Manuel Alcántara Sáez, Mercedes García Montero, Scott Morgenstern, Cristina Rivas Pérez
{"title":"What Legislators Tell Us About Legislatures: Evidence From PELA-USAL","authors":"Manuel Alcántara Sáez, Mercedes García Montero, Scott Morgenstern, Cristina Rivas Pérez","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 2","pages":"133-147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144492612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"‘No es la democracia que míster superman quiere imponernos desde Washington’: An analysis of populist attitudes on democracy from Latin American legislators","authors":"Patricia Marenghi, Mercedes García Montero","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12484","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In studies on Populism, extensive discussion has mounted around whether the phenomenon represents a threat to democracy or a corrective force. In line with this concern, we examine whether the populist attitudes held by legislators are related to their opinions on the functioning of and satisfaction with three central aspects of governance: (I) democracy itself; (II) its institutions; and (III) the separation of powers. Using the ideational approach and survey information collected for the PELA-USAL database, we first measure the populist attitudes of legislators in 12 Latin American countries. We then test through multivariate analysis two theoretical arguments: (1) that populism is relatively hostile to democracy and its institutions; and (2) that ideological extremism and the situation of the legislator in the government/opposition dynamic serve as moderators (enhancers) of that hostility. The results suggest that the populist attitudes of these legislators are indeed significantly connected to lower levels of trust and satisfaction with democracy and its institutions and that populism in combination with ideological extremism sharpens that critical perspective, while a legislator's affiliation with the ruling party or coalition in government tends to temper it.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 2","pages":"229-249"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12484","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144492782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Valentina González-Rostani, José Incio, Guillermo Lezama
{"title":"Social media versus surveys: A new scalable approach to understanding legislators' discourse","authors":"Valentina González-Rostani, José Incio, Guillermo Lezama","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12481","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores how legislators use social media, specifically investigating whether their posts reflect the concerns expressed by their legislative party peers in an anonymous survey. Utilizing data from Twitter (now X), we compare legislators' social media posts with their responses in a survey of legislators in Latin America. We propose a novel and scalable method for analyzing political communications, employing OpenAI for topic identification in statements and BERTopic analysis to identify clusters of political communication. This approach enables a thorough and detailed examination of these topics over time and across political parties. Applying our method to statements made by members of the Chilean Congress, we observe a general alignment between the preferences stated in surveys by elites and the prominence of these issues on Twitter. This result validates social media platforms (particularly Twitter) as a tool for predicting politicians' preferences. Our methodological approach offers a scalable tool for analyzing political rhetoric over time.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 2","pages":"258-266"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12481","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144492570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Following the leaders: Asymmetric party messaging in the U.S. Congress","authors":"SoRelle Wyckoff Gaynor","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12479","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Today, rank-and-file members are increasingly removed from the legislative process and often rely on congressional leaders for information to discuss major legislative decisions with constituents. As a result, preparing constituent communication materials has become an institutionalized responsibility for party and committee leaders, leading to a partisan discussion of legislation. Using a mixed-methods approach of computational text analysis and elite interviews, I demonstrate how members of Congress use leader-led, partisan messages for constituent communication. Echoing prior work on asymmetric partisanship, I find that Republican leaders are more likely to encourage party-centric messaging, and rank-and-file Republicans, particularly in the House, are more likely to adopt party messaging. The findings illustrate the institutional power of party leaders in a centralized Congress, as well as the role that constituent communication plays in encouraging and maintaining asymmetric polarization.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 1","pages":"85-106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143554992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Mustillo, John Polga-Hecimovich, Francisco Sánchez
{"title":"The logic of ambitious legislators in fluid party systems","authors":"Thomas Mustillo, John Polga-Hecimovich, Francisco Sánchez","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12465","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Classic theories of political ambition assume relatively stable and programmatic party systems. However, in many parts of the world, ‘fluid’ or ‘inchoate’ party systems do not provide ambitious legislators with the electoral benefits associated with stable party brands. In this paper, we examine ambition in fluid party systems: What is the frequency of party switching for legislators who seek re-election, and what are their characteristics? What incentives do parties create to push away or retain legislators? And which parties do ambitious legislators seek out? Using a systems approach, we argue that in fluid party systems, legislators' office-seeking behavior is driven by their attitudes towards parties and their constituents, their prospective evaluation of party performance, and ideology. Incentives for politicians to switch parties act as negative feedback mechanisms which keep the party system stuck in a fluid state. We test the determinants of party switching using two data sources from Ecuador: a public