Group Decision and Negotiation最新文献_第2页

COMB: Scalable Concession-Driven Opponent Models Using Bayesian Learning for Preference Learning in Bilateral Multi-Issue Automated Negotiation COMB：利用贝叶斯学习在双边多问题自动谈判中进行偏好学习的可扩展让步驱动型对手模型

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09889-7

Shengbo Chang, Katsuhide Fujita

{"title":"COMB: Scalable Concession-Driven Opponent Models Using Bayesian Learning for Preference Learning in Bilateral Multi-Issue Automated Negotiation","authors":"Shengbo Chang, Katsuhide Fujita","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09889-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09889-7","url":null,"abstract":"Learning an opponent’s preferences in bilateral multi-issue automated negotiations can lead to more favorable outcomes. However, existing opponent models can fail in negotiation contexts when their assumptions about opponent behaviors differ from actual behavior patterns. Although integrating broader behavioral assumptions into these models could be beneficial, it poses a challenge because the models are designed with specific assumptions. Therefore, this study proposes an adaptable opponent model that integrates a general behavioral assumption. Specifically, the proposed model uses Bayesian learning (BL), which can apply various behavioral assumptions by considering the opponent’s entire bidding sequence. However, this BL model is computationally infeasible for multi-issue negotiations. Hence, current BL models often impose constraints on their hypothesis space, but these constraints about the utility function’s shape significantly sacrifice accuracy. This study presents a novel scalable BL model that relaxes these constraints to improve accuracy while maintaining linear time complexity by separately learning each parameter of a utility function. Furthermore, we introduce a general assumption that the opponent’s bidding strategy follows a concession-based pattern to enhance adaptability to various negotiation contexts. We explore three likelihood function options to implement this assumption effectively. By incorporating these options into the proposed scalable model, we develop three scalable concession-driven opponent models using Bayesian learning (COMB). Experiments across 45 negotiation domains using 15 basic agents and 15 finalists from the automated negotiating agents competition demonstrate the proposed scalable model’s higher accuracy than existing scalable models. COMB models show higher adaptability to various negotiation contexts than state-of-the-art models.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141165451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Maximum Utility Consensus with Inequity Aversion in Social Network Group Decision Making 社会网络群体决策中的最大效用共识与不公平厌恶

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09887-9

Yangjingjing Zhang, Xia Chen, Mengting Gao, Yucheng Dong

引用次数: 0

A Novel Consensus and Dissent Framework Under Grey Preference Based on the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution for Two Decision Makers 基于两个决策者冲突解决图模型的灰色偏好下共识与异议新框架

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-05-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09882-0

Jinmuzi Zhang, Haiyan Xu, Ginger Y. Ke

引用次数: 0

Confidence and Outcome Expectations in Bilateral Negotiations–A Dynamic Model 双边谈判中的信心和结果预期--一个动态模型

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09886-w

Rudolf Vetschera, Luis C. Dias

{"title":"Confidence and Outcome Expectations in Bilateral Negotiations–A Dynamic Model","authors":"Rudolf Vetschera, Luis C. Dias","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09886-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09886-w","url":null,"abstract":"This work proposes and studies a dynamic model of two bargaining parties exchanging offers over time, considering their confidence about the share of the “pie” they obtain, which translates into expectations regarding the outcome of the bargaining process. The model predicts the sequence of offers as well as the final agreement for given confidence parameters. A mathematical analysis of the model shows the outcome is an Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution with exponents determined by the bargainers’ confidence. Moreover, a compensation effect can be found between confidence and risk aversion. This work also considers that confidence levels of bargainers might change during the negotiation, and we conduct a comprehensive simulation study to analyze the effect of such changes. Through Monte-Carlo simulation, we show that a bargainer is better off if its confidence increases, but the advantage is lost if the other party’s confidence increases in a similar way. In that case, concessions are smaller and negotiations last longer. Changing confidence parameters make the outcome harder to predict, as it will depend more on the final confidence than the initial one. The simulations also show that the average size of concessions, and therefore the final agreement, depend not only on whether confidence increases or decreases, but also on the change rate, with stronger effects observed when change accelerates towards the end of the process.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140832250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations 二人公平分配加法估值

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-04-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09885-x

D. Marc Kilgour, Rudolf Vetschera

引用次数: 0

Correction to: Concept Design Evaluation of Sustainable Product–Service Systems: A QFD–TOPSIS Integrated Framework with Basic Uncertain Linguistic Information 更正：可持续产品服务系统的概念设计评估：带有基本不确定语言信息的 QFD-TOPSIS 综合框架

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-04-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09884-y

Qiang Yang, Zhen-Song Chen, Jiang-Hong Zhu, Luis Martínez, W. Pedrycz, M. Skibniewski

引用次数: 0

Determination of a Representative Collective Value Function Through a Value Function-Based Consensus-Reaching Process 通过基于价值函数的达成共识过程确定具有代表性的集体价值函数

