Harun Emre Yildiz, Sergey Morgulis-Yakushev, Ulf Holm, Mikael Eriksson
{"title":"Directionality matters: Board interlocks and firm internationalization","authors":"Harun Emre Yildiz, Sergey Morgulis-Yakushev, Ulf Holm, Mikael Eriksson","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1423","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1423","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines an understudied aspect of network relationships—that is, direction of relational ties. Tie direction is important since it can shape when and how firms can benefit from the international experience of other firms. We focus on a specific type of network relationship—that is, interlocking directorates, which provides a clinical context to study directionality. We show that, due to their higher familiarity, identification, and executive power, focal firm directors serving in other firms' boards (i.e., outgoing ties) are more beneficial for utilizing partners' international experience. However, outside directors sitting on the boards of focal firms (i.e., incoming ties) can bring more useful first-hand experience and facilitate international expansion once these ties get stronger. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>As they grow internationally, firms need to manage risks and uncertainties of doing business abroad. In this regard, they can potentially benefit from the international experience of other firms in their network. We show how firms can realize these benefits by means of interlocking ties (i.e., shared board memberships). To that end, we examine the directionality of interlocking ties. Specifically, we argue that a firm's ability to utilize partners' experience for its own international expansion is greater when its directors sit on the boards of other firms (so-called outgoing ties) compared to when other firms' directors sit on its own board (so-called incoming ties). However, experience coming through incoming ties is more effective for a firm's international expansion once these ties get stronger.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"13 1","pages":"90-110"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/gsj.1423","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43322813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ryan Krause, Juanyi Chen, Garry D. Bruton, Igor Filatotchev
{"title":"Chief executive officer power and initial public offering underpricing: Examining the influence of demand-side cultural power distance","authors":"Ryan Krause, Juanyi Chen, Garry D. Bruton, Igor Filatotchev","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1422","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1422","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Initial public offering (IPO) underpricing reflects the inability of early investors to capture the full value of an entrepreneurial firm. IPO firms can potentially limit underpricing by signaling wealth protection through lower chief executive officer (CEO) power. Such signaling is particularly challenging for many IPO firms, though, because for those doing business in high-power-distance cultures, CEO power can also signal wealth creation, making CEO power a mixed signal for IPO investors. Drawing on signaling theory, we argue that CEO power is positively associated with IPO underpricing, but this relationship weakens for IPO firms doing business in countries with high cultural power distance because the information signaled becomes less clear. The signaling impact of both CEO power and demand-side cultural power distance weakens, however, when underwriter reputation offers a substitute signal.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This research offers new knowledge for IPO corporate governance practitioners, such as entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, underwriters, and regulators. Specifically, our research demonstrates that the power dynamic in the upper echelons has implications for demand-side legitimacy or making U.S.-listed firms more legitimate with international customers. As a result, stockholders and securities analysts who balk at the consolidation of CEO power should consider the potential benefits that such consolidation of power might grant the firm when competing in different cultural environments associated with foreign markets.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"11 4","pages":"686-708"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41796343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Time to change lanes: How pro-market reforms affect informal ventures' formalization speed","authors":"David H. Weng, Seung-Hyun Lee, Yasuhiro Yamakawa","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1421","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1421","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We argue that pro-market reforms encourage informal ventures to obtain formal registration quickly by altering the relative costs and benefits of joining the formal sector. We furthermore contend that this reform effect is shaped by several contextual factors such that venture embeddedness and market position increase the costs of leaving the informal sector, weakening the effect of pro-market reforms. Although foreign competition may make the formal sector more competitive and dampen the effect of pro-market reforms, larger informal economy may induce informal ventures to stay put. Results based on a sample of multicountry ventures support our arguments, suggesting that pro-market reforms can speed up informal ventures' formalization processes.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze the relationship between pro-market reforms and informal ventures' formalization speed. We find that pro-market reforms compel informal entrepreneurs to seek the benefits and to move to the formal sector quickly. Also, more embedded ventures and ventures with larger market positions are less responsive to pro-market reforms as these ventures incur higher costs in leaving the informal sector. Since strong foreign competition makes the formal sector less attractive for nondominant entities, informal ventures may find pro-market reforms less attractive in countries with heightened foreign competition. Ventures in countries with more intense foreign competition are less susceptible to the effect of pro-market reforms. Overall, while pro-market reforms provide ample incentives to formalize, informal ventures are not uniformly incentivized to do so given these contingences.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"11 4","pages":"767-795"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48545246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael J. Leiblein, Marcus M. Larsen, Torben Pedersen
