Mechanisms of Checks and Balances: Appropriations, Congressional Committees, and Interbranch Conflict

Abstract

We study how committees influence policy outcomes in the context of appropriations. Since the birth of modern political science, the power of the purse has been recognized as a primary institutional check through which Congress constrains presidential ambitions. Despite the importance of committees and subcommittees in classic accounts of appropriations, recent developments raise questions about their relevance for contemporary legislative outcomes. We test the hypothesis that appropriations outcomes are less aligned with the president's request as the relevant subcommittee is more ideologically distant from the president. Using comprehensive new data on presidential budget requests and congressional appropriations for the U.S. federal government from 1972 to 2021, we find strong support for this expectation, particularly in the House. Our findings suggest that the composition of legislative committees affects policy outcomes and illustrate how the (sub)committee system helps Congress overcome its collective action problems to constrain the executive.