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Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes: Evidence from State Legislatures 党派治理与少数党否决权：来自州议会的证据
IF 1.4 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12449
Robert Oldham
{"title":"Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes: Evidence from State Legislatures","authors":"Robert Oldham","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12449","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12449","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is often argued that bipartisan lawmaking depends on minority legislative parties controlling institutional veto points through divided government and/or supermajority pivots. Using a new dataset of state legislative rollcall votes on tax increases—an issue where states vary in whether they require majority or supermajority votes—I assess (1) whether minority control of veto points is necessary for bipartisan policymaking and (2) whether there are greater levels of partisan governance when the majority controls all veto points. I find that partisan governance is more likely when the majority controls all vetoes. However, bipartisan policymaking is still the most common outcome even when institutional conditions are seemingly ideal for partisan governance. Interviews with state policymakers uncover various noninstitutional reasons for bipartisanship regardless of veto control. My findings suggest that while institutional rules can compel bipartisanship, they are just one of many reasons why the minority party participates in lawmaking.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12449","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139797685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes: Evidence from State Legislatures 党派治理与少数党否决权：来自州议会的证据
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12449
Robert Oldham
{"title":"Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes: Evidence from State Legislatures","authors":"Robert Oldham","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12449","url":null,"abstract":"It is often argued that bipartisan lawmaking depends on minority legislative parties controlling institutional veto points through divided government and/or supermajority pivots. Using a new dataset of state legislative rollcall votes on tax increases—an issue where states vary in whether they require majority or supermajority votes—I assess (1) whether minority control of veto points is necessary for bipartisan policymaking and (2) whether there are greater levels of partisan governance when the majority controls all veto points. I find that partisan governance is more likely when the majority controls all vetoes. However, bipartisan policymaking is still the most common outcome even when institutional conditions are seemingly ideal for partisan governance. Interviews with state policymakers uncover various noninstitutional reasons for bipartisanship regardless of veto control. My findings suggest that while institutional rules can compel bipartisanship, they are just one of many reasons why the minority party participates in lawmaking.","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139857547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Asymmetries in Potential for Partisan Gerrymandering 党派选区划分潜力的不对称性
IF 1.4 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12448
Nicholas Goedert, Robert Hildebrand, Laurel Travis, Matt Pierson
{"title":"Asymmetries in Potential for Partisan Gerrymandering","authors":"Nicholas Goedert,&nbsp;Robert Hildebrand,&nbsp;Laurel Travis,&nbsp;Matt Pierson","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12448","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article investigates the effectiveness of potential partisan gerrymandering of the US House of Representatives across a range of states. We use a heuristic algorithm to generate district maps that optimize for multiple objectives, including compactness, partisan benefit, and competitiveness. While partisan gerrymandering is highly effective for both sides, we find that the majority of states are moderately biased toward Republicans when optimized for either compactness or partisan benefit, meaning that Republican gerrymanders have the potential to be more effective. However, we also find that more densely populated and more heavily Hispanic states show less Republican bias or even Democratic bias. Additionally, we find that in almost all cases we can generate reasonably compact maps with very little sacrifice to partisan objectives through a mixed-objective function. This suggests that there is a strong potential for stealth partisan gerrymanders that are both compact and beneficial to one party. Nationwide, partisan gerrymandering is capable of swinging over 100 seats in the US House, even when compact districts are simultaneously sought.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12448","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142099907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Anti-Democratic Influence: The Effect of Citizens United on State Democratic Performance 反民主影响：联合花旗党对各州民主表现的影响
IF 1.4 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12447
Rachel Funk Fordham
{"title":"Anti-Democratic Influence: The Effect of Citizens United on State Democratic Performance","authors":"Rachel Funk Fordham","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12447","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12447","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does money in politics affect democratic performance? I study the effect of the Supreme Court's 2010 landmark decision in <i>Citizens United v. FEC</i>, which struck down existing state bans on independent campaign expenditures, on democracy in the U.S. states. Results from a difference-in-differences design indicate that the <i>Citizens United</i> ruling had a substantial negative effect on state democratic performance and that this effect is largely independent of the effect of Republican party control identified by previous research. The results suggest that unlimited political spending may pose a threat to the health of democracy in the United States.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139603859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Talking Like Opposition Parties? Electoral Proximity and Language Styles Employed by Coalition Partners in a Mixed Member Majoritarian System 像反对党那样说话？选举邻近性与混合成员多数制中联盟伙伴的语言风格
IF 1.4 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12446
Hideo Ishima
