{"title":"Bequest motives and the Social Security Notch","authors":"Siha Lee , Kegon T.K. Tan","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.09.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.09.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Bequests may be a key driver of late life savings behavior and more broadly, a determinant of intergenerational inequality<span><span>. However, distinguishing bequest motives from precautionary savings is challenging. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we exploit an unanticipated change in </span>Social Security benefits, commonly called the Social Security </span></span>Notch<span>, as an instrument to identify the effect of benefits on bequests. We match data moments generated by the Notch with a model of late life savings behavior that accounts for mortality risk and unobserved expenditure shocks to identify bequest motives. The model is used to decompose the importance of bequest motives as a driver of late life savings by comparing asset profiles with and without utility from bequests. We find that roughly 40% of accumulated assets and bequests are attributable to bequest motives among retirees. Our policy counterfactual features a more progressive Social Security benefits schedule that reduces benefits for the richest retirees. We show that although wealth declines, consumption remains largely unchanged since wealth generated by bequest motives acts as a cushion against benefit reduction.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 888-914"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135685693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The costs of macroprudential deleveraging in a liquidity trap","authors":"Jiaqian Chen , Daria Finocchiaro , Jesper Lindé , Karl Walentin","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.09.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.09.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study various macroprudential tools and their interaction with monetary policy<span> in a New Keynesian model featuring long-term debt, illiquid housing and an effective lower bound constraint on policy rates. We find that the short-run deleveraging costs of different macroprudential tools – all sized to imply the same reduction in household debt in the medium and long-term – can differ significantly, depending on the state of economy and monetary policy. Specifically, a loan-to-value tightening is more than three times as contractionary as a loan-to-income tightening when debt is high and monetary policy cannot accommodate.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 991-1011"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136119740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frank N. Caliendo , Maria Casanova , Aspen Gorry , Sita Slavov
{"title":"Retirement timing uncertainty: Empirical evidence and quantitative evaluation","authors":"Frank N. Caliendo , Maria Casanova , Aspen Gorry , Sita Slavov","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.01.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>People often retire at a different age than expected. We construct a measure of retirement timing uncertainty and find that the standard deviation of the difference between retirement expectations and actual retirement dates ranges from 3 to 6 years. To understand the potential implications of this uncertainty, we develop a simple model of exogenous but risky retirement. In this environment, individuals would give up 1.0%-4.5% of total lifetime consumption to fully insure this risk and 0.8%-3.2% of lifetime consumption simply to know their actual retirement date upon entering the labor force. This is crucial for retirement planning purposes because not saving to hedge this risk would leave individuals with even larger welfare costs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 226-266"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79390709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ayşe İmrohoroğlu , Çağrı S. Kumru , Jiu Lian , Arm Nakornthab
{"title":"Revisiting taxes on high incomes","authors":"Ayşe İmrohoroğlu , Çağrı S. Kumru , Jiu Lian , Arm Nakornthab","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.11.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.11.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we study income taxation in a model with entrepreneurial activity<span>. We conduct two types of changes in tax policy: changing the overall progressivity of taxes versus changing the tax rate on the richest 1% of the population. Our results indicate that increasing the tax rate on the richest 1% of the population is more effective in raising revenues than increasing the overall progressivity of taxes as it leads to smaller declines in capital and output. We find that incorporating entrepreneurship in generating a reasonable wealth distribution leads to revenue-maximizing progressivity to be smaller than found previously.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 1159-1184"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135515194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Money laundering and the privacy design of central bank digital currency","authors":"Zijian Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.06.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.06.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This paper studies the implications of money laundering for the optimal design of central bank digital currency (CBDC). I build a general equilibrium framework to explicitly allow money laundering by agents and income audits by a government. I find that as long as CBDC offers less anonymity than cash, introducing CBDC will decrease money laundering. However, if CBDC still offers a relatively high level of anonymity but a low </span>interest rate, then introducing CBDC will decrease the output from not only agents who launder money but also agents who do not. If CBDC instead offers low anonymity and a high interest rate, then introducing CBDC can increase aggregate welfare without lowering output. Furthermore, introducing CBDC needs not increase the funding costs of banks or decrease bank lending.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 604-632"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135220294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The risk-premium channel of uncertainty: Implications for unemployment and inflation","authors":"Lukas B. Freund , Hanbaek Lee , Pontus Rendahl","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2022.12.