{"title":"Partisan and Ideological Bias Among the Attentive Public: Evidence From Witness Slips in the Illinois General Assembly","authors":"Michael Kistner, Michael Pomirchy","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70057","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Prior work conjectures that representational gaps may arise due to biases in who contacts politicians. However, direct measures of legislator contact by members of the public are elusive. This study leverages a unique data source to evaluate partisan and ideological bias in public outreach: witness slips in the Illinois General Assembly, online forms individuals can use to support or oppose specific pieces of legislation. Using these expressed positions, we document two key facts. First, witnesses are significantly more supportive of Republican-sponsored legislation than Democratic-sponsored legislation. Second, after estimating ideal points for witnesses, we find witnesses are ideologically closer to Illinois Republicans than Democrats. Additional analyses reveal important ideological heterogeneity by policy jurisdiction and interest group affiliation. Together, the results support one theoretical explanation of why legislators systematically mischaracterize public opinion: the views they are exposed to differ significantly from those of the general public.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147268933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Rich Woman's World? Wealth and Gendered Paths to Office","authors":"Rachel Bernhard, Andrew C. Eggers, Marko Klašnja","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70055","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce and seek to explain a new and surprising fact about members of the US Congress: since at least the 1980s, Congresswomen have been substantially wealthier than Congressmen serving in the same party and decade. We articulate three mechanisms that could explain this gender wealth gap, and use new data on the backgrounds and families of members of Congress to evaluate each mechanism. We find no evidence that the wealth gap arises because districts likely to elect women also elect wealthier members, or because women had more lucrative pre-Congressional careers. We do find evidence that the gap can be explained by women facing steeper challenges that wealth helps them overcome—particularly related to caregiving—and by Congresswomen's spouses earning more money than Congressmen's spouses. Our analysis sheds light on how obstacles facing ambitious women can lead to apparently counterintuitive advantages among the women who manage to succeed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70055","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146091413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cover Bills","authors":"Nicolas Florez, Christian Fong","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70054","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Legislators sometimes vote on bills that fail but, in the process, allow lawmakers to take an extreme position before ultimately voting to compromise. We call these proposals <i>Cover Bills</i>. Through two survey experiments, we show that primary voters are more supportive of a compromiser if that legislator first votes for a cover bill. Through a causal mediation analysis, we show that cover bills are effective not because they prove that the compromise was the best deal the legislators could get, but because they demonstrate that the legislator shares the voter's ideological commitments. They reduce the punishment associated with compromising even if respondents find out about the cover bill from legislators who opposed the compromise.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70054","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146057901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Electoral Reform and Legislative Behavior: Evidence From Denmark's Transition to Proportional Representation","authors":"Martin Ejnar Hansen","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70056","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article examines the effect of electoral system reform on legislative speech-making by Members of Parliament (MPs), focusing on the case of Denmark's 1918 shift from single-member districts (SMD) to proportional representation (PR) in elections to the lower chamber. While the relationship between electoral systems and MP behavior is well established, few studies have been able to isolate causal effects using a natural control group. Leveraging the unique institutional configuration of Denmark's bicameral parliament—where the upper chamber remained unaffected by the reform—this study applies a difference-in-differences design to assess how reform shaped parliamentary behavior. Using a novel dataset covering all MPs between 1901 and 1939, the analysis compares both the absolute number of speeches delivered and the relative speech frequency of MPs across 1 electoral periods. The results demonstrate that MPs in the reformed lower chamber spoke significantly less following the introduction of PR, aligning their behavior more closely with that of MPs in the unreformed upper chamber. These findings hold across both outcome measures and after accounting for relevant controls, including seniority, party affiliation, and chamber-specific institutional differences. The analysis provides strong support for the argument that PR enhances party control over individual legislators and reduces incentives for personal vote-seeking via speech-making. The article contributes to the broader literature on electoral systems and legislative behavior, and offers new historical insight into the institutional development of representative democracy in early twentieth-century Europe.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70056","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146002288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who Shows Up? Legislative Attendance by Electoral Seat Type in Bangladesh and Pakistan","authors":"Dipak Kumar Biswas, Erik S. Herron","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70046","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Institutional mechanisms, like reserved seats, aim to enhance representation for underrepresented groups, including women and minorities. Yet little is known about whether legislators elected through these seats engage in legislative work at comparable levels to their peers elected through general seats. We examine legislative attendance—an observable form of engagement—in Bangladesh and Pakistan, two hybrid regimes with Westminster-derived institutions. Drawing on theories of electoral incentives, institutional weakness, and competing principals, we argue that reserved-seat legislators seek visibility during sessions to build reputations. Lacking independent electoral mandates and relying on party elites for nomination, they demonstrate loyalty and diligence through observable participation. Using an original dataset of attendance records and elite interviews, we find that reserved-seat legislators attend plenary sessions more often than general-seat legislators, even after controlling for demographic and institutional factors. These findings suggest that reserved seats, often criticized as symbolic, can generate strong incentives for visible participation. This study highlights how institutional pathways influence legislative behavior and contribute to comparative research on representation in non-Western contexts.