合同执行与预防性保健：理论与证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.red.2023.09.008

Shiv Dixit

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我研究了医疗保险合同的执行摩擦如何决定预防性保健的分布。我的研究表明，当合同执行不力时，保险公司会对预防性保健投资不足，以维持对保险的需求。这种机制是自我强化的，即今天的低水平预防会导致未来的低水平预防。与此相反，我的研究表明，完全强制执行的动态合约并不具有这种历史依赖性。利用这些结果，我设计了一个检验方法来证明数据不能拒绝有限承诺的假设。

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Contract enforcement and preventive healthcare: Theory and evidence

I study how enforcement frictions in health insurance contracts determine the distribution of preventive care. I show that when contracts are weakly enforced, insurers underinvest in preventive care to perpetuate the need for insurance. This mechanism is self-enforcing, whereby low levels of prevention today breed low levels of prevention in the future. In contrast, I show that dynamic contracts that are perfectly enforced do not feature such history dependence. Leveraging these results, I devise a test to show that the hypothesis of limited commitment cannot be rejected in the data.

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Dynamics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Dynamics publishes meritorious original contributions to dynamic economics. The scope of the journal is intended to be broad and to reflect the view of the Society for Economic Dynamics that the field of economics is unified by the scientific approach to economics. We will publish contributions in any area of economics provided they meet the highest standards of scientific research.