{"title":"Talking Like Opposition Parties? Electoral Proximity and Language Styles Employed by Coalition Partners in a Mixed Member Majoritarian System","authors":"Hideo Ishima","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12446","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12446","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Extant literature has shown that political parties that form a coalition government face one major dilemma; that is, they must govern together but fight elections separately. Thus, coalition members tend to commit to a differentiated strategy as an election approaches. However, existing research has mainly focused on empirical findings from countries with proportional representation and few measures for direct criticism from partners. In order to test the theory, this study examines parliamentary speeches from Japan's mixed member majoritarian context. It uses a supervised machine learning method for measuring confrontational attitudes toward governments irrespective of their ideologies. The results of this study show that on average, while a coalition partner may present a slightly hostile attitude toward governments in parliamentary speeches, this effect is not influenced by election proximity. This may imply that incentives for managing coalitions could differ in majoritarian-centered electoral systems.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138974003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Recorded Votes as Attention Booster: How Opposition Parties use Roll Calls and Nonrecorded Votes for Position Taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21 记录投票作为注意力的助推器：2017-21年德国联邦议院中反对党如何利用点名和无记录投票来表明立场
IF 1.4 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-12-10 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12442
Lukas Hohendorf, Ulrich Sieberer, Jonas Wenzig
{"title":"Recorded Votes as Attention Booster: How Opposition Parties use Roll Calls and Nonrecorded Votes for Position Taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21","authors":"Lukas Hohendorf,&nbsp;Ulrich Sieberer,&nbsp;Jonas Wenzig","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12442","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12442","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article investigates roll-call request and its effects on opposition-voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll-call votes (RCVs) as a position-taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–21), the analysis shows that RCVs are more likely on high-salience issues, more important motion types, and to some extent opposition motions. Voting conforms to the position-taking model as opposition parties are less likely to vote with the government on their own motions and more important motion types. However, opposition behavior does not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes suggesting that parties act consistently across all votes. Thus, RCVs provide valid measures for studying interparty competition in parliament despite their selective sampling properties.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12442","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138585101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Filibuster Rhetoric Informs Perceptions of Politicians 拉布演说如何影响人们对政治家的看法
IF 1.4 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12445
Kevin K. Banda, Joel Sievert
{"title":"How Filibuster Rhetoric Informs Perceptions of Politicians","authors":"Kevin K. Banda,&nbsp;Joel Sievert","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12445","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12445","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does rhetoric about the filibuster inform people's views of political figures? We argue that support or opposition to eliminating the filibuster conveys information to citizens that they can use to assess a politician's ideological position. This information can also be used when citizens form affective evaluations of politicians, but its effects depend on people's partisan identities. We use a preregistered survey experiment—along with a secondary analysis of cross-sectional survey data—to show that a candidate who says that the filibuster should be eliminated is viewed as being more liberal than a candidate who says that it should be protected or who says nothing. We further show that Democrats like candidates who use elimination rhetoric more than protection or no rhetoric while Republicans react in the opposite way. These results suggest that elite messaging about salient political institutions can fundamentally shape people's views of political figures.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138592771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Parliamentary Control of the Executive and the Duration of Government Formation 议会对行政部门的控制和政府组建的期限
IF 1.4 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12443
Lasse Aaskoven, Shane Martin
{"title":"Parliamentary Control of the Executive and the Duration of Government Formation","authors":"Lasse Aaskoven,&nbsp;Shane Martin","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12443","url":null,"abstract":"<p>One particularly striking difference between parliamentary democracies is the length of time it takes to form a government after a general election, with consequences for governability and democratic accountability. This study contributes to the literature on government formation duration by exploring whether parties find it more difficult to form a government when parliament has greater control over what the executive can do. All else equal, parliamentary control reduces cabinet autonomy, meaning parties face greater uncertainty as to whether they will be able to achieve their policy goals if they enter government. This institution-generated incomplete information exacerbates bargaining uncertainty and ultimately increases bargaining delays during government formation. Using newly collected data on two measures of parliamentary control – committee powers and budgetary powers – covering 36 non-presidential countries, we find that post-election government formation tends to take more time in countries where parliamentary control of the cabinet is stronger.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142099906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information and Confrontation in Legislative Oversight 立法监督中的信息与对抗
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-12-05 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12440
Ayse Eldes, Christian Fong, Kenneth Lowande
{"title":"Information and Confrontation in Legislative Oversight","authors":"Ayse Eldes,&nbsp;Christian Fong,&nbsp;Kenneth Lowande","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12440","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lsq.12440","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Committees can use oversight hearings to collect and communicate the information Congress needs to oversee the bureaucracy, but many worry that members instead focus on scoring political points by lambasting witnesses. We leverage the collective judgment of congressional staff to measure how exchanges between legislators and witnesses vary on two separable dimensions: information and confrontation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that confrontation crowds out information, we show that members of the president's party engage in less confrontational oversight and reveal no more or less information than their peers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12440","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138600886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
About the Authors 关于作者
IF 1.5 3区 社会学
Legislative Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-12-02 DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12393
{"title":"About the Authors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12393","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138473383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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