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145845830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legislative Control and Partisan Disparities in Dyadic Representation","authors":"Daniel Butler, Zoe Nemerever, Steven Rogers","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70050","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Prior work finds that U.S. legislators often misrepresent their constituents' preferences, with politicians often siding with their party over their own constituents' preferences. To explain this misrepresentation, district-level characteristics receive more attention than what happens within the legislature. We argue that insights about legislative leadership can help us understand the conditions under which politicians may vote against their constituents' preferences. We investigate how partisan control of the legislative chamber affects state legislators' voting behavior using district-level returns on veto-referendum ballot initiatives. Our analyses reveal differences in dyadic representation based on which party controls the legislative chamber. When Republicans control the chamber, they allow their members to face more cross-pressured votes, partially explaining why Republicans are more prone to voting against constituents' preferences. Our results demonstrate the need to better understand the role of party leaders in shaping partisan differences in the quality of representation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145845831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shared Pain, Common Purpose: How Shared Problem Status Drives Congressional Collaboration on Opioid Legislation","authors":"Robert J. McGrath","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70052","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Why do members of Congress collaborate on legislation in an era of intense partisan polarization? This paper argues that shared exposure to pressing, district-level policy problems can motivate cross-party collaboration, particularly in a policy area that cuts across traditional ideological divides. Focusing on the case of the opioid crisis, I develop the importance of <i>shared problem status</i> in driving cosponsorship of opioid-related legislation. That is, when legislators represent similarly affected constituencies, they are more likely to cosponsor opioid-related legislation, even when they differ in party or ideology. While existing research often treats cosponsorship as a function of social networks or institutional proximity, there are clear incentives for members to respond to issue areas that reflect local problem severity. Using dyadic data on bill cosponsorship in the House and Senate from portions of the 112th through the 116th congresses (2012–2019), I find that member pairs with each legislator representing districts with high opioid death rates are significantly more likely to collaborate on opioid legislation. These findings suggest that geographically distributed policy crises can open space for bipartisan cooperation, even in an otherwise gridlocked Congress.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70052","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145848274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Quality of Bipartisan Legislation","authors":"Liam Bethlendy","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70048","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Do good (i.e., welfare-improving) policies receive bipartisan support? I develop a formal model where the quality of bipartisan legislation is conditional on voter perceptions of party competence. If voters infer that bills with bipartisan support are good bills and reelect the majority party for passing such legislation, then minority parties may have an incentive to oppose good bills to make the majority look bad. However, if voters believe only an incompetent minority party opposes the majority party's bills regardless of quality, then a strategic minority may support even bad bills. The minority party supports good bills and opposes bad bills only when the majority party has a large reputation advantage (i.e., when the majority party is more popular with voters). In an extension, I show that the majority may purposefully introduce bad bills. We can infer little about the quality of bipartisan legislation without considering party reputation concerns.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145739876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Boosted and Branded: Congressional Advertising With Constituents","authors":"Stephanie Davis, Annelise Russell","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70047","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Members of Congress have an unprecedented number of ways to communicate with constituents, and this article examines the evolving strategies of representation by focusing on how members use paid advertising to engage with their districts. Prior research offers competing explanations for lawmakers' communication strategies—one ascribed to asymmetric patterns of partisan politics and another to electoral constraints. Drawing on a dataset of franked communications by House members from 2018 to 2024, we investigate the factors driving variation in these representation investments. Our findings reveal distinct patterns in paid advertising, with junior lawmakers and electorally vulnerable members investing in constituent outreach. Additionally, the composition of franked communication has changed over time as digital advertising and SMS outreach have become primary tools for constituent communications. By integrating insights from prior research on electoral security and tenure, this study highlights the diversification of congressional communication methods and the asymmetric dynamics shaping their use. Ultimately, this analysis provides new perspectives on how Congress adapts its communication strategies to navigate the challenges of representation in a rapidly changing technological landscape.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145739877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effects of Seating Arrangements on Parliamentary Collaborations","authors":"Laurence Brandenberger, Teodora Bujaroska","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70049","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does parliamentary seating affect parliamentary behavior? In this paper, we dig into the question of whether spatial proximity affects the behavior of elected representatives. Using data from the 50th legislative period of the Swiss parliament and an inferential network model, we estimate the effects of different operationalizations of seating proximity and find that direct and indirect left and right neighbors tend to support each other's legislative work. However, when ideological and regional closeness (among other factors) is controlled for, the proximity effect remains small, pointing to the limited effects of seating proximity on legislative behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70049","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145739642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}