{"title":"Are governance mode and foreign location choices independent?","authors":"Michael J. Leiblein, Marcus M. Larsen, Torben Pedersen","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1420","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1420","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article explores the relationship between organizational governance and location choices. While the existing literature provides significant intuition regarding the factors that influence these choices, it often assumes that governance and location choice are independent from one another. This article tests the veracity of this assumption in the global semiconductor industry. We report evidence of significant correlations across choices regarding how to govern and where to locate production, evidence of a reciprocal relationship between governance and location choices, and evidence suggesting how interdependence between governance and location choices affects the stability of relationships highlighted by extant theories. We conclude with implications for future theoretical and empirical research based on the existence of these interdependent effects.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Managers face difficult choices when deciding how to organize the performance of an activity. They must choose whether to outsource an activity by balancing the potential benefits of a supplier's lower costs or knowledge against the costs of diminished coordination and control. They must also choose where to perform an activity by considering the benefits of locally bound expertise as well as potential costs associated with cultural, legal, and social barriers. While prior research has often addressed these issues by assuming that these choices are independent, this paper demonstrates that governance and location choices are interdependent and that each choice reciprocally affects the other. It concludes by suggesting managers utilize an expanded governance-location choice set when evaluating where and how to manage their core activities.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"12 2","pages":"273-307"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42933129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does fairness narrow the gap? Effect of procedural justice on MNE attention disparity","authors":"David H. Weng, Hsiang-Lin Cheng","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1415","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1415","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Earlier studies have suggested that multinational enterprise (MNE) subsidiaries may receive unequal attention from headquarters, but have not yet thoroughly examined either this issue or potential mechanisms that may ameliorate the situation. Our study contends that procedural justice helps bridge an MNE's attention gap as perceived by subsidiaries. We further posit that this proposed effect would be moderated by several contextual factors including subsidiary capability, subsidiary initiative, MNE internationalization, and MNE scope. An assembled sample of MNEs headquartered in Taiwan supports our predictions. These findings have important implications for both the attention-based view of the firm and headquarters–subsidiary relationships.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>MNEs often allocate unequal attention among their overseas subsidiaries. Yet the means of addressing this potential attention disparity remains underexplored. We contend that developing a set of fair, transparent, and unbiased procedures within an MNE can help address this issue. Results based on a sample of MNEs based in Taiwan support this argument. These analyses also suggest that the effect of procedural justice would be weakened when subsidiaries are more capable and demonstrate greater initiative. In contrast, the impact of procedural justice will be strengthened for highly internationalized MNEs. Our findings offer crucial practical implications for MNEs to allocate attention among and manage their subsidiaries.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"13 1","pages":"147-175"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/gsj.1415","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47978928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ivan Garrido, Sílvio Vasconcellos, Kadígia Faccin, Jefferson Marlon Monticelli, Caroline Carpenedo
{"title":"The moderating role of polycentric institutions in the relationship between effectuation/causation logics and corporate entrepreneur's decision-making processes","authors":"Ivan Garrido, Sílvio Vasconcellos, Kadígia Faccin, Jefferson Marlon Monticelli, Caroline Carpenedo","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1419","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1419","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study analyzes how firms respond to institutional polycentrism, a governance system that emerges from multiple and independent centers of power that interact to determine and regulate an evolutionary overarching comprehensive social system of rules. We propose that institutional polycentrism moderates corporate entrepreneurs' decision-making processes. We conducted a case study at a multinational corporation over four decades of internationalization using process data analysis. We found that institutional polycentrism determines a calibration between causation and effectuation logics. The study offers two contributions: (a) expanding the explanatory power of institutional polycentrism by understanding how it moderates the corporate entrepreneur's decision-making process in polycentric institutional contexts and (2) proposing a relatively novel contingency dimension of the effectuation versus causation and establishing new boundary conditions of the effectuation versus causation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study analyzes the decision-making process of corporate entrepreneurs of a multinational steel producer throughout its internationalization trajectory. The article highlights that decisions based on rules established with past experience are unsuitable in contexts characterized by a multiplicity of foreign institutional forces. The joint interaction of these forces on the firm induces corporate entrepreneurs to respond to such pressures under a new, more flexible, and experimental approach. Finally, the results indicate that institutional multiplicity generates a kind of calibration between these decision-making approaches, contributing to innovation processes in the company.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"11 4","pages":"740-766"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/gsj.1419","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46677656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lucio Fuentelsaz, Elisabet Garrido, Minerva González
{"title":"Speed of institutional change and subsidiary performance: The moderating impact of home and host country learning","authors":"Lucio Fuentelsaz, Elisabet Garrido, Minerva González","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1416","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1416","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This research examines the role played by home and host country learning in the relationship between the speed of institutional change and subsidiary performance. We posit a negative relationship between the speed of institutional change in the host country and subsidiary performance. We also argue that this relationship is contingent on the institutional learning that parent multinationals (MNEs) have previously attained in other countries. By integrating the dynamic institution-based view and the organizational learning literature, our analysis highlights the key role that abilities and skills developed by MNEs to face rapid institutional changes have on the host countries in which they operate. We test our theoretical model using a sample of 342 subsidiaries from 68 MNEs operating in emerging and developed economies during 2001–2017.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>MNEs regularly face institutional changes in both home and host countries. However, institutions evolve at different speeds. According to previous studies, the performance of subsidiaries is threatened when institutional changes happen quickly. MNEs need to develop the ability to help their subsidiaries face changes immediately and with no loss of performance. Our research shows that MNEs can learn from prior rapid institutional changes in the home and host countries and transfer this knowledge to their subsidiaries so that they can be more equipped to deal with it in the future.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"12 1","pages":"163-195"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/gsj.1416","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46905395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