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2022.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the role of macroeconomic uncertainty in a search-and-matching framework with risk-averse households. Heightened uncertainty about future productivity reduces current economic activity even in the absence of nominal rigidities. A risk-premium mechanism accounts for this result. As future asset prices become more volatile and covary more positively with aggregate consumption, the risk premium rises in the present. The associated downward pressure on current asset values lowers firm entry, making it harder for workers to find jobs and reducing the supply of goods. With nominal rigidities the recession is exacerbated, as a more uncertain future reinforces households' precautionary behavior, which causes demand to contract. Counterfactual analyses using a calibrated model imply that unemployment would rise by less than half as much absent the risk-premium channel. The presence of this mechanism implies that uncertainty shocks are less deflationary than regular demand shocks, nor can they be fully neutralized by monetary policy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 117-137"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202522000655/pdfft?md5=f2fc5d8502334a2c9f3c558918cbe731&pid=1-s2.0-S1094202522000655-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138739247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rescue policies for small businesses in the COVID-19 recession","authors":"Alessandro Di Nola , Leo Kaas , Haomin Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.06.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.06.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>While the COVID-19 pandemic had a large and asymmetric impact on firms, many countries quickly enacted massive business rescue programs which are specifically targeted to smaller firms. Little is known about the effects of such policies on business entry and exit, investment, factor reallocation, and macroeconomic outcomes. This paper builds a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous and financially constrained firms in order to evaluate the short- and long-term consequences of small firm rescue programs in a pandemic recession. We calibrate the stationary equilibrium and the pandemic shock to the U.S. economy, taking into account the factual Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) as a specific policy. We find that the policy has only a modest impact on aggregate output and employment because (i) jobs are saved predominately in the smallest firms that account for a minor share of employment and (ii) the grant reduces the reallocation of resources towards larger and less impacted firms. Much of the reallocation effects occur in the aftermath of the pandemic episode. By preventing inefficient liquidations, the policy dampens the long-term declines of aggregate consumption and of the real wage, thus delivering small welfare gains.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 579-603"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202523000224/pdfft?md5=b388eb21a2fb0949abec3e701f90a524&pid=1-s2.0-S1094202523000224-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85255310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal GDP-indexed bonds","authors":"Yasin Kürşat Önder","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.08.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.08.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I investigate the introduction of GDP-indexed bonds as an additional source of government borrowing in a quantitative default model. The idea of linking debt payments to developments in GDP resurfaced with the 1980s debt crisis and peaked with the COVID-19 outbreak. I show that the gains from this idea depend on the underlying indexation method and are highest if payments are symmetrically tied to developments in GDP. Optimized indexed debt can eradicate default risk, halve consumption volatility, and increase asset prices while raising the government's debt balances. These changes occur because an optimally chosen indexation method does a better job at completing the markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 747-777"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78974358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal policy and the monetary transmission mechanism","authors":"Nicolas Caramp , Dejanir H. Silva","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.08.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.08.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span><span>The economy's response to monetary policy depends on its fiscal backing. We present a novel decomposition of the equilibrium that links the </span>wealth<span> effect, i.e. the revaluation of households' financial and human wealth, to the fiscal response to monetary policy. When monetary policy has fiscal consequences, monetary variables affect the timing of aggregate output while fiscal variables shape its present value and the wealth effect. Consequently, a contractionary monetary policy reduces </span></span>inflation only if followed by contractionary fiscal policy. The slope of the Phillips curve determines the importance of monetary-fiscal coordination for the effectiveness of monetary policy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 716-746"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90007164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contract enforcement and preventive healthcare: Theory and evidence","authors":"Shiv Dixit","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.09.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.red.2023.09.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I study how enforcement frictions in health insurance contracts determine the distribution of preventive care. I show that when contracts are weakly enforced, insurers underinvest in preventive care to perpetuate the need for insurance. This mechanism is self-enforcing, whereby low levels of prevention today breed low levels of prevention in the future. In contrast, I show that dynamic contracts that are perfectly enforced do not feature such history dependence. Leveraging these results, I devise a test to show that the hypothesis of limited commitment cannot be rejected in the data.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":"51 ","pages":"Pages 1048-1094"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134977991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}