{"title":"Interest Groups and Intra-Party Conflict on Scored Votes","authors":"Laurel Harbridge-Yong, Warren Snead","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While inter-party conflicts and polarization are central for understanding policymaking, salient intra-party conflicts remain. We explore one lens into these conflicts—interest groups scoring votes at odds with party leaders. We examine how often and under what conditions party-aligned interest groups oppose the positions of party leadership and whether this disagreement is associated with heightened intra-party conflict. We find that disagreement is more common for the majority party compared to the minority party and, for both parties, disagreement is associated with reduced voting cohesion. We also identify salient differences between Democrats and Republicans during this time period. Disagreement on scored votes shines a valuable light into the competing pressures on both parties and interest groups, including those to govern and message. Although interest groups and aligned party leaders often agree on policy, both face a complex constellation of incentives and can make different tradeoffs on specific votes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144999060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prior Experience and State Legislative Effectiveness","authors":"Eric R. Hansen, Sarah A. Treul","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>How do the prior experiences of lawmakers shape their performance in office? Representatives who have held prior elected office or professional backgrounds in relevant fields—specifically law, government, or politics—seem to have an advantage in winning elections. It is unclear whether those experiences help them become more effective legislators. Using a variety of data sources, we assess whether lawmakers with relevant prior experiences are more effective in advancing bills in the 50 state legislatures. We find mixed results. We find that state senators are more effective than their colleagues if they first served in the state house, but that prior local officeholders are no more effective than first-time officeholders. Among occupational groups, lawyers alone seem to make more effective lawmakers than their colleagues. The results suggest that some narrow types of experience may help lawmakers be more effective in office, but that general experience in government and politics does not predict effectiveness. The results can help political observers and voters assess candidates' claims about how their prior experience will help them contribute to governance.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144998958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Getting what you pay for: Resource allocations and legislative success","authors":"Emily Cottle Ommundsen","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Members of Congress run for office with a variety of goals they hope to achieve if elected. How members go about achieving these goals is constrained by numerous institutional factors. Yet there exist two areas in which members are afforded broad discretion: the allocation of their time and budget. In this paper, I assess the personal qualities and institutional circumstances that motivate members' budgetary decisions, and take an important step further to evaluate the consequences of such choices. I find that members who spend a greater proportion of their budget are more effective lawmakers than those who do not spend their full budgets. Further, I demonstrate that members who invest more in legislative staff have the highest rates of legislative productivity. Members make strategic choices in how they divide their budget. This paper demonstrates that investing in skilled staff is a wise strategy for members desiring legislative success.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144999101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategies of Control: Members of Congress and Policy Outcomes","authors":"Erinn Lauterbach, Melinda N. Ritchie","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite Congress' Article I powers, challenges within and outside of Congress prevent lawmakers from influencing policy outcomes. Legislators confront obstacles when trying to pass bills, and legislation is often not implemented as intended. What strategies do lawmakers have for controlling policy outcomes? We argue that legislators use formal and informal means to influence policy, but that they choose an instrument that exploits their comparative advantage in Congress. Authority over legislative functions and access to stages of the legislative process influence lawmakers' strategy. We merge two datasets to measure the statutory tools drafted into legislation and House members' informal interactions with agencies between 2005 and 2012, drawing on nearly 14,000 bills and 65,000 contacts. Our findings contribute to theories of delegation and oversight—by focusing on the allocation of authority among individual legislators rather than transitory interbranch political explanations—and advance our understanding of the distribution of power in Congress.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144999084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Priority Projects: Constituent Spending Demand and the Benefits of Congressional Credit Claiming","authors":"Peter T. McLaughlin","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do incumbents in the US Congress turn federally funded district projects into electoral gains? Clarifying the connection between federal spending and congressional elections is critical for understanding the institution, as distributive benefits are theorized to enhance representation and facilitate broader policymaking. Extant studies argue that members of Congress use credit claiming for distributive benefits to cultivate an impression of influence, portraying themselves as uniquely capable of securing projects for their constituents. I develop a targeted theory of congressional distributive politics and argue that public support is granted to legislators for securing the <i>right</i> distributive benefits rather than securing the <i>most</i> distributive benefits. Using two survey experiments to explore constituent demand for different types of spending, I find robust evidence that legislators' ability to meet constituent demand shapes the effectiveness of their credit claims. I also find unexpected partisan convergence in the public's spending priorities and responsiveness to congressional credit claiming. This research advances the literature on congressional representation and offers a more complete account of the politics around congressional spending.