William Wales, Galina Shirokova, Tatiana Beliaeva, Evelyn Micelotta, Louis Marino
{"title":"The impact of institutions on the entrepreneurial orientation-performance relationship","authors":"William Wales, Galina Shirokova, Tatiana Beliaeva, Evelyn Micelotta, Louis Marino","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1418","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1418","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this study, we theorize how regulatory, normative, and cognitive institutions moderate the entrepreneurial orientation (EO)-performance relationship. We test our hypotheses using data from entrepreneurial ventures in 31 countries. In countries with well-developed legal and financial institutions and where entrepreneurship is normatively supported, entrepreneurs achieve higher returns from an entrepreneurial strategic posture. Institutions positively moderate this relationship through increased resource access, a critical element for innovative entrepreneurial strategies. The effect of institutions is further moderated by the stage of economic development. We advance our understanding of EO by exploring country-level institutional boundary conditions to its value and extend institutional theory through evidence of its moderating effects and interactions with economic development.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A country's institutional environment influences the extent to which firms benefit from being entrepreneurially orientated (EO). Based on data from 31 countries, we show that entrepreneurs receive higher returns from an entrepreneurial strategic posture in countries where institutions—legal and financial systems, entrepreneurship education, and cultural support for entrepreneurship—are more developed. Well-developed institutions increase returns from EO indirectly by enhancing the ability of firms to access the resources needed to experiment and generate value from their strategic orientation. The influence of institutions on the EO-performance relationship further depends upon the stage of economic development of a country, with institutional impact being more pronounced within “efficiency-driven” economies compared to more developed “innovation-driven” economies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"11 4","pages":"656-685"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/gsj.1418","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47262858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The dark side of informal institutions: How crime, corruption, and informality influence foreign firms' commitment","authors":"Juan Bu, Yadong Luo, Huan Zhang","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1417","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1417","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study focuses on three prevalent societal issues—crime, corruption, and informal sector—that constitute the dark side of informal institutions in developing countries. We argue that the dark side of informal institutions has the potential to impede foreign firms' desire and ability to commit to the host countries. The effects of these three forms on foreign firms differ depending on the type of local commitment. Analyzing the World Bank data of foreign firms in 36 developing countries, we find that (a) host country corruption is stronger in deterring foreign firms' long-term investment, (b) host country informality is stronger in obstructing foreign firms' innovation output, and (c) host country crime is stronger in undermining foreign firms' production capacity utilization. Our analysis also shows that host country's efficient regulatory institutions and foreign firms' non-market-seeking motive are two important countervailing forces that attenuate the negative effects of the dark side of informal institutions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Foreign firms investing in developing countries need to deal with some illegal yet widespread practices in these countries. Specifically, crime, corruption, and informal sector represent the most prevalent and important societal issues that exert informal constraints on foreign firms. This study examines how the negative informal institutions influence foreign firms. Our cross-country analysis using the World Bank data shows that, among the three negative informal institutions, corruption has a stronger effect in deterring foreign firms' investment commitment, informal sector has a stronger effect in obstructing foreign firms' innovation commitment, and crime has a stronger effect in undermining foreign firms' production commitment. Moreover, these negative effects will be alleviated when the developing country has efficient regulatory institutions or when the foreign firm has a low market dependence on the developing country. Our findings provide implications for managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing in developing countries and offer suggestions for policymakers on how to improve the institutional environment for foreign investment.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"12 2","pages":"209-244"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49457686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aten Zaandam, Dinesh Hasija, Alan E. Ellstrand, Michael E. Cummings
{"title":"Founder and professional CEOs' performance differences across institutions: A meta-analytic study","authors":"Aten Zaandam, Dinesh Hasija, Alan E. Ellstrand, Michael E. Cummings","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1414","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1414","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the effect of institutions on performance differences between founder and professional CEOs. We do so by integrating an institutional perspective with findings from the literatures on CEOs' managerial discretion and cognition. Specifically, we theorize that in informal institutional environments characterized by high power distance and individualism and in formal institutional contexts characterized by low regulatory and political quality, differences in cognitive styles lead founders to enjoy performance advantages over professional CEOs. The results of our meta-analysis of 117 studies across 22 countries conducted between 1987 and 2020 support our predictions. We conclude by discussing the implications for research and policy regarding institutional development and the governance of entrepreneurial firms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We develop a framework to examine the influence of the institutional environment on performance differences between founder and professional CEOs. Our results show that founder CEOs experience performance advantages across high discretionary institutional settings when compared with professional CEOs. Boards may use this information to guide their recommendations or decisions related to founder CEO succession or retention. Moreover, firms pursuing international strategies such as joint ventures may also use this information as one of their search criteria while shortlisting their potential prospect partners.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"11 4","pages":"620-655"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/gsj.1414","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45553353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}