{"title":"District Size and Proximity to the Pork Barrel in Congressional Elections","authors":"Brian T. Hamel, Lanie Richards","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70039","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We propose that district size moderates the relationship between pork barrel spending and U.S. House election outcomes. Our argument is two-fold: (1) pork has a greater effect on citizens' lives—and thus, their vote—when allocated in geographic proximity to them; and (2) in smaller districts, pork projects are proximate for more people, increasing their reach and impact. We provide empirical support for our argument using a pre-registered survey experiment and observational data from two recent Congresses. Most notably, we find that earmarks are modestly associated with higher vote shares for the incumbent in smaller districts but make no electoral difference in larger districts. These results cannot be explained by other legislator and district characteristics. Our paper highlights how the physical characteristics of House districts can shape electoral accountability and offers a novel structural explanation for why decades of research have found almost no overall relationship between pork and votes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145366383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Partisan Politics of Rainy Day Fund Investment","authors":"Lauren Futter","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70038","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>When do legislatures save for disasters and economic downturns? How do electoral uncertainty and majority party agenda control influence these decisions? I develop a two-stage bargaining model of rainy day fund (RDF) investment. In the first stage, a legislator from the majority party proposes an allocation of the budget between an RDF, particularistic good, and public good. Before the second stage, there is an election and an economic crisis may occur. If a crisis occurs, the legislature can access an existing RDF to fund relief. The model predicts that a majority party is more likely to save when it is likely to remain in the majority, though saving remains below socially optimal levels. Supermajority and other requirements for larger voting coalitions incentivize RDF investment. Testing the results of the model empirically using measures of partisan competition reveal that states with stronger majorities are more likely to invest in their RDFs.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145366384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effect of Policy Traceability on Legislative Incentives","authors":"Matto Mildenberger, Alexander Sahn","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70036","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Theories of legislative politics have long emphasized how a policy's traceability—whether and how voters connect legislative action with policy effects—shapes political incentives to legislate. Douglas Arnold emphasized how the “nature of the causal chain that links a policy instrument with its policy effects” structures the logic of congressional action. Despite its prominence, this key theoretical claim has received little empirical attention. In this article, we use two survey experiments to test how several policy attributes—including traceability—shape legislators and public policy preferences. We find that elites are responsive to both policy traceability and problem traceability—whether a policy problem itself can be linked to elite actions. By contrast, prospective voters are indifferent to both forms of traceability. With respect to other policy attributes, elites and mass publics share similar preferences. Our results provide support for a previously untested theory of policymaking and describe the nature of strategic decision-making by legislators.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145272125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Your Job, Keep Your Seat: The Causal Effect of MPs' Legislation on Reelection","authors":"Serika Atsumi","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70037","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Distinguishing between personal and party votes is inherently challenging, and it remains unclear to what extent they function in each country. This study employs the ballot of a private member's bill as an instrumental variable to examine whether legislative behavior influences electoral outcomes in the United Kingdom, which has a highly institutionalized party system. The findings reveal that legislative behavior increases the vote share of Conservative MPs by 2.6 percentage points compared to the previous election. However, given the high prominence of the party vote, this increase is only large enough to change the electoral winner in just under 10% of the constituencies. Furthermore, for opposition MPs, legislative behavior had no effect in any respect. Nevertheless, this result suggests that personal votes exist even in an unlikely case—when party competition is intense and MPs have limited autonomy in Parliament.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145223874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rhetorical and Revealed Opposition to Compromise Among Local and State Legislators","authors":"Melody Crowder-Meyer","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70034","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Policymaking in democratic governments requires compromise, yet polarized legislators face mixed incentives around compromise. These incentives also vary by gender and party, with women and Democrats facing greater pressure to express support for compromise. I investigate how legislators handle this situation by revealing both how often legislators openly report supporting compromise and legislators' willingness to oppose compromise when they can do so in secret. Drawing on original surveys of local and state legislators, I find that many legislators rhetorically support compromise but oppose compromise surreptitiously. Further, while women and Democrats are equally or more likely than men and Republicans to report supporting compromise when asked directly, this pattern reverses with women and some Democratic legislators opposing compromise <i>more</i> than men and Republicans when they can do so secretly. Evidence suggests this is due, in part, to women and Democrats being more likely to seek office due to policy issue motivations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Politics Is Not Pivotal: Supermajority Debate Rules in State Legislatures","authors":"James M. Curry, Robert L. Oldham","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70035","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The 60-vote end-debate threshold is a key institution in the United States Senate. Most winning coalitions require 60 votes, effectively giving veto power to a minority of senators. But do supermajority debate rules necessarily translate into minority veto power? We examine this in state legislatures, where there is far more variation in whether chamber rules require a majority or a supermajority of legislators to cut off debate. Across multiple analyses and data sources, we fail to find systematic evidence that supermajority debate rules are associated with several outcome variables, including the size of bill passage coalitions, news coverage of obstruction, and the success of major proposals. The lack of evidence indicates that, in many cases, debate rules do not translate into legislative “pivots” and that case-specific knowledge is necessary for understanding the influence of legislative rules.