Legislative Studies Quarterly最新文献_第4页

Legislative Pensions and Re-election Seeking: Evidence from Canadian Legislatures 立法养老金与寻求连任：来自加拿大立法机构的证据

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-06-07 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12424

Stefano Burzo, Bert Kramer, Daniel Irwin, Christopher Kam

{"title":"Legislative Pensions and Re-election Seeking: Evidence from Canadian Legislatures","authors":"Stefano Burzo, Bert Kramer, Daniel Irwin, Christopher Kam","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12424","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12424","url":null,"abstract":"We use data from Canadian legislatures to examine how legislative pension rules affect the propensity of incumbents to seek re-election. We predict that legislators with defined-benefits pensions are more likely to seek re-election than legislators without pensions. Once the legislator is vested (i.e., qualified) in the pension, however, this incentive disappears; indeed, pensions that accrue value quickly and can be collected at an early age, induce legislators to retire rather than seek re-election. Difference-in-differences estimates bear out these predictions: on average, legislators with defined benefits pensions are 11 percentage points more likely to seek re-election than legislators without pensions, whereas legislators who on vesting immediately qualify for a pension of 50% of their salary are 11 percentage points less likely to do so. These results show that legislative pensions alter the value that legislators place on re-election and, in doing so, they affect the accumulation of legislative professionalism and the strength of democratic accountability.","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"49 2","pages":"383-409"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12424","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48700813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

About the Authors 关于作者

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12387

引用次数: 0

Experimental Evidence of the Benefits and Risks of Credit Claiming and Pork Busting 信用索赔和猪肉破坏的收益和风险的实验证据

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-05-14 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12425

Nathan T. Barron, Peter T. McLaughlin

{"title":"Experimental Evidence of the Benefits and Risks of Credit Claiming and Pork Busting","authors":"Nathan T. Barron, Peter T. McLaughlin","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12425","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12425","url":null,"abstract":"As appropriations earmarks return to Congress, every legislator faces a decision: pursue or refuse congressionally mandated federal spending projects. This decision is likely influenced by public messaging concerns. We theorize that both credit claiming for federal projects and position taking against spending projects (“pork busting”) can benefit legislators as they look to improve future electoral returns. We field a nationally representative survey experiment to estimate the effect of credit-claiming and pork-busting messages on the perceived effectiveness, fiscal responsibility, and overall approval of an unnamed member of Congress. We find that respondents are likely to penalize the representative's approval assessment when presented with an out-party message strategy. Conversely, respondents are likely to increase the representative's personal trait assessments when presented with an in-party message strategy. We expand on these results in an additional analysis and find that these trends persist when controlling for other partisan and demographic factors. We discuss our results in light of traditional expectations, potential mechanisms, and future directions for related research.","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"49 1","pages":"103-129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46900744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bureaucratic Responsiveness under Dynamic Political Settings: Experimental Evidence from Local Governments 动态政治环境下的官僚反应:来自地方政府的实验证据

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12423

Don S. Lee, Soonae Park

{"title":"Bureaucratic Responsiveness under Dynamic Political Settings: Experimental Evidence from Local Governments","authors":"Don S. Lee, Soonae Park","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12423","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12423","url":null,"abstract":"How do bureaucrats respond to legislators' demands for change in policy implementation? We distinguish between unified and divided government, where the degree of legislative oversight over bureaucratic autonomy is likely to differ, and we argue that how bureaucrats actually respond in varying executive-legislative relations depends on their incentives shaped by greater autonomy in implementation (unified government) versus closer monitoring by legislators (divided government). Analyzing two sets of original data from list and endorsement experiments with local bureaucrats in Korea (n = 4064)—one from the period of legislative auditing and the other from the nonauditing period—we find that bureaucrats are more likely to incorporate legislators' views into their decision-making under unified than under divided government. Furthermore, bureaucrats are more responsive to legislatures when their political ideology is congruent with that of a legislative majority than when it is incongruent, regardless of unified or divided government. Our findings have a clear implication: the importance of bureaucratic autonomy and preferences rather than monitoring as an effective tool to increase bureaucratic responsiveness.","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"49 2","pages":"323-352"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12423","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43217723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bicameralism Hinges on Legislative Professionalism 两院制与立法专业化

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-04-05 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12422

Adam R. Brown, Alex Garlick

引用次数: 0

Issue Competition in Parliamentary Speeches? A Computer-based Content Analysis of Legislative Debates in the Austrian Nationalrat 国会演讲竞逐?《奥地利国民报》立法辩论的计算机内容分析

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12421

Christoph Ivanusch

引用次数: 0

Electoral Incentives and Geographical Representation: Evidence from an Italian Electoral Reform 选举激励与地域代表性:来自意大利选举改革的证据

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-03-13 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12418

Edoardo Alberto Viganò

{"title":"Electoral Incentives and Geographical Representation: Evidence from an Italian Electoral Reform","authors":"Edoardo Alberto Viganò","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12418","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12418","url":null,"abstract":"Candidate-centered electoral systems create incentives for MPs to cultivate a personal vote among their constituents, which in turn should strengthen geographical representation. However, existing research has missed the theoretical distinction between the selection and incentives effects of electoral systems. Electoral rules influence who successfully runs for office (selection) and MPs' behavior once they have been elected (incentives). Focusing on the 2005 Italian electoral reform from a mixed to a proportional system, this article assesses the effects of the electoral system change on reelected MPs' attention to local issues in parliamentary questions and bills. The dual source of variation in electoral incentives (mixed system and reform) provides a unique opportunity to disentangle the impact of incentives and selection on MPs' behavior. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that MPs formerly elected in single-member districts (SMDs) did not significantly decrease their attention to local issues after the reform. This suggests that electoral incentives alone are not enough to modify significantly the behavior of MPs experiencing the institutional change and that selection effects should be taken more into account when considering the impact of electoral systems. By differentiating two mechanisms through which electoral rules influence legislators' behavior, this finding contributes new knowledge to the ongoing debate about the consequences of electoral institutions and reforms.","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"49 2","pages":"257-287"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12418","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47025343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems? 利益集团何时在强有力的总统制度中游说立法者？

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-03-13 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12419

Andrés Dockendorff, Simón Lodato

引用次数: 0

How Do General Election Incentives Affect the Visible and Invisible Primary? 大选激励措施如何影响看得见和看不见的初选？

IF 1.5 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-03-02 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12415

Mackenzie Lockhart, Seth J. Hill

引用次数: 0

Competence in the Eye of the Electorate: Appearance, Incumbency, and Vote Shares 选民眼中的能力:外表、任职和投票份额