{"title":"Bundled Power: How Donors Value Procedural Powers in U.S. State Legislatures","authors":"Ayoung Chun","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70076","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I examine the extent to which interest groups attend to institutional rules and procedures of lawmaking by assessing how they reward legislators who hold different forms of procedural authority in U.S. state legislatures. Revisiting an influential attempt to gauge interest group interest in procedural power, I reassess how “committee assignment power” has been measured and interpreted and ask what donors reward when they give to legislators coded as holding appointment authority. The analysis focuses on contributions directed toward actors involved in committee organization rather than direct access to committee members. I show that the contribution premium associated with assignment authority is composition sensitive and concentrated in a subset of chambers and leadership positions rather than uniformly observed across legislatures. Because offices involved in committee organization frequently bundle multiple procedural capacities, estimated assignment effects are difficult to attribute to appointment authority alone. The results suggest that donors reward bundled leadership capacities that structure the legislative agenda rather than committee appointment authority in isolation. More broadly, commonly used institutional measures may collapse multiple levers of power into a single indicator, and campaign finance may reinforce procedural centralization within legislatures as well as shape policy outcomes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2026-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70076","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148281954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Samantha Register, Srinivas Parinandi, Alexandra A. Siegel
{"title":"Who Claims Fraud? Correlates of State Legislators' Voter Fraud Claims","authors":"Samantha Register, Srinivas Parinandi, Alexandra A. Siegel","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70069","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>State legislators play a key role in election administration, but have increasingly challenged the legitimacy of elections. Using a dataset of tweets from over 4200 state legislators, we examine the institutional, individual, and state-level factors associated with legislators' propensity to make electoral fraud claims from 2019 to 2022, a period characterized by heightened criticism of status quo electoral procedure. We find that Republican partisanship, state polarization, serving in a state with a higher nonwhite population, and belonging to the state's upper chamber are correlated with more frequent election fraud tweets. Meanwhile, legislative professionalism, committee leadership, unified government, and being a female legislator are associated with making fewer fraud claims. By shifting attention from Congress to state legislatures—institutions that directly oversee election rules and administration—we identify correlates of public contestation of electoral procedure among subnational elites.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148173725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Claiming and Blaming: How Minority Party Status Shapes Filibuster Framing in the U.S. Senate","authors":"Jessie E. Munson","doi":"10.1111/lsq.70067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70067","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Why do senators choose to talk about filibustering, a tool widely associated with obstruction and gridlock? This paper examines how senators strategically reference filibustering in official communications, focusing on two rhetorical frames: credit claiming and blaming. Using an original dataset of Senate press releases from the 109th through 118th Congresses, I show that filibuster rhetoric is structured primarily by party status: minority-party senators claim credit for obstruction, while majority-party senators assign blame. Individual-level factors such as electoral safety and ideological extremity play a limited role. Contrary to expectations, filibuster credit claiming has declined over time, while evidence of increased blaming is mixed. Additional analyses show that these patterns persist across institutional contexts, including unified and divided government, respond to changes in filibuster rules for judicial nominations, and shift within senators as party control changes. Filibuster rhetoric serves as a strategic tool for signaling resistance and shifting blame.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"51 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2026-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.70067","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148097831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}