borrowing channel” for covered bonds under the first programme and asset-backed securities, indicating that syndicated loan spreads reflect banks’ borrowing costs in the bond market. Additionally, our results reveal that the CSPP significantly influenced firms’ debt financing choices, with these effects being more pronounced for non-switchers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101387"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143372777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Banks, freedom, and political connections: New evidence from around the world","authors":"Bartłomiej Cegłowski , Krzysztof Jackowicz , Łukasz Kozłowski , Iwa Kuchciak","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101353","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101353","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines how various facets of social and political freedom shape the impact of political connections on bank lending. Using a new dataset covering the period 2007–2018 and more than 100 countries, we find that the establishment of political connections stimulates lending, but only in countries with constrained media freedom and restricted freedom of association and expression, as well as in those scoring low on political rights and civil liberties. These results suggest that social and political freedom constitute critical factors that limit the resource-allocation distortions caused by political connections.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101353"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142699292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political governance and firm performance in China: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment","authors":"Lei Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101348","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101348","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The involvement of the Communist Party of China in corporate decision-making has formed a corporate governance model with “Chinese characteristics” that diverges from commonly studied governance models. This paper aims to provide direct insight into China’s corporate governance model by examining how the involvement of Party organizations in corporate governance influences the performance of private firms. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a quasi-natural experiment (i.e., sudden deaths of board directors) that leads to an exogenous change in the proportion of Party directors. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find that an increase in the proportion of Party directors (i.e., stronger political governance) improves private firms’ performance. This finding is robust to various tests. Moreover, the channel analysis suggests that the Party organization performs advisory and supervisory functions in corporate governance. Last, we present evidence that the excessive involvement of the Party organization in corporate governance also imposes political costs on private firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101348"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142722629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lending standards and output growth","authors":"Divya Kirti","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101351","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101351","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>What drives macro-financial vulnerabilities? Inspired by Minsky–Kindleberger narratives, one prominent view emphasizes that lending standards repeatedly deteriorate in good times, creating exposure to widespread reassessments of risk. Another emphasizes that leverage amplifies negative shocks. This paper constructs panel data on lending standards and uses it to show that Minsky–Kindleberger dynamics interact with leverage. Standards erode with improving economic performance, but do not always co-move with aggregate leverage. The combination of deteriorating standards and leverage—above and beyond leverage alone—signals poor subsequent macroeconomic performance. Inconsistent with models incorporating rational expectations, this poor subsequent performance is systematically reflected in forecast errors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101351"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142699293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unlocking strategic alliances: The role of common institutional blockholders in promoting collaboration and trust","authors":"Thomas J. Chemmanur , Yao Shen , Jing Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101350","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101350","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the role of common institutional blockholders (CIBs) in promoting strategic alliances and facilitating the transfer of human capital between alliance partner firms. We find that firms are more likely to form strategic alliances (including research and development (R&D), licensing, manufacturing, and marketing alliances) when they share CIBs with a larger proportion of their industry peers. To establish a causal relationship, we exploit the exogenous shocks to CIB ownership induced by annual Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions. Our firm-pair-level analysis indicates that two firms are more likely to form alliances when they share a CIB. Additionally, we show that R&D alliance partner firms connected through CIBs exhibit greater across-partner redeployment of R&D-related human capital than partner firms without CIB connections. Overall, our findings underscore the significance of common institutional blockholder ownership in reducing the distrust that hinders strategic alliance formation and in realizing the economic benefits of such alliances.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101350"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142699291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank lending to fossil fuel firms","authors":"Elias Demetriades, Panagiotis N. Politsidis","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101349","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How do banks react to firms’ climate risks? Using almost 80,000 global syndicated loans originated from 2001 to 2021, we study bank lending to fossil fuel firms vis-à-vis other firms. We find that loans to fossil fuel firms are at least 7 % more costly compared to other firms, and even more so toward the end of our sample. However, loan amounts to fossil fuel firms are approximately 22 % larger, implying heavy financing of brown activities. We show that the pricing effects are even stronger for banks with higher reliance on ESG considerations, consistent with the shifts driven by the supply side (bank behaviour). Overall, our findings corroborate the view that banks price in climate risks but continue to heavily lend to polluting firms in the medium term (with an average maturity of four and one quarter years).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101349"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142699290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Funding deposit insurance","authors":"Dick Oosthuizen , Ryan Zalla","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101342","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101342","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance to characterize the optimal levels of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers’ resolution cost of bank failures. The key model tension is the policymaker’s dynamic tradeoff between building a fund to discourage moral hazard and insulate taxpayers from large fiscal shortfalls, and allowing banks to productively invest their deposits. We find that risk-adjusted premiums reduce moral hazard, enabling the policymaker to increase the share of covered deposits to total deposits by 12.5 percentage points and decrease the share of expected annual bank failures from 0.74% to 0.60%. The model predicts a fund-to-covered-deposits ratio that matches the data and declines in taxpayers’ income due to taxpayers’ risk aversion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101342"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142656828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}