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Real estate transaction taxes and credit supply 房地产交易税与信贷供给
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101436
M. Koetter , P. Marek , A. Mavropoulos
{"title":"Real estate transaction taxes and credit supply","authors":"M. Koetter ,&nbsp;P. Marek ,&nbsp;A. Mavropoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101436","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101436","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect on the growth rates of regional house prices and outstanding mortgage loans by all local German banks. The results show that a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces regional house prices by 3%–4%. Furthermore, IV-regressions yield that a 1 percentage point drop in regional house prices induced by a RETT increase leads to a 0.3% decline in regional mortgage lending, particularly among low-capitalized banks in rural regions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101436"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Understanding central bank responses to geopolitical risks: Evidence from the Fed and ECB 理解央行对地缘政治风险的反应：来自美联储和欧洲央行的证据
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101452
Evangelos Salachas , Georgios P. Kouretas , Nikiforos T. Laopodis
{"title":"Understanding central bank responses to geopolitical risks: Evidence from the Fed and ECB","authors":"Evangelos Salachas ,&nbsp;Georgios P. Kouretas ,&nbsp;Nikiforos T. Laopodis","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using VAR and Local Projections models, enhanced with macroeconomic factors and monetary policy shocks, we investigate the underlying mechanisms through which the Fed’s and ECB’s react to bank reactions of geopolitical risks between January 1994 and March 2024. Our findings reveal that central banks react to geopolitical risk events by tightening monetary policy to fend off potential inflationary pressures. However, the effect is often temporary, as policymakers typically adopt accommodative measures during economic expansions and shift to tighter policies during contractions. Analyzing reactions based on central bank presidents' tenures, we find that while earlier responses were limited, in recent years, both central banks have reacted more strongly and immediately, reflecting their growing concern over geopolitical risks. Furthermore, we document that the Fed adopted a more accommodative stance in response to bilateral geopolitical risk shocks between the US and China, driven by changes in capital flows and trade activities. In contrast, the ECB’s responses were more consistently contractionary, particularly in periods of heightened inflation concerns or when geopolitical tensions threatened price stability within the euro area.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101452"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144852347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Institutional distraction and illegal business practices: The role of career concerns and wealth incentives 制度性干扰和非法商业行为：职业关注和财富激励的作用
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101450
Daniel Neukirchen , Gerrit Köchling , Peter N. Posch
{"title":"Institutional distraction and illegal business practices: The role of career concerns and wealth incentives","authors":"Daniel Neukirchen ,&nbsp;Gerrit Köchling ,&nbsp;Peter N. Posch","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101450","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101450","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We exploit exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolios to show that managers engage in significantly more stakeholder-related misconduct when institutional investors are distracted. Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that managerial career concerns and risk-taking equity incentives strongly moderate this relationship, suggesting that managers weigh the potential benefits and risks before engaging in misconduct during these periods. Finally, we provide evidence that the results are more pronounced when especially those institutional investors who are likely to be motivated monitors of the managers become distracted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101450"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-blockholder dissatisfaction and firm performance volatility: A groupthink perspective 非大股东不满与公司绩效波动：群体思维视角
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101456
Jeong-Bon Kim , Johan Maharjan , Yijiang Zhao
{"title":"Non-blockholder dissatisfaction and firm performance volatility: A groupthink perspective","authors":"Jeong-Bon Kim ,&nbsp;Johan Maharjan ,&nbsp;Yijiang Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101456","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101456","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Social psychology research suggests that management groups under greater external pressure are more prone to groupthink (i.e., a tendency to reach premature consensus), leading to greater performance volatility. To isolate the group dynamics channel, we focus on the pressure management faces from largely uninformed and dissatisfied non-blockholders. Consistent with the groupthink view, we find that non-blockholder dissatisfaction is positively associated with performance volatility, which is further corroborated by tests addressing omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In addition, the baseline relationship is stronger in firms with greater interaction among directors, more powerful CEOs, and less diverse boards. Our findings suggest that non-blockholder dissatisfaction heightens performance volatility by exacerbating groupthink.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101456"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144919692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Artificial intelligence and financial crises 人工智能和金融危机
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101453
Jon Danielsson , Andreas Uthemann
{"title":"Artificial intelligence and financial crises","authors":"Jon Danielsson ,&nbsp;Andreas Uthemann","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101453","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101453","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) poses new and poorly understood threats to financial stability. We use a game-theoretic model to analyse the stability impact of AI, finding that it amplifies existing financial system vulnerabilities — leverage, liquidity stress and opacity — through superior information processing, common data, speed and strategic complementarities. The consequence is crises become faster and more severe, where the likelihood of a crisis is directly affected by how effectively the authorities engage with AI. In response, we propose that the financial authorities develop their own AI systems and expertise, establish direct AI-to-AI communication, implement automated crisis facilities and monitor AI use.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101453"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144878801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Risk shocks, due loans, and policy options: When less is more! 风险冲击、到期贷款和政策选择：当少即是多！
IF 6.1 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101439
Paulo Júlio , José R. Maria , Sílvia Santos