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144999124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Military Experience and the Use of Force: Congressional AUMF Votes Among Combat and Non-Combat Veteran Legislators","authors":"Matthew Fiorelli, Heather Jebb","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70003","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Does prior military experience affect the way members of Congress vote when authorizing the use of military force abroad? Some scholars argue that military experience increases hawkishness, while others posit that military service fosters restraint and caution. We intervene in this debate by separating AUMF resolutions from other foreign policy legislation and by examining the disparate effects of prior combat and non-combat service on veterans in Congress. We argue that the socializing effects of combat experience are more narrowly relevant to use of force legislation than non-combat military service. Using original research to determine which members of Congress deployed to combat theaters, we aggregate and analyze six roll call votes authorizing the use of military force abroad in six different Congresses. We find that combat exposure increases the likelihood that a member of Congress will vote to authorize the use of force. Our results challenge conventional wisdom and contribute new insights to the studies of American foreign policy, international relations, and civil-military relations.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144999151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policy Content of Legislative Vetoes and Success of Presidential Activism Under Semi-Presidentialism","authors":"Mažvydas Jastramskis, Lukas Pukelis","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70006","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The power to veto legislation and return it to parliament is one of the most prominent presidential powers and a major source of presidential activism. Until now, research has mostly focused on the frequency of presidential vetoes—that is, how often presidents use veto power. However, we still know relatively little about the determinants of veto success, especially under semi-presidential republics. We argue that categorizing legislative vetoes according to their policy content introduces an important dimension to research on the success of presidential activism. This article employs the case of Lithuania, where presidents have the power of an amendatory veto. We find that the content of vetoes is partially important: technical vetoes have significantly higher chances of being successful.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144782823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andrew M. O. Ballard, James M. Curry, Mary A. Kroeger
{"title":"The Separation of Powers and Policymaking in the US States","authors":"Andrew M. O. Ballard, James M. Curry, Mary A. Kroeger","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do the separation of powers dynamics in the United States affect policymaking outcomes? Scholars and observers of national politics have long expected that they do, but since there has been little meaningful variation in the constitutional separation of powers system, it has been difficult to conduct empirical assessments. We turn to the American states, were there is variation from state to state in separation of powers institutions. Drawing on a dataset of hundreds of thousands of bills introduced to state legislatures, and the case of North Carolina giving its governor veto power in 1997, we find evidence that greater separation of powers institutions generally relate to less legislative productivity and less partisan lawmaking. However, these findings are meaningfully conditioned by the presence or absence of divided government, and there is some variation from state to state.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144774062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Analyzing gender gaps in bicameral legislatures: How asymmetrical institutions affect the supply and demand for female candidates","authors":"Yoshikuni Ono, Yuko Kasuya, Hirofumi Miwa","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12493","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In bicameral legislatures, gender representation varies significantly between chambers. Historically, Japan's upper house has maintained a proportion of women twice that of the lower house. However, electoral systems alone cannot fully explain this disparity. We argue that seemingly gender-neutral legislative institutions influence both voting behavior and candidates' willingness to run, contributing to significant disparities in gender representation in bicameral legislatures. To test this argument, we conduct two survey experiments exploring the underlying mechanisms from the perspectives of voters and candidates. Our findings suggest that informing voters about the upper house's subordinate role increases support for female candidates in upper house elections. Furthermore, women display a greater willingness to pursue office when assured of job security in the upper house, while men exhibit less interest when made aware of its limited authority to appoint the prime minister. This study enhances our current understanding of the effects of asymmetrical institutions between chambers from a gender perspective.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12493","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144782194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Political Economy of High-Skilled Immigration: Analyzing (Co)Sponsorship on High-Skilled Immigration Bills in the U.S. Congress","authors":"Rena Sung","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70005","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>What drives politicians' support for high-skilled immigration policy? I argue that politicians support different types of high-skilled immigration policy by balancing business demand for skilled foreign labor and their party's position toward immigration. Using high-skilled immigration bills, (co)sponsorship data, and H-1B visa applications from 2003 to 2020 in the U.S., I find that business demand affects politicians' behavior differently depending on the type of immigration bills, which I categorize as expanding, zero-sum, and restrictive. Expanding bills increase high-skilled immigration, thereby increasing the total number of immigrants, whereas zero-sum bills increase it at the expense of other types of immigration. Restrictive bills strengthen monitoring processes to reduce skilled immigration. Business demand plays a significant role when the nature of immigration bills aligns closely with their party's position for Democratic representatives, as in the case of expanding bills. On the other hand, for Republican representatives, business demand wields greater influence when the nature of immigration bills deviates from their party's stance, as in the case of restrictive bills. Business demand does not strongly affect the support for zero-sum bills. By highlighting business demand and partisanship, this paper provides insights into the competitive dynamics among legislators regarding different types of high-skill immigration policies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144782449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}