国际环境匹配协议中的联盟稳定性

IF 3.6 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Charlotte Süring, Hans-Peter Weikard
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究对旨在减少全球温室气体排放的环境匹配协议的三种不同变体进行了经验校准模拟。与标准协议相比,我们确定匹配协议是否能产生更大的稳定联盟,并增加减排贡献和回报。我们分析的匹配协议具有统一匹配率的特点,即联盟成员匹配(i)其他联盟成员、(ii)所有其他参与者或(iii)仅非成员的无条件贡献,而非成员不承诺任何匹配,并使其个人收益最大化。模拟考虑了 12 个非对称世界区域,其减排收益为线性,成本为二次方,根据 STACO 3 模型进行了校准,并使用了共享社会经济路径数据库中的排放数据。我们发现,匹配博弈的第一个变体无法产生任何稳定的联盟,因此表现不如产生稳定的双人联盟的标准协议。第二个变体产生了一个稳定的大联盟,并大大提高了减排量和报酬水平,超过了非合作的纳什基线。在这个博弈中,部分联盟是不稳定的。第三种变式产生的双人联盟与标准联盟形成博弈类似,但成员不同,而且由于匹配机制,减排量和报酬水平更高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Coalition Stability in International Environmental Matching Agreements

This study presents empirically calibrated simulations of three different variants of environmental matching agreements aimed at reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. We determine whether matching agreements can produce larger stable coalitions and increase abatement contributions and payoffs as compared to standard agreements. The matching agreements we analyze feature uniform matching rates by which coalition members match the unconditional contributions of (i) the other coalition members, (ii) all other players, or (iii) only non-members, while non-members do not commit to any matching and maximize their individual payoffs. The simulation considers twelve asymmetric world regions with linear abatement benefits and quadratic costs, calibrated based on the STACO 3 model, and uses emissions data from the shared socioeconomic pathways database. We find that the first variant of the matching game fails to produce any stable coalitions and thus performs worse than the standard agreement that produces a stable two-player coalition. The second variant produces a stable grand coalition and significantly increases the abatement and payoff levels beyond the non-cooperative Nash baseline. Partial coalitions are unstable in this game. The third variant produces a two-player coalition similar to the standard coalition formation game, but with different members and higher abatement and payoff levels due to the matching mechanism.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
6.70%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: The idea underlying the journal, Group Decision and Negotiation, emerges from evolving, unifying approaches to group decision and negotiation processes. These processes are complex and self-organizing involving multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, evolving, dynamic problems. Approaches include (1) computer group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS), (2) artificial intelligence and management science, (3) applied game theory, experiment and social choice, and (4) cognitive/behavioral sciences in group decision and negotiation. A number of research studies combine two or more of these fields. The journal provides a publication vehicle for theoretical and empirical research, and real-world applications and case studies. In defining the domain of group decision and negotiation, the term `group'' is interpreted to comprise all multiplayer contexts. Thus, organizational decision support systems providing organization-wide support are included. Group decision and negotiation refers to the whole process or flow of activities relevant to group decision and negotiation, not only to the final choice itself, e.g. scanning, communication and information sharing, problem definition (representation) and evolution, alternative generation and social-emotional interaction. Descriptive, normative and design viewpoints are of interest. Thus, Group Decision and Negotiation deals broadly with relation and coordination in group processes. Areas of application include intraorganizational coordination (as in operations management and integrated design, production, finance, marketing and distribution, e.g. as in new products and global coordination), computer supported collaborative work, labor-management negotiations, interorganizational negotiations, (business, government and nonprofits -- e.g. joint ventures), international (intercultural) negotiations, environmental negotiations, etc. The journal also covers developments of software f or group decision and negotiation.
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