{"title":"The (Financial) Ties That Bind: Social Networks of Intraparty Caucuses","authors":"SoRelle Wyckoff Gaynor","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12360","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12360","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Intraparty caucuses in the US Congress are often recognized for the information sharing, voting blocs, and personal relationships they facilitate. This article introduces an additional benefit to joining intraparty caucuses: campaign donations. Applying social network analysis and exponential random graph models to the 115th and 116th Congresses, I find that members are more likely to donate to their fellow caucus members than other members in Congress. In addition, I find that party leaders, particularly Republican party leaders, are less likely to donate to members that join intraparty caucuses, indicating that Leadership PAC funding is strategic for rank-and-file members and party leaders alike. This article adds to our understanding of intraparty caucuses, particularly their role in facilitating member-to-member campaign donations, and the relationship between caucus members and party leaders.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 4","pages":"885-920"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43405169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constituency Size and Evaluations of Government","authors":"Daniel Bowen","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12358","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12358","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article examines the relationship between legislative constituency size and opinions about the US state government. I show that over the course of US history, the states have disconnected the size of their legislatures from population change, resulting in a growing constituency size in nearly every state. I argue that because district size structures the nature of constituent–legislator interaction and levels of district heterogeneity, size influences the effectiveness of legislator efforts to build trust and support, resulting in more negative evaluations of representative government. Using a unique data set of nine Pew Research Center public opinion polls on favorable opinions of US state governments from 1997 to 2012, I find that constituency size is indeed associated with more negative evaluations. This relationship cannot be explained by other probable causes like legislative professionalism, partisanship, opinions about the federal government, or population size alone. Legislative institutions appear to moderate how residents experience and evaluate state government.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 2","pages":"459-499"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lsq.12358","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43513713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tomas Turner-Zwinkels, Oliver Huwyler, Elena Frech, Philip Manow, Stefanie Bailer, Niels D. Goet, Simon Hug
{"title":"Parliaments Day-by-Day: A New Open Source Database to Answer the Question of Who Was in What Parliament, Party, and Party-group, and When","authors":"Tomas Turner-Zwinkels, Oliver Huwyler, Elena Frech, Philip Manow, Stefanie Bailer, Niels D. Goet, Simon Hug","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12359","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12359","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Reliably answering questions about representation and parliamentary behavior requires data about which parliamentarian was where, and at what time. However, parliament membership is not stable over time. For example, it is common for politicians to change office (we find up to 40% turnover between elections). Consequently, parliament membership, as well as party and party group composition change on a daily basis. To address the challenges that these fluctuations present, we introduce a new open-source database:‘ ‘Parliaments Day-By-Day” (PDBD). PDBD currently contains demographic and day-by-day membership data for the national parliaments of Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, covering the period between 1947 and 2017, and comprising a total of 21 million parliament-legislator-day observations. We demonstrate the usefulness of this high-resolution data in a concise study of the day-by-day development of parliaments in terms of gender and seniority. This reveals hitherto unknown patterns of early turnover, gendered replacement, and seniority.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 3","pages":"761-784"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lsq.12359","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44917082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Candidate Extremism and Voter Roll-Off in US House Elections","authors":"Michael G. Miller","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12356","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12356","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Growing evidence suggests that extreme candidates perform worse, in part because their party’s share of turnout declines. But does candidate ideology affect the decision of whether to abstain in a House race among voters who already turned out in the presidential election? I examine the relationship between candidates’ ideology and voter abstention in the House contest, reporting two main results. First, fewer voters abstain in elections featuring more ideologically polarized House candidates. A consideration of party effects reveals more nuance, however: In most cases, roll-off is lower when extreme candidates run, but the effect of an extreme Republican is substantially larger than that of an extreme Democrat. Further analysis suggests that decreased roll-off is probably due to extreme candidates mobilizing out-partisans. My results suggest that allowing for the possibility of voter abstention is an important theoretical addition to understanding the behavioral effects of extremist candidates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 4","pages":"791-821"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lsq.12356","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47768161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Voters Know Enough to Punish Out-of-Step Congressional Candidates?","authors":"Brandon Marshall, Michael Peress","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12355","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12355","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Traditional democratic norms suggest that accountability requires voters to be able to accurately perceive the positions of candidates for office. When asked to place congressional candidates on an ideological spectrum, voters show a surprisingly high level of both inaccuracy and variation in the policy positions of candidates. In this article, we investigate three theories of candidate placement to determine the possible sources for voter inaccuracy of candidate positions: the assimilation and contrast theory, the partisan cheerleading theory, and the information theory. We develop an instrumental variables approach for distinguishing between the competing theories. We find some evidence for assimilation and contrast among low knowledge voters and little support for cheerleading. We also find evidence that the actual position of the candidate has a detectable but small effect on voters’ perceptions of that candidate, limiting the extent to which House candidates are held individually accountable for the positions they take. Instead, we find evidence that voters cue off of the positions of the party’s other candidates, suggesting that candidates for a political party are held collectively accountable.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 3","pages":"639-675"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lsq.12355","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42481939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12304","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the published version of Amy Melissa (2019), issue 45:2, the author would like to remove the supplementary file from the article.</p><p>The publisher regrets the error.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"46 2","pages":"615"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12304","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72170222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heeding to the Losers: Legislators' Trade-Policy Preferences and Legislative Behavior","authors":"María Victoria Murillo, Pablo M. Pinto","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12337","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12337","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Electoral incentives affect legislators' responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators' responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed-list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll-call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators' trade-policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, are more likely to motivate legislators to defy their parties. These findings underscore the importance of understanding when and how catering to local constituents can affect politicians’ trade policy choices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 3","pages":"539-603"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lsq.12337","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48272788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Majority Party Agenda Setting: Picking Fights or Avoiding Them?","authors":"Austin Bussing, Sarah A. Treul","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12354","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12354","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In legislatures such as the U.S. House of Representatives, where the majority party controls the agenda, the frequency of observed partisan disagreement is partially a function of strategic agenda-setting choices made by that party. Do majority party leaders use their agenda control to privilege bills that accentuate disagreements with the minority party? In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework focused on the costs and benefits associated with floor consideration of partisan legislation. We test hypotheses derived from our theory on a dataset of 15,611 bills considered in House committees during the 104th–114th Congresses (1995–2016). We find that minority party opposition in committee is associated with a decreased likelihood of floor consideration, suggesting that the majority party does not use agenda setting to indiscriminately favor partisan legislation. Our findings focus attention on the costs of partisan agenda setting, and contextualize the partisan disagreement we ultimately observe on the House floor.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 3","pages":"605-637"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lsq.12354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45541180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transaction Costs and Congressional Careers: The Effect of Flight Availability on Retirement Decisions","authors":"Neil Malhotra, Christian González Rojas","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12339","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12339","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do the transaction costs of office holding affect congressional careers? These costs may influence the kinds of people who select into public office and therefore the representativeness of democratic institutions. Gaining causal leverage on this question has been difficult given that many costs associated with office holding are endogenous to characteristics of legislators. Using a natural experiment, we examine the effect of exogenous changes in transaction costs in the US Congress caused by changes in the availability of direct flights from home districts to Washington, DC. We find that gaining an airport that provides a round-trip direct flight to Washington, DC, is associated with an approximately 1.6 percentage point increase in the probability that a member runs for reelection. One implication of these results is that members more sensitive to office-holding costs—such as moderates or members of underrepresented groups—may be less likely to seek and maintain political careers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 3","pages":"727-740"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lsq.12339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46267520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}