Legislative Studies Quarterly最新文献_第2页

Controlling for Oversight in Studies of Oversight 监督研究中的监督控制

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-07-27 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70081

Jenn S. Kim, Benjamin Kinnard, John Patty

{"title":"Controlling for Oversight in Studies of Oversight","authors":"Jenn S. Kim, Benjamin Kinnard, John Patty","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70081","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In honor of the creation of the Congressional Oversight Research Database (CORD), we explore some of the selection effects that observable measures of oversight may be subject to. We present a model in which Congress endogenously chooses whether to hold a hearing or to preempt the need for one by overturning an agency's policy in advance. These endogenous oversight choices imply that observable outcomes arise through two pathways: Congress may overturn a policy immediately or only after acquiring additional information through a hearing. Failing to account for this information-gathering stage can obscure the underlying mechanisms that drive these outcomes. Using data from ProQuest and CORD, we test two implications of the model, finding evidence that Congress selects into conducting oversight hearings and implementing subsequent policy reversals more often when in opposition to the President, with no impact of the information gathered during a hearing on subsequent policy reversals. This implies that Congress uses committee hearings primarily as a mechanism for sharing information about the executive branch when it is politically convenient, rather than as a mechanism for gathering information on policy alternatives. We then conclude with broader implications for empirical research on oversight, including the importance of distinguishing between information gathering and information sharing in oversight.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2026-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70081","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does Unequal Representation Bias Policymaking? Quasi-Experimental Evidence From the Italian Senate 不平等代表权会影响政策制定吗？来自意大利参议院的准实验证据

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-07-15 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70086

Massimo Troncone

引用次数: 0

Out of Step, Out of Party: Party Switching in American State Legislatures 步调不合，党派不合：美国州立法机构的党派转换

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-07-12 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70085

Boris Shor

{"title":"Out of Step, Out of Party: Party Switching in American State Legislatures","authors":"Boris Shor","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70085","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Do parties shape legislators' revealed behavior, or do they merely reflect it? Party switchers offer a rare opportunity to examine party effects because the same legislators can be observed before and after crossing the aisle. I assemble a dataset of 500 state legislative party switches across 49 states from 1993 to 2024 and use comparable ideal-point estimates to examine two questions: what predicts switching, and how much legislators' voting records change afterward. Ideological misfit is by far the strongest predictor of switching, while district preferences add little independent explanatory power. Partisan context also matters: switching is less common under stronger conditional party government and more common for minority-party members in lopsided chambers. After switching, legislators move substantially toward their new parties. Among major-party switchers, the average shift is about 0.64 common-space units, roughly half the typical gap between party medians. These shifts are largest for party-median Democrats, consistent with the view that they faced the greatest party pressure, and they grow larger in chambers with stronger conditional party government and greater legislative professionalism. The results show that parties constrain legislators' behavior, and that the strength of that constraint varies systematically with party-system conditions, competitive context, and institutional differences.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2026-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148467109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The House Appropriations Committee Surveys & Investigations Staff and the Arc of Congressional Competence 众议院拨款委员会调查和调查工作人员和国会职权范围

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-07-06 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70083

Matthew Dull

引用次数: 0

Uniform Punishment and Conditional Reward: Ideological Extremism and Senatorial Approval in the United States 统一惩罚与条件奖励：美国的意识形态极端主义与参议院批准

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70084

Benjamin Highton, Erik Engstrom

引用次数: 0

The Purpose-Driven Congress: Measuring and Explaining Legislative Outcomes of House Investigations 目的驱动的国会：衡量和解释众议院调查的立法结果

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70082

Claire Leavitt

引用次数: 0

Partisan Knowledge Claims in Congressional Oversight 国会监督中的党派知识主张

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70079

Kenneth Lowande, Mark A. Weiss

引用次数: 0

Issue Attention in Congressional Primary Elections 国会初选中的问题关注

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70075

Audrey Sachleben, Sarah A. Treul

{"title":"Issue Attention in Congressional Primary Elections","authors":"Audrey Sachleben, Sarah A. Treul","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70075","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Prominent theories of campaign issue strategy provide three main perspectives candidates can adopt when deciding what issues to discuss: (1) issues voters view their party as “owning”, (2) “trespassing” onto issues that the other party owns, and (3) addressing timely and salient issues (e.g., “wave riding”). This paper examines candidate issue messaging strategies in congressional primary campaigns. By isolating party-owned issues and issue trespassing from wave riding, a distinction not typically made in previous literature, we explore how candidate characteristics and electoral conditions influence the use of these three strategies in primary elections. Leveraging a dataset of campaign website issue platforms for nearly all congressional candidates running in primary elections from 2018 to 2022, we find that incumbent candidates dedicate relatively more of their campaign platform to party-owned and opposing party-owned issues compared to challengers. Further, we find that candidates who must appeal to a partisan primary electorate spend relatively less time engaging in issue trespassing, but discuss salient, wave riding issues more. Overall, our results contribute to the growing body of literature on issue messaging strategies and primary elections.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2026-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148282590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ulterior Oversight: Minority Party Investigations and the Politics of Exclusion 别有用心的监督：少数党调查与排斥政治

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-06-16 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70080

Jordan M. Butcher, Cody A. Drolc

{"title":"Ulterior Oversight: Minority Party Investigations and the Politics of Exclusion","authors":"Jordan M. Butcher, Cody A. Drolc","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70080","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The minority party in Congress faces structural barriers to influencing policy and controlling the oversight agenda. Yet even when excluded, it can use investigations and formal reports to challenge majority narratives and sustain political visibility. Building on foundational theories of legislative behavior, oversight, and recent work on minority party strategy, we examine when and how the minority uses formal oversight reports and differentiate their behavior from the majority. Using data from the Congressional Oversight Records Database (CORD), we find that minority-issued reports become shorter under unified government, less frequent when the minority is rolled more often on the floor, and longer when the minority has recently lost majority control or when its members have greater committee experience. These findings show that minority oversight is both constrained and strategic; it expands in depth when experience and recent displacement provide motivation but contracts in scope when institutional exclusion is greatest. These findings contribute to emerging research built around CORD by showing that oversight serves as a durable yet limited outlet for the minority party seeking to challenge or advance their own narratives.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2026-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148282353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Career Rewards for Part-Time Politicians 兼职政治家的职业奖励

IF 1.7 3区社会学

Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2026-06-16 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.70071

Frederik K. Kjøller

{"title":"Career Rewards for Part-Time Politicians","authors":"Frederik K. Kjøller","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70071","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do part-time politicians benefit professionally from holding political office? Despite the prevalence of part-time officeholders in democratic systems, little is known about how political service interacts with ordinary careers. This study examines whether entering part-time local office affects politicians' likelihood of attaining managerial positions in their non-political employment. Leveraging Danish electoral data from 1997 to 2013 linked to administrative labor-market registers, I employ an event-study design comparing narrowly elected winners and losers in municipal elections. The analysis distinguishes effects across public versus private employment and jobs inside versus outside the municipality. The results show that winning office increases the probability of holding a public-sector managerial position within the municipality by about one percentage point—substantial relative to a low baseline—while no effects emerge elsewhere. Electoral victory also increases candidates' likelihood of pursuing and attaining local and national political office. These findings indicate modest but meaningful career rewards concentrated where political authority is exercised.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2026-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70071","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148282352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0