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Mutual Outsourcing in a Vertically Related Market With Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility 纵向关联市场中的相互外包与战略性环境企业社会责任
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-05-20 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70048
Lili Xu, Xinying Fan, Sang-Ho Lee
{"title":"Mutual Outsourcing in a Vertically Related Market With Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility","authors":"Lili Xu,&nbsp;Xinying Fan,&nbsp;Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/manc.70048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70048","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study considers mutual outsourcing firms in a vertically related market and examines their strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) activities. We demonstrate that ECSR adoption reduces mutual outsourcing firms' profits, resulting in a prisoner's dilemma situation, but enhances welfare regardless of competition modes. We also find that Cournot competition generates higher levels of ECSR and welfare than Bertrand competition, whereas Cournot competition (under low substitutability) or asymmetric competition (under high substitutability) emerges as an equilibrium in the endogenous choice of competition modes. Finally, we provide policy discussions on input pricing strategies, showing that a discriminatory wholesale price reduces welfare when products are less substitutable, whereas its effects on ECSR and profits depend on the competition mode; in contrast, a mutual outsourcing price regulation consistently decreases mutual outsourcing firms' ECSR and profits but may improve welfare when products are highly substitutable under Bertrand competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"571-588"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70048","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Capital Composition and the Declining Labor Share 资本构成与劳动份额下降
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-05-15 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70040
Maya Eden, Paul Gaggl
{"title":"Capital Composition and the Declining Labor Share","authors":"Maya Eden,&nbsp;Paul Gaggl","doi":"10.1111/manc.70040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70040","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There are two problems with the view that cheaper capital caused a decline in the labor share: first, aggregate capital and labor are gross complements; second, the price of capital is roughly constant, worldwide. Taking seriously the composition of capital resolves both challenges. Though information and communications (ICT) capital is a small fraction of capital, it is highly substitutable with labor, and its user cost declined sharply. Distinguishing ICT and non-ICT capital is empirically plausible and suggests that automation accounts for more than 1/4 of the global decline in the labor share, even if aggregate capital and labor are complements.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"547-564"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70040","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Workforce Gender Diversity Affect Firm Productivity in India? 劳动力性别多样性是否影响印度企业生产率？
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-25 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70045
Sanjay Kumar Mangla, Chih-Hai Yang
{"title":"Does Workforce Gender Diversity Affect Firm Productivity in India?","authors":"Sanjay Kumar Mangla,&nbsp;Chih-Hai Yang","doi":"10.1111/manc.70045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70045","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The relationship between workforce gender diversity and firm productivity is a long-standing issue in economic literature. The institutional and social factors make India as a unique case for examining this issue. But despite having an abundant labor force, evidence from India is rare. Drawing upon a firm level panel data, spanning from 2017 to 2022, this study provides new evidence on relationship between workforce gender diversity and firm productivity in India where the former has a significant positive association with the latter. In particular, this relationship demonstrates a non-linear pattern and is more prevalent in the service sector. Several robustness checks validate these findings. Our further analysis addresses the issue of non-disclosure of female workers' information; and its estimation results support our main findings.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"508-523"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Drastic Innovation Licensing and Partial Backward Ownership 激烈的创新许可和部分落后所有权
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-05-14 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70047
Chenxuan Shang, Wenyao Lin, Dongdong Li
{"title":"Drastic Innovation Licensing and Partial Backward Ownership","authors":"Chenxuan Shang,&nbsp;Wenyao Lin,&nbsp;Dongdong Li","doi":"10.1111/manc.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70047","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Drastic innovation, which eliminates rivals via cost advantages, is typically considered unprofitable to license. This paper revisit drastic innovation licensing in a vertical market with backward ownership. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that sufficient partial backward ownership makes licensing of drastic innovation profitable: fixed-fee licensing is preferred when the licensor holds upstream equity, while royalty licensing is optimal when the licensee does.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"565-570"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision 公共物品供给的内生制度形成
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-23 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70042
Daehong Min, Doojin Ryu
{"title":"Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision","authors":"Daehong Min,&nbsp;Doojin Ryu","doi":"10.1111/manc.70042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70042","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We revisit an existing framework of endogenous institution formation for public good provision, incorporating heterogeneous players to address the question, “Who joins an institution that sanctions only its members to provide a public good?” We analyze two models with different sources of heterogeneity. Considering players with heterogeneous wealth levels and valuations of the public good, our first model suggests multiple equilibria at which institution formation is successful. Formation requires each member's valuation to exceed a threshold linked to her contribution ratio. Correlations between valuations and wealth levels influence the equilibrium set's size. Our second model examines sequential decision-making, uncovering a first-mover advantage in which non-members free-ride on the institution as a second-order public good.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"497-507"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70042","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biased News Media and the Swing Voter's Decision in Repeated Games 有偏见的新闻媒体与反复博弈中的摇摆选民的决定
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-15 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70041
Jooyong Jun, Jeong-Yoo Kim