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70035","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Explaining How Subnational Politics Shapes Committee Assignment in a Federal Country: The Case of Argentina","authors":"Gabriel Levita, Victoria Ortiz de Rozas","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70033","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>As in many federal countries, subnational politics is the cornerstone of Argentine political careers, and the Congress is a central point for multilevel politics. Although existing literature shows that local politics influence the behavior of congressmen, their effect on committee appointments has been scarcely studied. This article examines the committee assignments of former mayors and governors in the Argentine Congress from 2011 to 2019. We find that being a first-time legislator with prior experience as a mayor and coming from provinces with large public sectors, competitive party systems, and small district magnitudes positively influence the chances of being appointed to distributive committees, that is, those whose benefits can be more easily disaggregated into specific geographic constituencies. Our findings enhance the understanding of the connections between the federal legislative branch and local executives, and they highlight the importance of distributional theory in analyzing committee membership.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geographical Representation on the Floor: Parliamentary Rules and Legislative Speeches in Party-Centered Contexts","authors":"Edoardo Alberto Viganò","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70032","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The degree of party control of parliamentary debates influences which MPs take the floor. However, we do not know whether floor access rules matter also for the content of speeches. Drawing on a corpus of speeches delivered in bill debates in the Italian lower house over 10 years, I investigate how variation in floor access rules across comparable debates shapes MPs' geographical representation in their legislative speeches. The findings reveal that open-access rules increase the intensity of geographical representation compared to when parties allocate speaking time, pointing to a tension between party control and dyadic representation. Additionally, this study demonstrates that the effect of open rules on geographical representation is consistent across MPs with different electoral incentives and degrees of alignment with party leadership, as well as across topics varying in their potential for geographical representation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144923827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human Capital Exiting Capitol Hill? Differences in Congressional Staff Turnover by Race and Gender","authors":"Alexander Bolton, Hans Hassell, Joshua McCrain","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70030","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Congress relies heavily on congressional staff to function and, as such, members have raised alarms about staff departures and their impact on the institution's capacity. We examine patterns of congressional staff exit to understand the severity of this problem. We document differences in departure rates among staff from certain demographic groups, as staff diversity shapes substantive representation. Using comprehensive congressional staffing employment data over the past two decades, we show turnover rates vary by race and gender, with minorities more likely to exit their positions and women, despite being less likely to be promoted, more likely to stay. Lastly, while overall turnover rates are high, we find that staff with higher education and committee experience (whose departures are more likely to affect brain drain) are more likely to remain in Congress. These results hold important implications for ongoing policy reforms and for descriptive representation in congressional policymaking.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144923826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jaclyn Kaslovsky, Albert H. Rivero, Andrew R. Stone
{"title":"Promoting a Diverse Bench: An Analysis of Elite Messaging About Descriptive Representation","authors":"Jaclyn Kaslovsky, Albert H. Rivero, Andrew R. Stone","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Existing work documents how senators use their official communications to explain their Washington activities and build support in the district. However, relatively little remains known about how senators communicate about one of their most important constitutional duties—providing advice and consent on Supreme Court nominees. In this paper, we investigate how senators discuss Supreme Court nominations with their constituents, focusing on one common rhetorical strategy: highlighting the descriptive traits of nominees. Using a new dataset of press releases about nominee race and gender, we demonstrate that senators of both parties frequently discuss the descriptive traits of nominees. Next, we systematically investigate the determinants of this rhetoric, finding that shared characteristics with the nominee, copartisanship, and institutional position predict discussion of descriptive representation. Then, we use the CES to demonstrate the impact of these messages on constituent evaluations of senators; we find a modest boost in using such messages. Finally, we conduct a preliminary investigation of discussion of nominee religion using our framework. Our findings provide important insight into how senators use rhetorical appeals to appeal to constituents and make the case for diversity in governing.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144918734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}