records dataset of every legislator who earned re-election from 1979 to 2021, and the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (<i>PELA</i>) surveys of all legislators from 1994 to 2017. Both sources distinguish between switchers and non-switchers. The results support the conclusion that ambitious legislators in fluid party systems are strategic actors that seek or keep parties to maximize their probability of re-election—and thereby further exacerbate the party system's fluidity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 2","pages":"148-165"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12465","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144492901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legislative capacity limits interest group influence: Evidence from California's Proposition 140","authors":"Alex Garlick, Mary Kroeger, Paige Pellaton","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12478","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Reformers assert that lobbyists take advantage of legislators who lack adequate staffing and research to win policy outcomes for their interest group clients. However, in the United States, legislators usually determine their own levels of staff. This paper exploits the 1990 passage of California's Proposition 140 to test a situation when the legislature's capacity dropped. Proposition 140 immediately lowered legislative expenditures for the 1991–1992 session by 38%, which decimated the policy staff, particularly in the state's Assembly. Using bill analyses that identify which outside groups served as the source of legislation, we show that group sponsored bills became more likely to pass than non-group bills in the wake of Proposition 140. This effect is concentrated in bills introduced in the Assembly. We account for other factors that could explain this relationship, particularly direct and indirect effects of the term limits wrought by Proposition 140, but find they did not alter legislator relationships with outside groups.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 1","pages":"71-84"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12478","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143554501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Line-item vetoes as a coordination mechanism","authors":"Valeria Palanza, Gisela Sin, Evangeline Reynolds","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12467","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Although presidential vetoes are central to the legislative process, the role of total versus line item vetoes (LIV) is largely unclear. While total vetoes are a sign of conflict between the branches, as the literature has emphasized, we argue that LIV function as a negative agenda setting mechanism that enables presidents to coordinate within their coalition. To test our argument, we use an original dataset on all statutes and executive decrees approved and vetoed in Brazil for the period 1988–2010. In both, statutes and decrees, we show that while total vetoes occur when conflict between branches is stronger, LIV happen when such conflict is minimal and presidents have tight control over their coalition. The results are robust across dependent variables, model specifications, and estimation strategies. Our findings highlight that while the total veto is a blunt bargaining mechanism, the LIV provides a scalpel, a much finer tool that helps presidents manage and sustain their congressional coalition.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 1","pages":"38-53"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12467","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143554425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elías Chavarría-Mora, Chuang Chen, Valentina González-Rostani, Scott Morgenstern
{"title":"How germane are moral and economic policies to ideology? Evidence from Latin American legislators","authors":"Elías Chavarría-Mora, Chuang Chen, Valentina González-Rostani, Scott Morgenstern","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12476","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do legislators, many of whom hold policy positions that are not consistently conservative or progressive, position themselves on the left–right ideological scale? Analyzing data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) survey, this paper leverages combinations of moral and economic policy positions to determine the weight—germaneness—of each policy on that scale. Using bi- and multivariate models on a database of about 5000 legislators, we confirm the importance of economics but also find that moral issues can be germane to the left–right placement of many of the region's legislators. The relative germaneness of the policies is inconsistent for legislators of the left and right. The left is more heterogeneous because moral policies are less germane to their identification. However, many centrists hold conservative economic and moral views, blurring the tie between policy and ideological positions. We confirm that contextual factors can sharpen the issue-to-ideology relationship.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 2","pages":"214-228"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12476","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144492795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The drama is in the ink: Conflict in written parliamentary questions","authors":"Solveig Bjørkholt, Martin Søyland","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12474","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Opposition is a core component of any democracy, yet it is scarcely studied. Leaning on research prescribing blurred lines between government and opposition in parliamentary democracies, we use word embeddings in tandem with sentiment analysis on written parliamentary questions in the Norwegian parliament to study conflict patterns between the government and opposition. Our findings consistently show that MPs of governing parties are more negative than MPs of the opposition. However, the effect is reduced considerably when the topical content of the question is included in the analysis. We attribute our finding to the existence of a <i>participation threshold</i> in parliamentary questions; MPs of governing parties will only ask questions whenever a given issue is sufficiently contentious.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"50 1","pages":"123-129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12474","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143554866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}