{"title":"Global strategy in a changing world: Why we need classic theories","authors":"Liena Kano, Catherine Welch","doi":"10.1002/gsj.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In their Point article, Van Assche and Lindner argue that recent geopolitical developments require revisiting theoretical assumptions underlying global strategy research. We question both the scope of the empirical changes they describe and the implication that existing frameworks have become inadequate. Rising state activism is significant but uneven across countries and sectors. Calls for revising core assumptions risk conflating contextual shifts with theoretical limitations. We argue that established theoretical traditions remain valuable when applied with conceptual precision and empirical discipline. We illustrate this using new internalization theory to explain firm–state interaction under geopolitical volatility. We then outline five pathways for engaging with existing theory to address empirical shifts, drawing on concrete examples of classic strategy and international business theories.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Today's global business environment is more politically charged and less predictable than in recent decades. Governments are intervening more actively, geopolitical tensions are reshaping supply chains, and multinational enterprises (MNEs) face growing pressure from regulators and society. Our study argues that these changes do not make existing global strategy frameworks obsolete. Rather, they make them more necessary. Established ideas continue to help managers organize cross-border operations under uncertainty, manage complex interdependencies with governments and partners, and respond strategically to increasingly turbulent environments. The practical message is that MNE managers do not need an entirely new toolkit to navigate current disruption. In their strategic planning, managers need to apply existing strategic tools more carefully, broadly, and consistently.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"16 3","pages":"330-356"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/gsj.70028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148783681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"FACTs about theorizing on global strategy amid geopolitical tensions","authors":"Torben Pedersen, Grazia D. Santangelo","doi":"10.1002/gsj.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The geopolitical turmoil of recent decades has heightened uncertainty for multinational enterprises and raised the question whether foundational theories in global strategy retain explanatory power. This article frames a Point-Counterpoint addressing this question. We situate the debate in the field's reflection on the timeliness of global strategy theories, examine seven foundational theories, and introduce the FACTs about theorizing on global strategy amid geopolitical tensions: four changing contextual conditions around state intervention, which is now Fast and Active, unfolds through distinct Channels, and pursues precise strategic Targets. While the Point suggests that geopolitics requires a major rethinking of existing theory, and the Counterpoint argues existing theories remain valid, we take a third path and offer FACTs as a roadmap for extending existing theories in the field.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Recent geopolitical upheavals are reshaping the environment for multinational enterprises. This article frames an ongoing debate on whether the foundational theories of global strategy still apply and proposes the FACTs of state intervention framework to help managers navigate the new context. State intervention has become Fast, Active (states as strategic players, not just rule-setters), operating through subtle Channels beyond formal regulation, and pursuing precise Targets in strategic sectors. For managers, this means political feasibility increasingly overrides economic efficiency in entry decisions; reputation and Environmental Social and Governance considerations reshape make-or-buy choices; conflicting jurisdictional demands constrain global architecture; digitalization questions the need for physical foreign assets; and within-country subcultures matter more than national averages. Global strategy can help managers reassess their strategies built on assumptions of an integrated, rule-based, efficiency-oriented world order, and prepare for fragmented, security-driven competition.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"16 3","pages":"287-301"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148785240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geopolitics and global strategy: Making money under anarchy","authors":"Daniel J. Blake, Srividya Jandhyala, Quan Li","doi":"10.1002/gsj.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Multinational firms conduct cross-border trade and investment in a world of anarchy, where nation-states must secure their survival in the absence of a world government. We develop a <i>geopolitical-economic order</i> (GEO) framework to argue that the extent of geopolitical competition incentivizes states to create one of two types of economic order: a market-based order built on <i>laissez-faire</i> and mutually beneficial voluntary exchanges, and a state-based order focused on state power and government intervention in the economy. Different orders shape the institutional environment for firms' cross-border activities in unique ways, leading to distinct sources of competitive advantage and market and non-market strategies. When the status quo level of geopolitical competition is disrupted, the prevailing and future state–market order becomes uncertain, forcing firms to prioritize strategic flexibility.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Countries exist within an international system with no world government to safeguard their interests. To ensure their nations security, governments prioritize geopolitics. When governments perceive a greater threat to their countries and heightened geopolitical competition, they are more willing to intervene in the affairs of multinational enterprises (MNEs), thereby increasing transaction costs. However, when geopolitical competition is more muted, governments may constrain themselves to promote cross-border investments by lowering barriers to entry, limiting discrimination against foreign firms, securing MNEs' property rights, and aligning regulations. Thus, geopolitics can foster two distinct types of economic “order.” In a transitory state, however, firms cannot determine the prevailing state–market relationship. Knowing which order a firm operates in is crucial for managers because different orders reward different strategies and sources of competitive advantage.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"16 3","pages":"259-286"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/gsj.70022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148783454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When governments act as strategists: Geopolitical turmoil and global strategy theory","authors":"Ari Van Assche, Thomas Lindner","doi":"10.1002/gsj.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The resurgence of geopolitical rivalry is challenging core assumptions of global strategy theory. Long-standing views that economic interdependence is inherently beneficial, governments act as rule setters, multinational enterprises operate autonomously, and market and political strategy are separate no longer capture today's international business environment. We argue that, in an era of politicized interdependence, governments increasingly act as system-level strategists, using economic statecraft to shape multinational enterprises and global value chains in pursuit of economic security. Consequently, economic interdependence has become a source of both prosperity and strategic vulnerability, firm autonomy is constrained by government priorities, and competitive advantage depends on integrating market and political strategy. We develop a framework distinguishing strategic sectors characterized by state co-strategizing from non-strategic sectors where market logics continue to dominate.