{"title":"Biased News Media and the Swing Voter's Decision in Repeated Games","authors":"Jooyong Jun,&nbsp;Jeong-Yoo Kim","doi":"10.1111/manc.70041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70041","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a monopolistic, biased news media platform that attempts to influence the decision of swing voters with cheap talk when voting is costly and abstaining is an option. First, we demonstrate that, while no fully communicative equilibrium exists in a stage game, a partially truth-revealing mixed-strategy equilibrium exists. We also characterize the equilibria in infinitely repeated games in which the news media's information distortion is monitored ex post after voting, resulting in the swing voter's transitioning to the punishment phase with positive probability. Notably, under perfect monitoring, repeated interactions do not reduce the news media's steering probability, whereas they do reduce the likelihood of the swing voter's abstention. Under imperfect monitoring, a voter's cheap talk as well as the media's cheap talk can help construct a partially communicative equilibrium. In both perfect and imperfect monitoring cases, a mixed-strategy equilibrium can enhance efficiency even though media bias persists, akin to what is observed in a stage game, providing a probable explanation for the persistence of biased news media.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"469-482"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biased News Media and the Swing Voter's Decision in Repeated Games 有偏见的新闻媒体与反复博弈中的摇摆选民的决定
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-15 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70041
Jooyong Jun, Jeong-Yoo Kim
{"title":"Biased News Media and the Swing Voter's Decision in Repeated Games","authors":"Jooyong Jun,&nbsp;Jeong-Yoo Kim","doi":"10.1111/manc.70041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70041","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a monopolistic, biased news media platform that attempts to influence the decision of swing voters with cheap talk when voting is costly and abstaining is an option. First, we demonstrate that, while no fully communicative equilibrium exists in a stage game, a partially truth-revealing mixed-strategy equilibrium exists. We also characterize the equilibria in infinitely repeated games in which the news media's information distortion is monitored ex post after voting, resulting in the swing voter's transitioning to the punishment phase with positive probability. Notably, under perfect monitoring, repeated interactions do not reduce the news media's steering probability, whereas they do reduce the likelihood of the swing voter's abstention. Under imperfect monitoring, a voter's cheap talk as well as the media's cheap talk can help construct a partially communicative equilibrium. In both perfect and imperfect monitoring cases, a mixed-strategy equilibrium can enhance efficiency even though media bias persists, akin to what is observed in a stage game, providing a probable explanation for the persistence of biased news media.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"469-482"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.70041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Drastic Innovation Licensing and Partial Backward Ownership 激烈的创新许可和部分落后所有权
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-05-14 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70047
Chenxuan Shang, Wenyao Lin, Dongdong Li
{"title":"Drastic Innovation Licensing and Partial Backward Ownership","authors":"Chenxuan Shang,&nbsp;Wenyao Lin,&nbsp;Dongdong Li","doi":"10.1111/manc.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70047","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Drastic innovation, which eliminates rivals via cost advantages, is typically considered unprofitable to license. This paper revisit drastic innovation licensing in a vertical market with backward ownership. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that sufficient partial backward ownership makes licensing of drastic innovation profitable: fixed-fee licensing is preferred when the licensor holds upstream equity, while royalty licensing is optimal when the licensee does.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"565-570"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental Externalities and Optimal Commodity Taxation Under ECSR: Revisiting the Origin-Destination Principle Trade-Off 经济社会责任下的环境外部性与最优商品税收：重新审视原产地-目的地原则权衡
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-05-12 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70046
Tsaur-Chin Wu, Hsiu-Wei Chang, Chia-Jen Chang
{"title":"Environmental Externalities and Optimal Commodity Taxation Under ECSR: Revisiting the Origin-Destination Principle Trade-Off","authors":"Tsaur-Chin Wu,&nbsp;Hsiu-Wei Chang,&nbsp;Chia-Jen Chang","doi":"10.1111/manc.70046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70046","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper explores the choice of origin versus destination tax principles in an open economy with strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR). Conceptualizing ECSR as collective reputation, we analyze how pollution scope and consumer awareness shape the optimal regime. Under localized pollution, the origin principle generally dominates due to rent-shifting efficiency, although a non-monotonic sandwich result emerges at intermediate trade costs. Under global pollution, we challenge the conventional view that the destination principle is universally superior for preventing a race to the bottom. We identify a novel reputation rescue mechanism: in the high-ECSR regime, the origin principle reclaims superiority because its production subsidies are essential to sustain collective reputation and preserve market viability. These findings offer a rationale for the policy divergence between the EU's CBAM and the US IRA.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"524-546"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous Choice of Reciprocal Trade Policies With Network Externalities 具有网络外部性的互惠贸易政策的内生选择
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Manchester School Pub Date : 2026-08-03 Epub Date: 2026-04-19 DOI: 10.1111/manc.70044
Seonyoung Lim
{"title":"Endogenous Choice of Reciprocal Trade Policies With Network Externalities","authors":"Seonyoung Lim","doi":"10.1111/manc.70044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.70044","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines how network externalities shape the strategic interaction of trade policies between home and foreign countries. Incorporating reciprocal trade policy into an import-competing model under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we show that the endogenous choice of trade policies depends critically on the strength of network effects. Under Cournot competition, weak network externalities yield an Intervention–Non-intervention outcome, where the home country imposes tariffs while the foreign country opts for free trade. However, when network externalities are sufficiently strong, two equilibria arise: Intervention–Non-intervention or Non-intervention–Intervention, implying that the home country may prefer free trade. Under Bertrand competition, strong network externalities lead the foreign country to subsidize exports rather than impose an export tax. Moreover, depending on the degree of network effects, three distinct equilibria emerge. These findings suggest that when network externalities are strong, the trade policy preferences of the two trading countries converge, making an equilibrium in which the home country adopts free trade and the foreign country pursues export subsidies Pareto optimal.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"94 5","pages":"483-496"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148662735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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