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09883-z

Kun Zhou, Zaiwu Gong, Xiaoqing Chen, Roman Słowiński

{"title":"Determination of a Representative Collective Value Function Through a Value Function-Based Consensus-Reaching Process","authors":"Kun Zhou, Zaiwu Gong, Xiaoqing Chen, Roman Słowiński","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09883-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09883-z","url":null,"abstract":"Consensus-reaching among decision-makers (DMs) is an important prerequisite for effective group decision-making. Determining a collective value function that is recognized by major DMs is new in consensus research. We are approaching this problem by adopting the preference disaggregation analysis (PDA) to construct a novel consensus-reaching process (CRP). More precisely, we define the value function that can restore the preference information of all DMs as the consensus value function, and determine all such value functions by the PDA method. A consensus discriminant model is constructed to determine whether DMs can reach a consensus. Considering the adjustment cost of DMs, the minimum cost consensus model, and the minimum cost inconsistency elimination model, are constructed by introducing estimation errors and 0–1 variables, respectively, thus assisting DMs to reach a consensus. Furthermore, in the process of selecting a representative collective value function from the consensus space for subsequent decision analysis, a lexicographic optimization process is applied to convert the multi-objective programming problem of DMs’ individual requirements for the collective value function into a multi-stage single-objective programming problem. This study provides a new concept of consensus and extends the classic minimum cost consensus model to the case of value functions. Finally, an illustrative example showing the proposed CRP in action is presented, while conducting sensitivity analysis to explore the impact of parameter changes on the model.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140561990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Group Risky Choice and Resource Allocation Under Social Comparison Effects 社会比较效应下的群体风险选择和资源分配

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09875-z

Xia Chen, Yucheng Dong, Ying He

{"title":"Group Risky Choice and Resource Allocation Under Social Comparison Effects","authors":"Xia Chen, Yucheng Dong, Ying He","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09875-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09875-z","url":null,"abstract":"In a decision-making problem where a group must select an action from risky lotteries to receive a payoff that needs to be distributed among the group members, the group’s external risky choice and internal resource allocation emerge as two critical and interrelated subproblems. Individuals unconsciously exhibit social comparison behavior in many group contexts, profoundly impacting their payoff preferences. In this study, we first formulate a novel group resource allocation model and explore how the allocation equality of group resource is influenced by social comparisons. Particularly, we discuss the non-dictatorship condition under social comparison effects, which guarantees an extreme case of group resource allocation, i.e., “winner-take-all,” does not appear. Subsequently, we investigate the group risky choice under the effects of social comparison. The main results show that (1) introducing social comparison effects can increase allocation equality when loss aversion is high but decrease allocation equality when loss aversion is low, and (2) the classical risk sharing rule still holds in the group under social comparison effects, but introducing social comparison effects will lead to the group being more risk averse.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140324757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An Integrated Approach to Preferential Voting Models with Variable Weights for Rank Positions 排名位置权重可变的优先投票模型综合方法

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-03-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09874-0

Byeong Seok Ahn

{"title":"An Integrated Approach to Preferential Voting Models with Variable Weights for Rank Positions","authors":"Byeong Seok Ahn","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09874-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09874-0","url":null,"abstract":"In a ranked voting system, voters select a subset of candidates and rank them from most to least preferred. Data envelopment analysis (DEA)-based voting models, among others, are used to determine the rank-position weights most favorable for each candidate, with the goal of achieving the highest aggregate score. However, concerns have been raised about the weights assigned to each rank position, as well as the potential for rank reversal of some candidates resulting from changes in votes earned by other candidates. To address these issues, some authors have developed two improved models. These models aim to incorporate the constraints of candidates that are not being evaluated into a single restriction, preventing inefficient candidates from influencing the order of efficient candidates. Moreover, these models treat the parameters used to make the distance between successive ranks as variable weights, and calculate average efficiency scores of candidates while considering the entire range of parameters. In this study, we revisit the two improved models and explore an alternative approach based on results from linear algebra and convex analysis, which is more intuitive and easier to understand. Furthermore, we provide closed-form optimal solutions for DEA-based voting models that share the common goal of maximizing the distance between successive ranks while considering both efficiency-related and weight constraints. The analysis of these four models offers a better understanding of their similarities and differences.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140299800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Coalition Stability in International Environmental Matching Agreements 国际环境匹配协议中的联盟稳定性

IF 3 4区管理学

Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-03-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09878-w

Charlotte Süring, Hans-Peter Weikard

{"title":"Coalition Stability in International Environmental Matching Agreements","authors":"Charlotte Süring, Hans-Peter Weikard","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09878-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09878-w","url":null,"abstract":"This study presents empirically calibrated simulations of three different variants of environmental matching agreements aimed at reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. We determine whether matching agreements can produce larger stable coalitions and increase abatement contributions and payoffs as compared to standard agreements. The matching agreements we analyze feature uniform matching rates by which coalition members match the unconditional contributions of (i) the other coalition members, (ii) all other players, or (iii) only non-members, while non-members do not commit to any matching and maximize their individual payoffs. The simulation considers twelve asymmetric world regions with linear abatement benefits and quadratic costs, calibrated based on the STACO 3 model, and uses emissions data from the shared socioeconomic pathways database. We find that the first variant of the matching game fails to produce any stable coalitions and thus performs worse than the standard agreement that produces a stable two-player coalition. The second variant produces a stable grand coalition and significantly increases the abatement and payoff levels beyond the non-cooperative Nash baseline. Partial coalitions are unstable in this game. The third variant produces a two-player coalition similar to the standard coalition formation game, but with different members and higher abatement and payoff levels due to the matching mechanism.","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140203828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0