Time to change lanes: How pro-market reforms affect informal ventures' formalization speed

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
David H. Weng, Seung-Hyun Lee, Yasuhiro Yamakawa
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Research Summary

We argue that pro-market reforms encourage informal ventures to obtain formal registration quickly by altering the relative costs and benefits of joining the formal sector. We furthermore contend that this reform effect is shaped by several contextual factors such that venture embeddedness and market position increase the costs of leaving the informal sector, weakening the effect of pro-market reforms. Although foreign competition may make the formal sector more competitive and dampen the effect of pro-market reforms, larger informal economy may induce informal ventures to stay put. Results based on a sample of multicountry ventures support our arguments, suggesting that pro-market reforms can speed up informal ventures' formalization processes.

Managerial Summary

We analyze the relationship between pro-market reforms and informal ventures' formalization speed. We find that pro-market reforms compel informal entrepreneurs to seek the benefits and to move to the formal sector quickly. Also, more embedded ventures and ventures with larger market positions are less responsive to pro-market reforms as these ventures incur higher costs in leaving the informal sector. Since strong foreign competition makes the formal sector less attractive for nondominant entities, informal ventures may find pro-market reforms less attractive in countries with heightened foreign competition. Ventures in countries with more intense foreign competition are less susceptible to the effect of pro-market reforms. Overall, while pro-market reforms provide ample incentives to formalize, informal ventures are not uniformly incentivized to do so given these contingences.

是时候改道了:亲市场改革如何影响非正式企业的正规化速度
我们认为,亲市场改革通过改变加入正规部门的相对成本和收益,鼓励非正规企业迅速获得正式注册。我们进一步认为,这种改革效果是由几个背景因素形成的,如风险嵌入性和市场地位增加了离开非正规部门的成本,削弱了亲市场改革的效果。虽然外国竞争可能使正规部门更具竞争力并抑制亲市场改革的效果,但较大的非正规经济可能促使非正规企业原地不动。基于跨国企业样本的结果支持了我们的论点,表明亲市场改革可以加速非正式企业的正规化进程。本文分析了市场化改革与非正规企业正规化速度之间的关系。我们发现,亲市场改革迫使非正规企业家寻求利益,并迅速转向正规部门。此外,更深入的企业和拥有更大市场地位的企业对亲市场改革的反应更弱,因为这些企业在离开非正规部门时会产生更高的成本。由于激烈的外国竞争使正式部门对非主导实体的吸引力降低,非正式企业可能会发现,在外国竞争加剧的国家,亲市场改革的吸引力降低。在外国竞争更激烈的国家,企业不太容易受到亲市场改革的影响。总的来说,虽然亲市场改革为正规化提供了充分的激励,但考虑到这些偶然因素,非正式企业并没有得到一致的激励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
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