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article argues that recent geopolitical tensions are reshaping how multinational companies operate globally. Traditionally, global strategy theories assumed that governments mainly created stable rules while firms independently pursued efficiency and growth. The paper shows that this assumption no longer fully holds. Especially in strategic sectors, governments use public policy actions to reshape international business with the aim of strengthening their country's economic security. For managers in strategic sectors, this means that geopolitical considerations cannot merely be treated as an external risk managed by compliance or government affairs teams. They must more deeply integrate their political strategies with their competitive strategy.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"16 3","pages":"302-329"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2026-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/gsj.70026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148784902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protecting CSR-based reputation abroad: Intra-firm trade as a governance mechanism","authors":"Jae Chul Jung, Yoonjeoung Heo, Unjung Whang","doi":"10.1002/gsj.70002","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates how multinational enterprises' (MNEs') commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects intra-firm trade in international subsidiaries. While CSR-committed MNEs need to protect their reputation, intra-firm trade can facilitate monitoring and coordinating the behavior of MNEs' international subsidiaries. Such governance functions help these MNEs mitigate challenges related to bounded rationality and reliability, ultimately reducing governance costs. Thus, we expect CSR-committed MNEs to be more likely to engage in intra-firm trade in their international subsidiaries. We further predict that the positive relationship is contingent upon host country corruption and MNE alliance experience, which may amplify or mitigate the levels of bounded rationality and reliability, respectively. We tested our theories using Korean MNE data during the 2006–2013 period and found empirical support.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>While MNEs are increasingly embracing CSR, CSR's impact on MNE governance choices (particularly in international subsidiaries) is not fully understood. This study proposes that intra-firm trade serves as both formal and informal governance mechanisms which protect the CSR-built reputation of MNEs internationally. Our analysis of Korean MNE data shows that MNEs' CSR commitment increases intra-firm trade in international subsidiaries. This effect is pronounced in corrupt host countries but is attenuated in MNEs with more alliance experience. Our findings suggest that MNEs' CSR-built reputation should be protected by preventing irresponsible behavior in their international subsidiaries. Additionally, this study underscores that intra-firm trade plays a pivotal role as a governance tool for MNEs.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"39-65"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146136379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership discrimination and outward FDI by China's privately-owned enterprises","authors":"Hongbin Tan, Zhaowei Chen, Bin Hao, Andrew Delios","doi":"10.1002/gsj.70001","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We introduce the concept of ownership discrimination to better understand the outward FDI (OFDI) of privately owned enterprises (POEs) from transition economies. In a transition economy, POEs may perceive ownership-based discrimination and thus suffer disadvantages in domestic market competition. Such perceived ownership-based discrimination could motivate POEs to engage in OFDI as a strategic response to the resulting disadvantages. We test this idea using a sample of POEs from 31 provinces in China. We find a positive relationship between perceived ownership discrimination and POEs' engagement in OFDI. This relationship is weaker for POEs with membership in political organizations that help them obtain benefits that counter the negative impact of ownership discrimination.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Firms may face institutional misalignment and, consequently, competitive disadvantages in their home country. Our study helps managers identify an important type of institutional misalignment for POEs in transition economies, which we call ownership-based discrimination. We argue that POEs can engage in OFDI as a strategic response to address the disadvantages in their domestic market caused by ownership discrimination. Based on the experiences and decisions of POEs in China, we see how such ownership-based discrimination leads to more OFDI by these firms. One action POEs can take is to develop stronger connections in the local market through membership in political organizations, which helps counter the negative impact of ownership-based discrimination.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"66-94"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146139436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefano Franco, Alfredo Valentino, Valentina Marano, Matteo Caroli
{"title":"Governing sustainability in multinational companies: Headquarter-subunit strategic alignment and control mechanisms","authors":"Stefano Franco, Alfredo Valentino, Valentina Marano, Matteo Caroli","doi":"10.1002/gsj.70007","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We contribute to extant research on subunit sustainability governance by introducing the concept of sustainability-specific strategic alignment, that is, the pre-implementation degree of similarity in importance assigned by headquarters (HQ) and subunits to sustainability issues. We theorize and find that subunit-perceived divergence between HQ's and local stakeholders' priorities undermines alignment, clarifying why early attention alignment can stall sustainability diffusion even without implementation frictions. We furthermore examine the moderating effect of three HQ's control mechanisms (i.e., monitoring, direct management, and resource control), and find that direct management attenuates alignment loss even in high divergence contexts, whereas monitoring and resource control often fall short or backfire. Findings show that control mechanisms are not uniformly effective and must be tailored to subunits' agency problems and local contexts.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We argue that effective sustainability governance requires headquarters (HQ) and subunits to similarly prioritize sustainability issues. Our research shows that this sustainability-specific alignment depends, in part, on the extent to which HQs' sustainability priorities reflect those of local stakeholders. When this perceived divergence is high, alignment suffers. We examine how HQ can respond through three control mechanisms: monitoring, direct management, and resource control. We find that only direct management supports alignment under high divergence. These findings highlight that not all control tools are equally effective and that multinational companies need to carefully manage sustainability goals across borders to ensure coherent and credible sustainability efforts across their subunits' networks.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"3-38"},"PeriodicalIF":4.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146139780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}