{"title":"Risk shocks, due loans, and policy options: When less is more!","authors":"Paulo Júlio ,&nbsp;José R. Maria ,&nbsp;Sílvia Santos","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101439","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We employ a structural model endowed with a banking system in which assets of different qualities, occasionally binding credit restrictions, and regulatory requirements coexist, to analyze the effectiveness of various macroprudential policies that cope with the level of due loans in the economy. We analyze how policy designs influencing impairment recognition by banks affect output and welfare, both in the steady state and across business cycles driven by financial risk. The cost of managing due loans, credit constraints, dividend strategies, and the cure rate, are key components of the driveshaft propelling policies to outcomes. Our findings suggest that “less is more,” <em>i.e.</em> policies emphasizing greater leniency in impairment recognition outperform stricter approaches, when management costs are sufficiently low, especially when combined with high cure rates that enhance the benefits of delaying recognition. However, reducing penalties for banks that violate regulatory requirements proves largely ineffective and exacerbates incentives for non-compliance. The presence of binding credit constraints enhances the effectiveness of lenient impairment policies when management costs are low and diminishes it otherwise.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101439"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144702823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decomposing systemic risk: The roles of contagion and common exposures 分解系统风险：传染和共同暴露的作用
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101451
Grzegorz Hałaj, Ruben Hipp
{"title":"Decomposing systemic risk: The roles of contagion and common exposures","authors":"Grzegorz Hałaj,&nbsp;Ruben Hipp","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101451","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101451","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We evaluate the impact of contagion and common exposures on banks’ capital using a structural regression framework derived from the balance sheet identity and inspired by the structural VAR literature. Contagion arises through bilateral exposures, fire sales, rollover risk, and market-based sentiment, while common exposures reflect overlapping portfolio holdings. We estimate the model using granular regulatory balance sheet and interbank exposure data for the Canadian banking sector. Our results yield three key insights. First, contagion driven by bilateral contractual exposures remains relatively stable over time until the onset of quantitative easing. In contrast, non-contractual contagion channels are less stable and move with market conditions. Second, we observe an increase in common exposure risk along with a decrease in contagion risk, following unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy measures in the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, we demonstrate how our framework complements traditional bank stress-testing approaches that focus on individual institutions by analysing second-round effects. In a policy application, we simulate targeted bailouts and show that their effectiveness in stabilizing the system is related to the interconnectedness of the rescued institution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101451"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144860300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The regulatory dialectic in bank-sponsored money market funds 银行发起的货币市场基金的监管辩证法
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101454
Stefan Jacewitz , Jonathan Pogach , Haluk Unal , Chengjun Wu
{"title":"The regulatory dialectic in bank-sponsored money market funds","authors":"Stefan Jacewitz ,&nbsp;Jonathan Pogach ,&nbsp;Haluk Unal ,&nbsp;Chengjun Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101454","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101454","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The regulatory dialectic describes the dynamic process of banks and regulators continuously acting and reacting to one another. We provide empirical evidence of the regulatory dialectic in the prime institutional money market fund (PI-MMF) industry. Regulations on commercial deposits fueled growth in bank-sponsored PI-MMFs as a form of shadow banking in a relatively less regulated market. Re-regulation following the 2008 financial crisis halted this rapid growth, and the industry shifted from PI-MMFs to government institutional MMFs. We conjecture that this dialectical process will continue, and the decline of the PI-MMF may engender a shift toward structurally similar products, like stablecoins.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101454"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144886740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cross-listing, innovation and the role of nation-level institutions 交叉上市、创新和国家级机构的作用
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101457
Trung K. Do
{"title":"Cross-listing, innovation and the role of nation-level institutions","authors":"Trung K. Do","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101457","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101457","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the relationship between cross-listing and innovation using a sample of firms from 40 countries spanning 1980–2016. We measure innovation through both the number of patents granted and citations received. Our results reveal a positive association between cross-listing and innovation, with this effect being more pronounced for firms from countries with poor legal environments and less developed financial systems. Overall, our findings align with bonding theory, suggesting that managers of cross-listed firms seek to bind themselves by adhering to the high legal and regulatory standards demanded by U.S. markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101457"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144903193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monetary policy transmission via nonbank lending: Evidence from peer-to-peer loans 非银行贷款的货币政策传导：来自p2p贷款的证据
IF 4.2 2区 经济学
Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101455
Esteban Argudo
{"title":"Monetary policy transmission via nonbank lending: Evidence from peer-to-peer loans","authors":"Esteban Argudo","doi":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101455","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101455","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I use data on unsecured consumer loans from Lending Club to study how peer-to-peer lending markets respond to monetary policy shocks. I find that both loan supply and demand decrease following unexpected increases in the federal funds rate. The contraction in supply is smallest for risky borrowers, while the decline in demand is largest for these borrowers. In contrast, both demand and supply increase following surprise LSAP contractions, with the increases being largest for risky borrowers. These findings suggest that peer-to-peer lending dampens the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission in unsecured consumer credit markets while increasing risk-taking.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48027,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Stability","volume":"80 ","pages":"Article 101455"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144893214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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