Common ownership and competitive dissimilarity: A global perspective on competition and institutional ownership

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Philip J. Steinberg, Jan C. Hennig, Jana Oehmichen, Judith Heigermoser
{"title":"Common ownership and competitive dissimilarity: A global perspective on competition and institutional ownership","authors":"Philip J. Steinberg,&nbsp;Jan C. Hennig,&nbsp;Jana Oehmichen,&nbsp;Judith Heigermoser","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1519","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Summary</h3>\n \n <p>Research highlights that common institutional ownership (an investor owning publicly traded shares in two rival firms) can reduce rivals' incentives to compete. So far, this literature focused on domestic market competition. However, competition also arises in global markets, and common owners invest outside their home countries. We integrate the perspectives of global market competition and cross-national distance into a model of shared principals with rival agents and argue for a positive effect of common ownership on rivals' competitive dissimilarity in global markets. Moreover, we argue that the competitive intensity in joint regions amplifies, and the cross-national distance between common owners and their firms mitigates this effect. We find support for our theorizing using a multi-industry dataset with 1574 of the largest firms worldwide.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Managerial Summary</h3>\n \n <p>When investors hold shares in two competing companies, it can reduce how aggressively those rivals compete. To avoid direct competition, these companies often adopt divergent strategic actions. Our research shows that this dynamic extends to how competitors behave in international markets. We also identify key boundary conditions to this effect: The effect weakens when competition within shared markets decreases and when the distance between the owned rivals and their common investor increases. For managers of globally operating companies, this highlights the need to consider not just competitors' strategies but also their ownership structure. Overlapping ownership could significantly influence competitive dynamics in global markets by shaping competitors' strategic approaches.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"94-129"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/gsj.1519","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Strategy Journal","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/gsj.1519","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Summary

Research highlights that common institutional ownership (an investor owning publicly traded shares in two rival firms) can reduce rivals' incentives to compete. So far, this literature focused on domestic market competition. However, competition also arises in global markets, and common owners invest outside their home countries. We integrate the perspectives of global market competition and cross-national distance into a model of shared principals with rival agents and argue for a positive effect of common ownership on rivals' competitive dissimilarity in global markets. Moreover, we argue that the competitive intensity in joint regions amplifies, and the cross-national distance between common owners and their firms mitigates this effect. We find support for our theorizing using a multi-industry dataset with 1574 of the largest firms worldwide.

Managerial Summary

When investors hold shares in two competing companies, it can reduce how aggressively those rivals compete. To avoid direct competition, these companies often adopt divergent strategic actions. Our research shows that this dynamic extends to how competitors behave in international markets. We also identify key boundary conditions to this effect: The effect weakens when competition within shared markets decreases and when the distance between the owned rivals and their common investor increases. For managers of globally operating companies, this highlights the need to consider not just competitors' strategies but also their ownership structure. Overlapping ownership could significantly influence competitive dynamics in global markets by shaping competitors' strategic approaches.

Abstract Image

共同所有权与竞争差异性:竞争与机构所有权的全球视角
研究强调,共同的机构所有权(投资者拥有两家竞争对手的公开交易股票)可以降低竞争对手的竞争动机。到目前为止,这些文献主要集中在国内市场竞争。然而,全球市场也出现了竞争,共同所有者在本国以外进行投资。我们将全球市场竞争和跨国距离的观点整合到一个与竞争代理人共享委托人的模型中,并论证了共同所有权对竞争对手在全球市场上的竞争差异性的积极影响。此外,我们认为联合地区的竞争强度会被放大,而共同所有者与其企业之间的跨国距离会缓解这种效应。我们使用全球1574家最大公司的多行业数据集来支持我们的理论。当投资者持有两家竞争公司的股票时,可以降低竞争对手的激烈程度。为了避免直接竞争,这些公司往往采取不同的战略行动。我们的研究表明,这种动态延伸到竞争对手在国际市场上的行为方式。我们还确定了这种效应的关键边界条件:当共享市场内的竞争减少,以及拥有的竞争对手与其共同投资者之间的距离增加时,这种效应就会减弱。对于全球运营公司的管理者来说,这突显出不仅需要考虑竞争对手的战略,还需要考虑它们的所有权结构。重叠所有权可以通过塑造竞争对手的战略方法,显著影响全球市场的竞争动态。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信