{"title":"社会比较效应下的群体风险选择和资源分配","authors":"Xia Chen, Yucheng Dong, Ying He","doi":"10.1007/s10726-024-09875-z","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a decision-making problem where a group must select an action from risky lotteries to receive a payoff that needs to be distributed among the group members, the group’s external risky choice and internal resource allocation emerge as two critical and interrelated subproblems. Individuals unconsciously exhibit social comparison behavior in many group contexts, profoundly impacting their payoff preferences. In this study, we first formulate a novel group resource allocation model and explore how the allocation equality of group resource is influenced by social comparisons. Particularly, we discuss the non-dictatorship condition under social comparison effects, which guarantees an extreme case of group resource allocation, i.e., “winner-take-all,” does not appear. Subsequently, we investigate the group risky choice under the effects of social comparison. The main results show that (1) introducing social comparison effects can increase allocation equality when loss aversion is high but decrease allocation equality when loss aversion is low, and (2) the classical risk sharing rule still holds in the group under social comparison effects, but introducing social comparison effects will lead to the group being more risk averse.</p>","PeriodicalId":47553,"journal":{"name":"Group Decision and Negotiation","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Group Risky Choice and Resource Allocation Under Social Comparison Effects\",\"authors\":\"Xia Chen, Yucheng Dong, Ying He\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10726-024-09875-z\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In a decision-making problem where a group must select an action from risky lotteries to receive a payoff that needs to be distributed among the group members, the group’s external risky choice and internal resource allocation emerge as two critical and interrelated subproblems. Individuals unconsciously exhibit social comparison behavior in many group contexts, profoundly impacting their payoff preferences. In this study, we first formulate a novel group resource allocation model and explore how the allocation equality of group resource is influenced by social comparisons. Particularly, we discuss the non-dictatorship condition under social comparison effects, which guarantees an extreme case of group resource allocation, i.e., “winner-take-all,” does not appear. Subsequently, we investigate the group risky choice under the effects of social comparison. The main results show that (1) introducing social comparison effects can increase allocation equality when loss aversion is high but decrease allocation equality when loss aversion is low, and (2) the classical risk sharing rule still holds in the group under social comparison effects, but introducing social comparison effects will lead to the group being more risk averse.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47553,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Group Decision and Negotiation\",\"volume\":\"15 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Group Decision and Negotiation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09875-z\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Group Decision and Negotiation","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-024-09875-z","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
Group Risky Choice and Resource Allocation Under Social Comparison Effects
In a decision-making problem where a group must select an action from risky lotteries to receive a payoff that needs to be distributed among the group members, the group’s external risky choice and internal resource allocation emerge as two critical and interrelated subproblems. Individuals unconsciously exhibit social comparison behavior in many group contexts, profoundly impacting their payoff preferences. In this study, we first formulate a novel group resource allocation model and explore how the allocation equality of group resource is influenced by social comparisons. Particularly, we discuss the non-dictatorship condition under social comparison effects, which guarantees an extreme case of group resource allocation, i.e., “winner-take-all,” does not appear. Subsequently, we investigate the group risky choice under the effects of social comparison. The main results show that (1) introducing social comparison effects can increase allocation equality when loss aversion is high but decrease allocation equality when loss aversion is low, and (2) the classical risk sharing rule still holds in the group under social comparison effects, but introducing social comparison effects will lead to the group being more risk averse.
期刊介绍:
The idea underlying the journal, Group Decision and Negotiation, emerges from evolving, unifying approaches to group decision and negotiation processes. These processes are complex and self-organizing involving multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, evolving, dynamic problems. Approaches include (1) computer group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS), (2) artificial intelligence and management science, (3) applied game theory, experiment and social choice, and (4) cognitive/behavioral sciences in group decision and negotiation. A number of research studies combine two or more of these fields. The journal provides a publication vehicle for theoretical and empirical research, and real-world applications and case studies. In defining the domain of group decision and negotiation, the term `group'' is interpreted to comprise all multiplayer contexts. Thus, organizational decision support systems providing organization-wide support are included. Group decision and negotiation refers to the whole process or flow of activities relevant to group decision and negotiation, not only to the final choice itself, e.g. scanning, communication and information sharing, problem definition (representation) and evolution, alternative generation and social-emotional interaction. Descriptive, normative and design viewpoints are of interest. Thus, Group Decision and Negotiation deals broadly with relation and coordination in group processes. Areas of application include intraorganizational coordination (as in operations management and integrated design, production, finance, marketing and distribution, e.g. as in new products and global coordination), computer supported collaborative work, labor-management negotiations, interorganizational negotiations, (business, government and nonprofits -- e.g. joint ventures), international (intercultural) negotiations, environmental negotiations, etc. The journal also covers developments of software f or group decision and negotiation.