社会比较效应下的群体风险选择和资源分配

IF 3.6 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Xia Chen, Yucheng Dong, Ying He
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在一个决策问题中,一个群体必须从有风险的彩票中选择一项行动,以获得需要在群体成员之间分配的报酬,群体的外部风险选择和内部资源分配成为两个关键且相互关联的子问题。在许多群体情境中,个体会不自觉地表现出社会比较行为,从而对其报酬偏好产生深刻影响。在本研究中,我们首先提出了一个新颖的群体资源分配模型,并探讨了社会比较如何影响群体资源分配的平等性。特别是,我们讨论了社会比较效应下的非独裁条件,它保证了群体资源分配的极端情况,即 "赢家通吃 "不会出现。随后,我们研究了社会比较效应下的群体风险选择。主要结果表明:(1) 当损失厌恶程度较高时,引入社会比较效应会提高分配平等性,但当损失厌恶程度较低时,分配平等性会降低;(2) 在社会比较效应下,经典的风险分担规则在群体中仍然成立,但引入社会比较效应会导致群体更加厌恶风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Group Risky Choice and Resource Allocation Under Social Comparison Effects

Group Risky Choice and Resource Allocation Under Social Comparison Effects

In a decision-making problem where a group must select an action from risky lotteries to receive a payoff that needs to be distributed among the group members, the group’s external risky choice and internal resource allocation emerge as two critical and interrelated subproblems. Individuals unconsciously exhibit social comparison behavior in many group contexts, profoundly impacting their payoff preferences. In this study, we first formulate a novel group resource allocation model and explore how the allocation equality of group resource is influenced by social comparisons. Particularly, we discuss the non-dictatorship condition under social comparison effects, which guarantees an extreme case of group resource allocation, i.e., “winner-take-all,” does not appear. Subsequently, we investigate the group risky choice under the effects of social comparison. The main results show that (1) introducing social comparison effects can increase allocation equality when loss aversion is high but decrease allocation equality when loss aversion is low, and (2) the classical risk sharing rule still holds in the group under social comparison effects, but introducing social comparison effects will lead to the group being more risk averse.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
6.70%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: The idea underlying the journal, Group Decision and Negotiation, emerges from evolving, unifying approaches to group decision and negotiation processes. These processes are complex and self-organizing involving multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, evolving, dynamic problems. Approaches include (1) computer group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS), (2) artificial intelligence and management science, (3) applied game theory, experiment and social choice, and (4) cognitive/behavioral sciences in group decision and negotiation. A number of research studies combine two or more of these fields. The journal provides a publication vehicle for theoretical and empirical research, and real-world applications and case studies. In defining the domain of group decision and negotiation, the term `group'' is interpreted to comprise all multiplayer contexts. Thus, organizational decision support systems providing organization-wide support are included. Group decision and negotiation refers to the whole process or flow of activities relevant to group decision and negotiation, not only to the final choice itself, e.g. scanning, communication and information sharing, problem definition (representation) and evolution, alternative generation and social-emotional interaction. Descriptive, normative and design viewpoints are of interest. Thus, Group Decision and Negotiation deals broadly with relation and coordination in group processes. Areas of application include intraorganizational coordination (as in operations management and integrated design, production, finance, marketing and distribution, e.g. as in new products and global coordination), computer supported collaborative work, labor-management negotiations, interorganizational negotiations, (business, government and nonprofits -- e.g. joint ventures), international (intercultural) negotiations, environmental negotiations, etc. The journal also covers developments of software f or group decision and negotiation.
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